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ABSTRACT
FIGHTING FOR THE NATION: MILITARY SERVICE, POPULAR POLITICAL
MOBILIZATION AND THE CREATION OF MODERN PUERTO RICAN
NATIONAL IDENTITIES: 1868-1952
MAY 2010
HARRY FRANQUI
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO, MAYAGÜEZ
M.A., TEMPLE UNIVERSITY, PHILADELPHIA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jane Rausch
This project explores the military and political mobilization of rural and urban
working sectors of Puerto Rican society as the Island transitioned from Spanish to U.S.
imperial rule. In particular, my research is interested in examining how this shift occurs
via patterns of inclusion-exclusion within the military and the various forms of
citizenship that are subsequently transformed into socio-economic and political
enfranchisement. Analyzing the armed forces as a culture-homogenizing agent helps to
explain the formation and evolution of Puerto Rican national identities from 1868 to
1952, and how these evolving identities affected the political choices of the Island. This
phenomenon, I argue, led to the creation of the Estado Libre Asociado in 1952. The role
played by the tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans in the metropolitan military in the final
creation of a populist project taking place under colonial rule in the Island was threefold.
Firstly, these soldiers served as political leverage during WWII to speed up the
decolonization process. Secondly, they incarnated the commonwealth ideology by
fighting and dying in the Korean War. Finally, the Puerto Rican soldiers filled the ranks
of the army of technicians and technocrats attempting to fulfill the promises of a modern
industrial Puerto Rico after the returned from the wars.
In contrast to Puerto Rican popular national mythology and mainstream academic
discourse that has marginalized the agency of subaltern groups; I argue that the Puerto
Rican soldier was neither cannon fodder for the metropolis nor the pawn of the Creole
political elites. Regaining their masculinity, upward mobility, and political
enfranchisement were among some of the incentives enticing the Puerto Rican peasant
into military service. The enfranchisement of subaltern sectors via military service
ultimately created a very liberal, popular, and broad definition of Puerto Rico’s national
identity. When the Puerto Rican peasant/soldier became the embodiment of the
Commonwealth formula, the political leaders involved in its design were in fact
responding to these soldiers’ complex identities, which among other things compelled
them to defend the “American Nation” to show their Puertorriqueñidad.
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INTRODUCTION
Every day tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans drive by the Monumento al Jíbaro
in Cayey Puerto Rico. Unbeknownst to them, this monument, hidden in plain view,
guards a key for understanding Puerto Rico’s past. The monument overlooks the modern
highway P.R.52, which cuts through the Cordillera Central and its extension, the Sierra
de Cayey, linking the San Juan metropolitan area with south-western Puerto Rico. Very
tellingly, the monument depicting a humble but proud peasant family, with a mountain
range as its background and faced by the highway system and the Caribbean Sea rests in
a foundation of Korean dirt drenched in Puerto Rican blood. More than a bridge between
the “Island” and the capital, this highway and the monument guarding it serve as a
historical bridge. Far from being a sad reminder of the disappearance of the Jíbaro
before the juggernaut of industrialization, this monument actually recognizes the
indebtedness of modern Puerto Rico to the Island’s common folk.
The political entity we know as the Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico or the
Commonwealth came into existence during the Korean War. Tens of thousands of Puerto
Ricans, who came mostly from the mountains and sugar cane plantations, participated in
this conflict. The war they fought in Korea was a battle for the decolonization of the
Island as the soldiers became a living symbol of the philosophy behind commonwealth
status. In this sense, the foundation of the statue is also the foundation of the modern
Puerto Rican state and of modern Puerto Rican national identities. There is no intention
of my part, however, to rewrite a nationalist history, but rather to tell a history left out by
nationalists and even by anti-colonial narratives. In essence, I try to tell the story of the
Puerto Rican soldier’s contribution to the political and socio-cultural histories of the
Island.
1

In this study I intend to analyze the military as an institution in an attempt to
comprehend its impact on the converging socio-cultural and political histories of Puerto
Rico. In particular, this project explores the military mobilization of popular sectors of
Puerto Rican society, especially the rural sectors, under two different metropoles, Spain
and the United States. Such experience, I argue, affected the political and socioeconomic histories of the Island and its cultural development. Thus, the subject of this
study is the military mobilization and demobilization of rural and urban working-class
sectors of Puerto Rican society from the mid-eighteenth hundred to the mid-nineteenth
hundred. The analysis of patterns of inclusion-exclusion within the military as these
forms of citizenship subsequently transformed into socio-economic and political
enfranchisement is of particular interest.
After the failed insurrection against Spanish rule, el Grito de Lares de 1868, the
barring of natives of Puerto Rico from the Spanish colonial armed forces, a very
restrictive polity, and dearth of a common education were some of the patterns of
repression and exclusion that led to the slow development of a distinct national identity in
the Island. However, this was embryonic as Puerto Ricans still retained many cultural
affinities with Spain such as language and religion. The disjuncture created by the
Cuban-Pilipino-Spanish-American War of 1898 left a mark in the developing of Puerto
Rican national identities. Moreover, the inclusion of Puerto Ricans into the U.S. Armed
Forces and mass political mobilization profoundly altered the national character of the
Island. The former provided a unifying and pro-state experience as well as the chance for
social mobility while the latter accounted for a wider polity and a flexible national
discourse. Under United States’ rule the military, and to a lesser degree political
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participation, were open to the masses. The U.S. also embarked in a comprehensive build
up of the public education system which was intended to Americanize the inhabitants of
Puerto Rico. Hence, although cultural affinity was absent between Puerto Ricans and
Americans in 1898, the fact that military institutions, the political arena, and the public
school system were opened to the masses deeply influenced the islander’s national
character.1
Attempting to tighten its control over the Island, Spain decided to exclude Puerto
Ricans from military service after a failed insurrection attempt in 1868. Under American
rule thirty years later, the military became a tool for the “Americanization” of the Island
as part of a broader nation-building project in the circum-Caribbean. In essence we are
comparing a project of anti-nation building by virtue of exclusion, the Spanish
authorities’ response to growing discontent against their rule in the Island, with a U.S.
project of nation building via limited inclusion (both politically and militarily) and
cultural assimilation. In this regard, analyzing the armed forces as a culturehomogenizing agent and as a vessel for socio-economic and political empowerment helps
1

Attention will be given to the role played by the public education system in the
Americanization of the Island. However, this last factor has been well covered by several
authors, and since it is a supporting argument, it will be treated by examining secondary
sources. See, Aida Negrón de Montilla, La americanización de Puerto Rico y el sistema
de instrucción pública, 1900-1930, 2da Ed. (Río Piedras, P.R.: Editorial de la
Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1990). Negrón de Montilla documents the attempts of the
metropolis to reproduce in Puerto Rico an education system similar to that of New
England in which English was the mandatory, and only, language; and the teaching of
U.S. history and American mainstream cultural values came to be the cornerstone of the
system. More importantly perhaps is her detailed study of the department’s
memorandums and guidelines which openly called for policing those native teachers that
strayed from the approved curriculum and included Puerto Rican culture in their lessons,
as well as those who criticized the colonial regime. And, Roamé Torres González,
Idioma, bilingüismo y nacionalidad: La presencia del inglés en Puerto Rico, (Río
Piedras, P.R.: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 2002).
3

to explain the formation and evolution of Puerto Ricans’ national identities from 1868 to
1952. Hence, studying the mass participation of popular sectors in military institutions
should provide us with a new understanding of the development of Puerto Rico’s national
identities and how these evolving identities affected the political choices of the Island.
In fact, I argue that the “modern Puerto Rican nationality” is a hybrid born out of
the perceived cultural affinity and political and military exclusion offered by the Spanish
authorities coupled with the perceived lack of cultural affinity and partial political and
socio-economic inclusion offered by the United States. Participation in U.S. institutions
provided unifying experiences for the Puerto Rican masses which allowed for the
strengthening of their national identities but with an American touch. Access to
education and military positions also offered an opportunity for mobility and the chance
to overthrow old socio-economic hierarchies, a phenomenon that led to the creation of
new elites that owed their well being and thus their allegiance to the new metropolis.
Hence, one of the purposes of this study is to put into historical context the role played by
popular sectors in creating a national identity of their own and in developing a political
space that fit their identities. Studying the patterns of inclusion-exclusion within the
military and the degree of political participation of the masses, under both Spanish and
American metropoles, helps to explain how Puerto Ricans’ national identities developed
during the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. This phenomenon, I
argue, eventually facilitated the creation of the Estado Libre Asociado in 1952.
Historian Florencia Mallon has argued that the degree of military, paramilitary,
and political mobilization of peasants and indigenous groups contributes to the depth of
the liberal spirit of a country’s polity. She believes that political groups considered as
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class not only sense a stake in nation-state formation but also seek to participate on its
design. Participation, she argues, is contested at the local level and filtered through
regional politics until it moves towards the national level where negotiation continues and
a contract is reached among contesting forces. Mallon calls this stage hegemony, a
process that will continue endlessly as counter-hegemonic forces keep challenging the
hegemonic entity or polity.2
The contestation of hegemony is not a new phenomenon. Mallon argues that
indigenous, peasants and other subaltern groups have always harbored ideas of social
justice and legal equality. It is not, however, until periods of crisis that these groups get
the opportunity to strengthen their political stand and gain more inclusion and
participation in developing or re-defining the nation and its institutions, either by being
included in political coalitions or by being mobilized for war. Mallon thus emphasizes
the construction of alternative national projects, (popular, inclusive and liberal), through
the political and military mobilization of peasants and other subaltern groups during
periods of crisis. When subaltern groups are successfully integrated within the new
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Florencia, Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The Making of Post Colonial Mexico
and Peru, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1995), 4,6, 9-10. Traditionally,
Mallon argues, national democratic discourses have included promises of universal
potential for autonomy, dignity and equality for all peoples. In practice, however, entire
groups of people have been barred from access to citizenship and liberty according to
Eurocentric class, racial, and gender exclusionary criteria. Mallon associates this type of
nationalism with the historical mission that the upper classes in a given country have
reserved for themselves, the creation of the nation and control of national identity.
Subaltern groups, she contends, have nonetheless initiated projects for “collective identity
based on a premise of citizenship available to all, and with individual membership
beginning with the presumption of equality.”2 In other words, subaltern groups have
taken the challenge of national democratic discourses and attempted to create their own
version of a more egalitarian practice trying to make real the unfulfilled promises of
nation and democracy.2
5

hegemonic coalition, the popular sectors are incorporated into the country’s polity and
economy, and the state becomes a real negotiator between labor and capital while
embarking on land reform. The combination of these factors attests to the liberal spirit of
a hegemonic political alliance based in a national populist discourse. Applying these
criteria to the case of Puerto Rico should help us determine whether the popular sectors
were really integrated into the Island’s polity and economy and hence, as part of a truly
national popular project.
Mallon’s approach is useful for understanding how subaltern groups affect the
development of national and democratic discourses and the creation of state’s polities.
However, her model has been applied only to sovereign countries. Can we find similar
patterns in non-sovereign countries, colonies, territories, protectorates, provinces, or
semi-autonomous states? More specifically, can elements of these models be applied to
the case of Puerto Rico, a late-colonial state? If we treat the metropolis simply as
contenders in the political arena, we may find Mallon’s approach useful. Benedict
Anderson has argued that the origin of nationalism is the belief that a nation in fact exists.
In turn the nation is an imagined political community, “and imagined both inherently
limited and sovereign.”3 If we followed standard definitions of “political sovereignty,”
we will be hard pressed to accept Puerto Rico as a nation and also the existence of Puerto
Rican nationalities. As a matter of fact there is no “national period” in Puerto Rican
history since most historians subscribe to political independence as a determinant factor
to switch from the “colonial” to the “national” period. Nancy Morris, however, has
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Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism, Rev. ed., (London and New York: Verso, 2002), 6-7.
6

argued that a group’s self recognition as a nation is usually based on “some combination
of objective characteristics of history, language, culture, and territory” which may lead to
a desire for self-determination but which not necessarily is “equal to a desire for political
independence.”4 Based on this premise, this study will try to show how national
sovereignty has several different meanings in the case of Puerto Rico, and how the
Island’s double colonial experience led to the creation of very flexible national identities
and political communities in which a case for autonomismo (political freedom without
outright separation from the metropolis), annexation, or independence could be made
using the same symbols usually identified with the Puerto Rican nation and
independence. More importantly, it is the empowerment of the popular sectors that
accounts for this broad and inclusive definition of national identity.
Studying military mobilization as political enfranchisement requires us to answer
the question, who controls military and political institutions and mobilization? In the
case of Puerto Rico, Spain sought and mostly succeeded in completely controlling the
military in the Island and in exercising tight control over the colonial political apparatus.
The story under United Sates rule quite different. The U.S. exercised direct control of the
armed forces in the Island, but it always needed the unwavering support of local
politicians to foment enrollment among the popular sectors. Thus, from very early on
Puerto Rican politicians and local leaders wielded a degree of indirect control over the
military, even if they responded directly to Washington. The same can be said of the
political institutions. While the U.S. retained most of the political power during the first
half century of the twentieth century, it also had to rely on local politicians in order to
4

Nancy Morris, Puerto Rico: Culture, Politics, and Identity, (Westport, Ct:
Praeger Publishing, 1995), 12-17.
7

present a more palatable colonial rule to the inhabitants of the Island. This situation
allowed for the gradual creolization and eventual popularization of metropolitan
institutions and projects.
In the early 1940s, it would be Luis Muñoz Marín, the first elected governor of
the Island and main architect of the final commonwealth formula, who would galvanize
the new electoral power of the masses into a popular project of social justice but with the
personal goal of obtaining the independence of the Island. Moreover, he would use the
participation of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. military as bargaining tool to advance the decolonization project, and finally to sell the concept of the commonwealth formula to the
electoral masses. But this is not a story of the manipulation of the masses to obtain a
political goal: it is actually the opposite. Muñoz Marín sought to use the electoral power
of the masses, and that of the military, to gain his objective, but he ultimately had to yield
to the masses’ will and renounce independence. Thus we have a rural and lower class
mass mobilized by a political party, the Popular Democratic Party, and a military, which
due to its colonial nature was under metropolitan control but also responded to local
leaders and local realities. The result of this combination was a very flexible and open
definition of national identities in the Island and a very pluralistic and social-oriented
state.
The role played by the tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans in the metropolitan
military in the final creation of a populist project taking place under colonial rule in the
Island was threefold. I argue first that these soldiers served as political leverage during
WWII to speed up the decolonization process; that they incarnated the commonwealth
ideology by fighting and dying in the Korean War; and finally, that the Puerto Rican
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soldiers would thereafter join the army of technicians and technocrats attempting to fulfill
the promises of a modern industrial Puerto Rico. In contrast to Puerto Rican popular
mythology and mainstream academic discourse that has marginalized the agency of
subaltern groups; I argue that the Puerto Rican soldier was neither cannon fodder for the
metropolis nor the pawn of the criollo political elites. Regaining their masculinity,
upward mobility, and political enfranchisement were among some of the incentives
enticing the Puerto Ricans into military service. The empowerment of popular sectors by
enfranchisement and participation in the political and military institutions of the
metropolis ultimately created a very liberal, popular, and broad definition of Puerto
Rico’s national identity. It is important to stress the point that if these soldiers were used
to complete a national populist project centered on industrial modernization and a new
modern national identity, they were not mere puppets. When the Puerto Rican Jíbaro
soldier became the embodiment of the Commonwealth formula, the political leaders
involved in its design were responding to the open and flexible identities evident among
popular sectors of Puerto Rican society, which among other things compelled them to
defend the “American Nation” to show their Puertorriqueñidad.
Thus, I seek to put into historical context the role played by popular sectors in
creating a national identity of their own, how such identity became hegemonic(however
briefly), and why it was necessary to develop a political status to accommodate the new
Puerto Rican identities. In other words, this project attempts to illustrate the influence of
the masses in altering the conceptualization of Puertoricaness in a never ending contest
for control of Puerto Rico’s national identities and how this phenomenon has translated
into the political arena culminating with the creation of the Estado Libre Asociado in
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1952. This project will explore the overlapping areas of cultural and political identities,
or when popular national identities meet political national identities. To reiterate, the
subject of this study is the political and military mass mobilization and inclusionexclusion patterns of popular sectors in Puerto Rico under both metropoles and how such
processes altered the character of Puerto Rican national identities and thus the Island’s
political history. This work should contribute to our understanding of the history of the
United States and Puerto Rico, as well as of the development of national identities and
popular projects among colonial subjects.
The structures and processes I have chosen to study have dictated that I take a
longue durée approach- at least to define the timeframe of this study, but without
disregarding archive-specific research. To do so, I have not followed a perfectly linear
narrative but an exponential one. Generally speaking, times of crisis, such as wars,
famines, and economic depressions, have served as accelerators of historical processes.
Periods of crisis tend to lead to the fall or rise of empires and political systems, to the
cyclical realignment of the world or, in a more local way, to the inclusion or exclusion of
disenfranchised groups within a state’s or empire’s polity. Therefore, this project focus is
on critical historical junctures. It will examine periods of political, military and
economic upheaval under Spain and the U.S. and the policies followed by both
metropolitan powers and local leaders, in an attempt to map the intersection of local,
national, and international histories and their effect on the structures under study. The
Lares Revolt of 1868, the Cuban-Pilipino-Spanish-American War of 1898, the First
World War and the Great Depression, the Second World War and the Korean War will
serve as the historical junctures that allows us to see with more clarity the contestation of
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hegemony in the Island. Furthermore, this study tries to combine history from above and
history from below. Interviews, personal letters, memoirs, and journals would be used as
much as newspapers, government (U.S. and Puerto Rico) and military records, census
data, and congressional hearings on the political status of the Island (from 1910s-1950s).
Chapter 1, Birth of a Nation: From 1868 to 1898, a labor of Thirty Years, begins
by analyzing the scholarly and popular debate about the significance of the Lares’ revolt
of 1868 and the policies followed by Spain before and after the event. Special attention
will be given to the socio-economic and political situation of the Island leading up to and
after this event. Was this revolt a national movement, a popular uprising, or an attempt to
revolution? In this chapter I argue that the revolt may have not been a national
revolution, but that the policies followed by the Spanish colonial authorities after the
event fueled the emergence of a unique national Puerto Rican identity. Furthermore, the
chapter traces the importance of military institutions under Spanish sovereignty and how
the metropolis, seeking to limit Puerto Rican participation in the military to forestall
insurrection and the development of a distinct Puerto Rican national identity,
accomplished the opposite.
Chapter 2, Puerto Rican a là Americana: An Alternative Nation? 1898-1914,
deals with the transfer of sovereignty over Puerto Rico from Spain to the United States in
1898 by examining the factors that facilitated or hindered the transition. In this chapter I
argue that passing from one metropolis to another was a relatively easy task due to
several factors: the war in Puerto Rico was relatively bloodless; Spain officially
relinquished control over the Island; the U.S. slowly increased access to political power,
and Puerto Rican elites and the popular sector participated actively on the institutions of
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the new metropolis. Without a real opposition, the new metropolis attempted to
“modernize” the Island and its inhabitants through a nation-building project supposedly
guided by “benevolent assimilation” and “compassionate uplifting”, in short, a
comprehensive plan to “Americanize” the Island and its inhabitants. This nation-building
project, which for the first two decades of U.S. control over the Island was firmly in the
hands of the metropolis, relied heavily, both directly and indirectly, on the military.
Chapter 3, “A New Day Has Dawned for the Puerto Rican Jíbaro”: World War I
and Mobilization of the Puerto Rican Peasant, begins by addressing the debate for
vesting Puerto Ricans with American citizenship in 1917, just as the United States
prepared to enter the First World War. I will argue that the unwillingness of the vast
majority to resist becoming American citizens reflects the impact that the institutions of
the new metropolis already had on Puerto Ricans and ultimately doomed the
independence movement’s hopes, at least by political means. Moreover, the first mass
participation of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. military and the newly created Puerto Rico
National Guard, and the support of the newly elected Puerto Rican legislature for the war
effort momentarily cemented U.S. control over the Island, and more importantly, over the
islander’s loyalty. However, overreliance on the criollo elites to mobilize and control the
peasantry and urban working classes had started to undermine the metropolis’ control
over the military apparatus, the political structures in the Island, and over the nationbuilding project via military service.
Chapter 4, Economic Wretchedness and the Nationalist Challenge: Prelude to the
Battle over Modern Puerto Rico, addresses the socio-economic and political situation of
the Island during the Great Depression and in the eve of the Second World War. During
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this period, mostly due to economic hardship, but also because of the emergence of the
Nationalist Party led by Pedro Albizu Campos and the violent response of the U.S.
colonial authorities to the nationalist challenge, the Island experienced real political
instability. This chapter analyzes how the economic distress afflicting the Island fueled
political discontent and how such discontent was in turn used by two emerging political
leaders, Pedro Albizu Campos and Luis Muñoz Marín, to further different decolonization
processes. I argue that what transpired during these years of political violence, especially
the shooting war between Nacionalistas and the Insular Police, was also a battle for
control of Puerto Rican identities.
Chapter 5, Education, Industrialization and Decolonization: The Battlefields of
the Puerto Rican Soldier During the Second World War, explores how once more, war
brought the promise of political and economic advancement by rekindling Puerto Rico’s
strategic position. Again, the Puerto Ricans were called to arms and responded with
overwhelming enthusiasm. Different projects of decolonization and modernization,
which included the revitalization of the economy and of the Puerto Rican’s self esteem,
rested on the roles these soldiers were about to play. This chapter analyzes the military
mobilization of tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans during World War II and how such
mobilization responded to military and diplomatic necessities and local political realities.
Emphasis is put on what Continental and Puerto Rican politicians and opinion makers
expected to gain from military collaboration and participation.
In this chapter I argue that the metropolis sought to secure the loyalty of natives
of the Island by allowing their mass entry into the U.S. military and by conferring upon
them the same benefits as Continental veterans. Furthermore, a return to the idea of
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Americanization through military service (and public education) made a comeback as
WWII engulfed Europe. The metropolis was also more inclined to granting a higher
degree of self-government to Puerto Rico since it would enhance its standing in the
international arena and could very well quench political unrest in the Island. The
metropolis’ plans, however, had to compete with those of local politicians. Aware of
Puerto Rico’s military and diplomatic relevance, Luis Muñoz Marín, leading the Popular
Democratic Party, followed a strategy that supported the war effort and placed the socioeconomic restructuration of the Island above everything else while using the participation
of Puerto Rican soldiers in the war, and the Island’s strategic position as leverage to
extract political concessions. Furthermore, Muñoz Marín and the Populares tried to
secure veteran’s benefits so that these men and women could attempt to change the dire
socio-economic condition of the Island. Unlike WWI veterans, before WWII ended, the
Puerto Rican soldier, just like his Continental counterpart, could count on generous
package of benefits designed to ease the soldier’s re-entry into civil life. A march
towards a “modern” Puerto Rico had started, and these Jíbaro soldiers would be spearing
such movement. That Luis Munoz Marín came to depend on the votes of the peasantry
and rural working classes to attain political power and on their military mobilization to
advance the socio-economic restructuration of the Island would force him to change his
personal political views, first tactically and later definitively.
Chapter 6, Fighting for the “Nation”? War at Home and Abroad and the Creation
of the Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, analyzes the state of political forces in the
Island and in the U.S mainland at the end of the Second World War. I will address
political and diplomatic factors and how they affected the process of decolonization in
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Puerto Rico. I will argue that faced by the indifference of Congress and ever increasing
complex Puerto Rican national identities, Luis Muñoz Marin opted for the path of
autonomismo, leading to the creation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The viability
of the Estado Libre Asociado would be proved in the local confrontation with the
Nacionalistas, and the free association pact would be sealed in blood on the battlefields
of Korea as the Puerto Rican soldier became the incarnation of the ideals of the
commonwealth; the coexistence of the “the two great cultures of the hemisphere” in one
space. In the process, new modern Puerto Rican identities emerged and briefly became
hegemonic, and they would prove impossible to be controlled by the state.

15

CHAPTER 1
BIRTH OF A NATION: FROM 1868 TO 1898, A LABOR OF THIRTY
YEARS
Puerto Rico necesita reformar su instrucción pública españolizandola
convenientemente y para ello se hace indispensable prescindir por completo de
los profesores naturales de este país… [y] de prescindir de ciertos puestos de
empleados hijos de este país. En esta Provincia sólo deben admitirse los
empleados [born in the Island] más subalternos, siempre que hayan dado pruebas
inequívocas de un acendrado españolismo.5

Historian Florencia Mallon has argued that during periods of crisis subaltern
groups get the opportunity to strengthen their political stand and gain more inclusion and
participation in developing or re-defining the nation and its institutions, either by being
included in political coalitions or by being mobilized for war.6 Focusing on the creation
of national discourses and identities and how they alter state formation, Fernando LópezAlves argues that political and military mass mobilization of peasants and lower classes,
the type, duration, timeframe, purpose, and who leads such mobilization affect the
creation of a region’s polity and leads to a higher or lower degree of democracy within a
5

“Puerto Rico needs to reform its public education conveniently Hispanizing it,
and to this end it is necessary to get rid of the professors born in this country… [and] to
ban the people of this country from certain positions. Those born in this province should
only be allowed to occupy the most subaltern positions, and only after unequivocally
proving their unyielding españolismo.” See, Leg. 5112. Expediente 15 Memoria
presentada por el Gobernador supr. Civil de Puerto Rico D. Laureano Sanz, in Gautier
Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal, 46-47.
6

Mallon, Peasant and Nation, 4, 6, 9-10.
16

given state.7 Both scholars try to measure to what extent marginalized groups become
parts of the hegemonic group in a given society by virtue of political and military
mobilization. This chapter analyzes the policies followed by the Spanish metropolis and
its colonial apparatus in Puerto Rico during periods of crises with regard to political and
military mobilization, and how those policies affected those born in the Island. Thus, the
questions in this chapter are; did military participation transformed into political
enfranchisement? Is the opposite true? Did demobilization of the inhabitants of Puerto
Rico mean political and socio-economic disenfranchisement? Did disenfranchisement
and displacement encourage the development of a distinctive Puerto Rican national
identity? And, if so, how did the development of a unique national identity affect the
choices of the criollo elite in the Island.
This chapter outlines patterns of inclusion-exclusion from the Spanish military
and paramilitary institutions in nineteenth-century Puerto Rico and how they influenced
the political choices of the criollo elite, and altered the self perception of those born in
the Island. I try to show a link between Spanish policies aimed to demobilize the Puerto
Ricans, in an effort to destroy the basis of a potential rebel army while providing cheap
labor for the incipient export-oriented agricultural enterprises, and colonial policies
seeking to curtail the emergence of a Puerto Rican national identity. I argue that the
combination of these policies weakened the criollos and liberals politically (as the
colonial administration intended) but also made more evident the differences between
peninsulares and those born in the Island and thus fueled the emergence of unique
Puerto Rican national identities.
7

Fernando López Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America,
1810-1900, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000), 8-9, 32-33, 44-47.
17

The sine qua non in discussions about nationalism and national identity in Puerto
Rico is without doubt, El Grito de Lares of September 23, 1868, the biggest revolt
against Spanish rule ever staged in the Island. On January 6, 1868, prominent Puerto
Rican separatists exiled in New York, under the guidance of Ramón Emeterio Betances,
founded the Comité Revolucionario de Puerto Rico.8 They aimed to overthrow the
Spanish regime in the Island and to create a democratic republic. The revolutionary
committee proceeded to organized cells in the Island for this purpose and to secure
weaponry for the rebel army.9 A series of setbacks doomed the plans of the
revolucionarios. They managed to secure 500 rifles, six canons, ammunitions and the
small transport ship, “El Telegrafo”, to arm the revolutionary army; however, their ship
was confiscated in Saint Thomas.10 And, Betances, who had planned to land in Puerto

8

Note on translation and language usage: All translations are mine unless
otherwise indicated. I have tried to use the original Spanish version for titles, offices and
names throughout this narrative as long as it did not cause confusion to do so.
Translations and abbreviations are offered and used throughout the text but their use is
limited. When referring to Puerto Rico, Island is capitalized since it actually does not
refer to its geographical shape. “Island” is more of a nickname for Puerto Rico. criollo is
used throughout this work, unless citing works where creole is used, for the sake of
accuracy. In Puerto Rico, criollo refers to a mostly white elite differentiated from the
peninsular elite by their place of birth, the Americas.
9

Since the exiles in New York had a ‘revolutionary” agenda, including the
abolition of slavery I use the term “revolutionaries” to refer to them. The leaders of the
revolt in Puerto Rico, which included slave owners who disagree with the abolition of
slavery, are referred to as “rebels”.
10

For the military aspect of the Lares revolt see; Héctor Andrés Negroni, Historia
militar de Puerto Rico: en conmemoración del encuentro de dos mundos, (España:
Ediciones Siruela S.A., 1992), 296-301. For an exhaustive study of the rebels who led
the revolt and their motivations see; Olga Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, sus
hombres y sus causas, 4th ed, (Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones Huracán, 1999).
18

Rico with men and weapons the first day of the revolution, set originally for September
29, was detained in Santo Domingo and never made it to the Island.11
Meanwhile, the leaders in Puerto Rico faced problems of their own. On
September 19 a rebel agent, Pedro García was captured by army colonel Don Antonio
Balboa, while raising funds for the insurrection in the western city of Mayagüez. Balboa
alerted the Capitán General Julián Juan Pavía, who launched a full investigation.12 The
next day, the miliciano Carlos Antonio López, informed his commander Juan Castañón in
the northwestern town of Quebradillas, that he had come to know of revolutionary plans
being drawn in the house of Manuel María González in Camuy, further north. Castañón
informed the mayor of Quebradillas who in turn alerted the mayor of Camuy.13 In the
first hours of the morning of the 21, Spanish authorities detained the rebel leader Manuel
María González and searched his house. The Spanish authorities found a list of members
of the rebel cell and a copy of their reglamento. The Camuy rebels who were not arrested
moved to Lares and warned the rebel cell in that town. From Lares, messengers were
sent to alert the rebel cell in Mayagüez that their plans had been compromised and of the
need to launch the rebellion as soon as possible. They also wanted the Mayagüez cell to
11

By order of the Dominican president Buena Ventura Báez, Betances and his
men were precluded from sailing to Puerto Rico., See; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito
de Lares,192, and; Negroni, Historia militar, 297.
12

See; José A. Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal
puertorriqueño en el siglo XIX, (San Juan, P.R.: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña,
1975), 103-105, and; Negroni, Historia militar, 298.
13

The milicianos’ commanders in Quebradillas and Camuy believed that the
mayors of their respective municipalities, Carlos Gonzalez and Pablo Rivera were
involved in the conspiracy and were conspiring to alert the rebels. See; Jiménez de
Wagenheim, El grito de lares, 160-62, and; Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento
liberal, 105.
19

try and to alert the rest of the cells throughout the Island. Reckoning that time was of the
essence, the leadership of the rebel cells in Camuy, Lares and Mayagüez decided to
launch their revolt six days before originally planned.
On September 23, 1868, hundreds of rebels started to converge at the farm of
Manuel Rojas, a coffee grower in the mountain town of Lares and rebel leader. On their
way to Lares the rebels exhorted slaves and jornaleros14 to join them in some cases
threatening to kill them if they did not do so.15 That evening the rebels marched into the
town itself and took it without resistance. They proceeded to form a provisional
government of republican character. The Republic of Puerto Rico, with a president and a
cabinet appointed by the chief military leaders present in Lares, Manuel Rojas and Juan
de Mata Torreforte, was officially established on the morning of September 24.16 Rojas
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Juan de la Pezuela y Ceballos, Gobernador y Capitán General of Puerto Rico
(1848-52) created the Reglamento Especial de Jornaleros on June 11 of 1849 in order to
provide a cheap labor force for the plantations and other enterprises. Free Blacks, people
of mixed race, and poor whites age sixteen or over, were subjected to the reglamento
which forced to work for others. Even those who own land but could not provide for all
their needs were forced them to work for others either for wages or goods. The
jornaleros were obliged to carry a notebook at all times where their daily activities were
to be written. Their freedom of movement was also severely hindered. Though the
reglamento included penalties for employers’ abusive behavior, all kinds of exploitations
were the norm. See; Luis A. Figueroa, Sugar, Slavery, and Freedom in NineteenthCentury Puerto Rico, (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, and San
Juan, P.R.: University of Puerto Rico Press, 2005), 142-48 166-173. See also, James L.
Dietz, Economic History of Puerto Rico, Institutional Change and Development,
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1986), 43, 45-52.
15

Jiménez de Wagenheim believes that those threatened were the slaves and
jornaleros working for landlords who were not part of the rebellion. The rebels
apparently killed Agustín Venero, a freed black, for refusing to join them. See; Jiménez
de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 170-74, and; Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del
pensamiento liberal, 108.
16

Francisco Ramírez was named President of the Republic of Puerto Rico,
Clemente Millán as Minister of Justice, Federico Valencia as Minister of Treasury,
20

and Torreforte instructed the new government to recruit and organize more rebel soldiers
and to secure funding by forcing the merchants to loan monies to the republic.17 By
decree, the rebel government declared null the hated jornalero (passbook) system that
forced landless peasants to work as peons, and promised freedom to those slaves who
joined them in the fight against the Spaniards. The rebels also welcomed foreigners to
join their ranks and become patriots of the republic. Another decree gave Spaniards in
Puerto Rico three days to swear allegiance to the new republic or to leave the Island if
they did not. The decree also warned of extreme repercussions if the Spaniards decided
to stay and did not support the rebels and the republic.18
The chief rebel commanders, Rojas and Torreforte, proceeded to name the
officers of the Ejército Revolucionario, which at that point consisted of roughly 600 men.
They named eight brigadier generals plus colonels for the infantry, artillery and cavalry.
Apparently these colonels were quickly promoted to generals.19 The rebel leadership
seemed to have ignored the absurdity of such chain of command for such a small number
of rebels for the sake of unity. Late in the morning of the 24, the rebels proceeded to the
Aurelio Méndez Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Bernabé Pol as Secretary of State. See
Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 179-80, and; Negroni, Historia militar, 298300, and; Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal, 107-08.
17

Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 179.

18

See the original decrees in: Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento
liberal, 102-103. For an analysis of the decrees see; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de
Lares, 179-84. See also; Negroni, Historia militar, 29, and; María Asunción García
Ochoa, La política española en Puerto rico durante el siglo XIX, (Rio Piedras, P.R.:
Editorial Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1982), 150-52.
19

Negroni counts at least twelve generals vs. ten in Jiménez de
Wagenheims’work. See Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 179-80, and;
Negroni, Historia militar, 299.
21

town of San Sebastian del Pepino. The commanders of the Milicias Disciplinadas in
Pepino, Lieutenant Manuel Cebollero and Eusebio Ibarra, who were part of a rebel cell,
had spent the previous night organizing slaves and jornaleros into a fighting force to join
the rebel column coming from Lares. They had also promised the rebel leadership that
their milicianos would join the rebellion.20 Later that morning, roughly forty rebels on
horseback entered Pepino’s plaza shooting and chanting “death to the Spaniards and the
Queen”, while exhorting the milicianos to join them. To their surprise, and that of the
Spanish authorities present, the milicianos responded to the rebels with intense fire
ignoring the calls of Cebollero and Ibarra.21 More rebels continued to pour into Pepino,
but their efforts bore no fruits against the effective fire of the milicianos, and the town’s
civilians who fired rifles and guns and threw dynamite against them from the rooftop of
buildings surrounding the plaza. The battle lasted over an hour before the rebels,
repulsed twice and driven off the Plaza by the milicianos, decided to head back to
Lares.22 The confrontation left eight rebels dead and two milicianos wounded. Fighting
against milicianos and civilians, the rebels lost the only engagement of the revolt.
Disconcerted by the unwillingness of the milicianos to join them and recognizing that
without them on their side, they could not possibly defeat the peninsular troops in the
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See; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 185-86, and; Gautier Dapena,
Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal, 106.
21

See; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 187-88, and; Negroni, Historia
militar, 298.
22

See; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 188-90; and, Negroni, Historia
militar, 298-99.
22

Island, the rebel army quickly melted away.23 Scattered in the mountains, and with no
hope of a general uprising or aid coming from the exterior, the rebels who initially
escaped eventually surrendered. Over 500 rebels found themselves imprisoned. Eighty
died while in custody due to poor sanitary conditions. Seven were sentenced to death,
but by virtue of a general amnesty, all rebels were set free by January 1869.24
From a strictly military standpoint the revolt was a fiasco. Lares was the only
town taken by the rebels and the Spanish authorities crushed the revolt in roughly twentyfour hours. The brevity of the uprising is even more damning when taking into account
that the rebel army was defeated by milicianos, who were an auxiliary corps manned
almost exclusively by Puerto Ricans.25 Furthermore, the rebels did not enjoy broad
support from the inhabitants of the Island, who were either unaware of the events or
chose either to remain neutral or loyal to Spain. Lack of communication and
coordination, and poor leadership just accentuated the absence of support from the
Island’s community in general. Over sixty percent of the participants were jornaleros,
peasants, or slaves, many of whom declared that they were forced to joining the rebels
under pain of death.26

Though a failure from a military point of view, many Puerto

Rican historians consider the Lares’ uprising as a defining moment for Puerto Rican
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See, García Ochoa, La política española 151-52; and, Jiménez de Wagenheim,
El grito de Lares, 188-192; and, Negroni, Historia militar, 299-300.
24

Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 17-18.
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Warned of Cebollero and Ibarra’s plans, Pepino’s mayor, Luis Chiesa, decided
to arm the civilians and to put the milicianos under the command of a retired Spanish
officer, Colonel Pedro Miguel San Antonio, whom restricted the milicianos to their
barracks until the rebels entered the plaza. Ibid., 188-90.
26

See; Ibid., 78, 174, 182, and; García Ochoa, La política española, 151.
23

nationality, a moment when the Island’s people ceased to see themselves as Spaniards.27
While one school of thought, and the Island’s mainstream media, regards this revolt as
the birth date of national consciousness in Puerto Rico and as a true national uprising,
others see it as a group of criollos and recently arrived hacendados seeking to correct
what they perceived as economic and political injustices.28 Economic historian James L.
Dietz interprets the revolt as “the point at which the development of Puerto Rico’s
productive forces came into fundamental conflict with Spain’s sociopolitical
domination”.29 Though most of the academic work falls into the second category, the
most popular view is that describing Lares as a national revolution.
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See; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 82-85.
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For those who see the revolt as the birth of Puerto Rico’s national identity see;
Antonio Correjter, “The Day Puerto Rico Became a Nation”, The San Juan Star Sunday
Magazine, 22 September 1968, and; Vicente Géigel Polanco, El Grito de Lares: gesta de
heroísmo y sacrificio, (Río Piedras, P.R.: Editorial Antillana, 1976). A more balanced
history of the revolt is found in Lidio Cruz Monclova, El Grito de Lares, (San Juan:
Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1968). Economic historians follow the second trend,
see; Laird W. Bergard, Coffee and the Growth of Agrarian Capitalism in NineteenthCentury Puerto Rico (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), 41-45,
140, and; Dietz, Economic History, 72-74, Bergard and Dietz agree that “Lares was a
concrete manifestation of the attempt by members of the more powerful creole class to
end the dominance of the hated Spanish merchants.” Ricardo Camuñas-Madera also
emphasizes the economic nature of the uprising. He argues that commercial relations
between non-peninsular (criollos and foreigners) farmers and peninsular monopolists
supported by the colonial regime in the Island were dominated by the later leading the
hacendados from the coffee zone to opt for revolution to correct the unequal relationship.
See, Ricardo Camuñas-Madera, Desplazamiento y revolución en el Puerto Rico del siglo
XIX, (San Juan, P.R.: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 2000), xi-xii, 97-107. For a
discussion of stated and unstated causes of the revolt and a synthesis of the economic,
displacement and discrimination theories see; Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de
Lares, 82,117.
29

Dietz explains that as the strength of large landowners and small merchants
increased, “Spanish domination and in particular, peninsular control over the largest
commercial establishments and credit, it became an obstacle rather than an ally to the
24

In fact, despite its short life, El Grito de Lares has inspired many politicians and
poets, whom often were the one and the same in Puerto Rico’s political history. Writing
for the San Juan Star in celebration of the first centenary of the revolt, Juan Antonio
Corretjer (1908-1985), one of Puerto Rico’s greatest poets and untamable fighter for
Puerto Rico’s independence, described the revolt as “[t]he day Puerto Rico became a
nation”.30 Of course that vision is possible in hindsight which also allows for the
reformulation of Puerto Rico’s national mythology, its stories and histories, and
Puertoricaness itself. The failed revolt became an obscure footnote in the Island’s
history until the 1930s when the Partido Nacionalista Puertorriqueño (Nationalist Puerto
Rican Party) adopted the Lares revolt as a national icon. Even more tellingly, in 1969,
Luis A. Ferré, the first governor of the Island presiding over a party seeking federated
statehood, declared the event a national holiday. At first glance it may look contradictory
that such opposing political camps embraced the same event as part of their national
iconography. However, Puerto Ricans from different sides of the political spectrum
understood that control of the national symbols had and still has an important role in
Puerto Rican politics. As argued by Arlene Dávila, command of the national mythology
and its icons provides for influence over national identities and wields significant
political power.31 This point was not lost on the Spanish authorities. Just about 7% (39

members of this class, as well as educated professionals, just as it had in the rest of the
New World. ” See; Dietz, Economic History, 73.
30

Correjter befriended the nationalist leader Pedro Albizu Campos and became
secretary general of the Nationalist Party in the 1930s. He was imprisoned in 1937, 1947
and 1950.
31

See; Arlene Dávila, Sponsored Identities: Cultural Politics in Puerto Rico,
((Puerto Rican Studies) Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997).
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out of 551 detainees) of the Lares’ rebels were born outside the Island. However,
foreigners occupied important positions within the rebel cells, a fact that became the basis
for the Spanish colonial government’s portrayal of the revolt as being foreign-inspired
and led.32
While the Lares uprising may have not been a national movement, the policies
followed by the Spanish colonial authorities in its aftermath fueled the emergence of
unique Puerto Rican national identities. From this standpoint Lares had undeniable
important consequences. If the revolt itself did not separate Puerto Ricans from
Spaniards, clumsy Spanish colonial policies would make the differences all too clear.
Following the insurrection the newly appointed Governor and Capitán General of Puerto
Rico, General Laureano Sanz, moved to exclude natives of the Island (“los hijos de este
país”) from teaching positions while promoting the españolización of public and private
instruction. Sanz also sought to exclude Puerto Ricans from the clergy and from all
administrative posts except the most “subaltern ones”33 These measures created even
more friction between peninsulares and the criollos, especially the elite, for they closed
traditional routes to socio-economic and political improvement.
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Jiménez de Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 78.
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Sanz wrote; “Puerto Rico necesita reformar su instrucción pública
españolizandola convenientemente y para ello se hace indispensable prescindir por
completo de los profesores naturales de este país”. He also argued for the
“conveniencia de prescindir de ciertos puestos de empleados hijos de este país. Nunca
pueden dar aquí buen resultado”. He added “… en esta Provincia [Puerto Rico] sólo
deben admitirse los empleados [born in the Island] más subalternos, siempre que hayan
dado pruebas inequívocas de un acendrado españolismo”. See, Leg. 5112. Expediente 15
Memoria presentada por el Gobernador supr. Civil de Puerto Rico D. Laureano Sanz, in
Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal, 46-47.
26

Exclusionary policies were not restricted to the political realm and the colonial
administration. “Los hijos de este país”, who had not only served faithfully for over 300
years but had also suppressed the Lares revolt, found themselves excluded from the
military. Soon after the revolt the colonial administration proceeded to ban Puerto Ricans
from its armed forces in an attempt to forestall other insurrections. The criollos leading
the Lares’ revolt had not been able to mobilize the masses to support their cause even
after appealing to the national spirit of Puerto Ricans.34 In an Island were different
languages could be heard by moving from one barrio to another; where Corsicans,
Italians, French, Germans, Irish and others had settled in colonies with their families and
created enclaves, by all means and purposes isolated from the rest of the Island; and with
few roads connecting the different towns, and with no common experience or common
education to share beyond their immediate community, it was difficult if not impossible
to appeal to national identity feelings.35
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See: Manifiesto de los patriotas borinqueños que dirigen el movimiento
revolucionario, in Gautier Dapena, Trayectoria del pensamiento liberal, Apéncice Núm.
4, 102-103.
35

Estela Cifre de Loubriel argues that the principal element in the formation of
the Puerto Ricans as a people (pueblo) was the exponential progression of the Island’s
population during the nineteenth century which itself was the result of mass immigration.
She identifies three distinct immigration waves during this century, 1800-1850, 18501880, and 1880-1898. The first stage was characterized by an influx of immigrants from
Santo Domingo, as well as French elements from Haiti and political émigrés from
Venezuela. Foreign immigration, triggered by the real Cédula de Gracias of August 10,
1815, accounted for much of the immigration to Puerto Rico during this first period.
Military personnel and loyalists started to arrive after the defeat of the Spanish armies in
the former empire and soon monopolized the Island’s bureaucracy. 32% of the total
immigration for the whole century occurred between 1851 and 1860. During this second
period, there was a marked increase of peninsular immigration, but Lares and Yara soon
made Puerto Rico less attractive to this group. The third period was characterized by a
slow decrease in immigration, especially of peninsular origin. Though it never overtook
the peninsulares, foreign immigration held steady throughout the century. Immigration
27

After 1868, and especially under Sanz’s leadership, the Iberian metropolis
embarked on a project of anti-nation building. Political exclusion, demobilization of the
population, and the españolización of the Island were the tools with which to avoid the
emergence of a strong Puerto Rican national identity; an identity that could be used to
rally those born in the Island against the Spaniards. However, Sanz’s plans had the
opposite effect. By closing the military to natives of Puerto Rico the Spaniards created a
common denominator for those born in the Island; exclusion by birthplace. Barring “los
hijos de este país” from the military was more damaging than any other form of
exclusion by the colonial administration since it affected the majority of the population
not just a small criollo elite. By following exclusionary policies the Spanish colonial
authorities made more obvious the differences between peninsulares and Puerto Ricans,
lost the opportunity to co-opt Puerto Ricans into serving Spain, and ultimately fueled the
development of a Puerto Rican national identity. In effect the combined exclusion of
Puerto Ricans from the colonial administration and the military undermined the loyalty of
the inhabitants of the Island and put them on the path of a separate and unique national
identity.

of peninsular origin (or of Spanish insular possession) accounted for 88.2% of the
century’s immigration while foreigners accounted for 8.5%. It is noteworthy that foreign
immigrants were mostly farmers, professionals and artisans while peninsular immigrants
were for the most part military personnel (including guardias civiles), merchants and
public employees. See; Estela Cifre de Loubriel, La inmigración a Puerto Rico durante
el siglo XIX, (San Juan, P.R.: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1964), XLIX-LIII,
LXXXIX, XCIX-CI, and; Estela Cifre de Loubriel, Catalogo de extranjeros residentes en
Puerto Rico en el siglo XIX, (Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones de la Universidad de Puerto
Rico, 1962), XXXV-XXXVII, XXXVIII-XLI, L-LVI. The vast majority of foreigners
living in Puerto Rico resided in the South/South-West, the West and North-West tip of
the Island, and the coffee region adjacent to these areas.
28

The development of this identity was slow. Political exclusion intertwined with
short-lived political reforms after 1868. This pattern would not change until the end of
Spanish sovereignty over the Island in 1898. Soon after the Grito de Lares, most of the
criollo leadership, which comprised the liberal movement, disenchanted with the results
of the revolt, opted for a policy of watered-down autonomismo or a higher degree of
political freedom, instead of independence from Spain. 36 The reluctance of the criollo
leadership to sever its ties to Spain, and degrees of cultural affinity with Spain, may have
slowed the development of a unique Puerto Rican national identity. This is not to say
that the criollos that stayed in the Island had many other options. The demobilization of
the Puerto Ricans reduced, if not arrested altogether, the political choices of the criollo
leadership. In fact the criollos’ position was weakened by the sudden absence of Puerto
Rican militias. Military exclusion provided Puerto Ricans with a common experience
that may have moved them towards a shared identity but it also weakened the criollos
and liberals.
Controlling access to the military and paramilitary apparatus and seeking to
curtail the power of the liberals and criollos in the Island were not new colonial
strategies. Nor was military service a marginal issue for the inhabitants of the Island. A
review of the political trajectory and of the development of the Puerto Rican militias
36

Román Baldorioty de Castro and Luis Muñoz Rivera, leaders of the
Autonomist Liberal Party (pro-autonomy) in Puerto Rico talked openly about the
impossibility of obtaining independence through war. One of the reasons was the state of
illiteracy and poverty of the peasantry which they thought would not allow for an
effective revolt or the survival of an independent republic. According to Jiménez de
Wagenheim’s findings, of the men taken prisoners after the revolt who were asked about
their literacy 40% responded negatively. This number was probably higher as the
authorities probably did not question the slaves involved in the revolt. Jiménez de
Wagenheim, El grito de Lares, 79.
29

during the nineteenth century should help to illustrate how Spain sought to neutralized
the liberals and the criollo elite in the Island by disarming the population in addition to
showing the military character of the colony and of those who made it their home.
Puerto Rico has had an intimate history with military institutions. From 1582 to
1897, the Island was ruled either as a presidio, a camp, or a military plaza, and, it was not
until 1897 that Puerto Rico enjoyed a civil government. 37 In 1582 the first garrison of
regular Spanish troops was assigned to the Island, and the functions of Governor and
Alcaide (keeper) del Morro were fused into one position effectively making the Island a
Capitanía General.38 The duties of the Capitán General included the command,
organization and jurisdiction of the army and militias. The post was usually reserved for
areas deemed of strategic military importance. Within the Spanish Empire these
administrative positions were separated from, and subordinated to, the offices of the
viceroys or governors. In the case of Puerto Rico, however, this office also entailed the
administration of all affairs of the Island. In the late eighteen century, as part of the
Bourbon reforms, Intendentes de Ejército y Provincia were added to the imperial
bureaucracy and existed along the positions of Governor, Viceroy or Captain General
throughout the Spanish Empire, but not in Puerto Rico were the Capitán General
remained as absolute ruler.39 For most of its history Puerto Rico was first and mostly a
military bastion and everything else was secondary.
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As Héctor Andrés Negroni argues, since the Island was but a military camp the
islander could be nothing but a soldier or at least be influenced by Puerto Rico’s military
baggage.40 In 1887, in a study of the Puerto Rican Jíbaro, Francisco del Valle Atiles
declared: “Since those remote days when Spain fought wars with England and the
Netherlands, [he refers to the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a period
during which no less than fifty-six invasions took place] until this very day, the jíbaro has
been a good Spanish soldier, willing to die for the motherland (patria); called by the
government or volunteering, he has heeded the call of duty…”41 Such was the military
nature of the Spanish colonization of the Island that the most common form of
communication between the Capitán General and the inhabitants of Puerto Rico was the
Bando, a type of general orders usually employed by a military commander to let his
troops know what was expected of them.42 The military nature of the Island can also be
illustrated by its budget. Even in 1842, when the population had increased from roughly
80,000 inhabitants in 1783 to almost half a million; and with coffee, sugar and tobacco
production rising to unseen levels, and a favorable trade balance, military expenditures
still accounted for 50% of the Island’s budget rapidly rising to 69% in 1846, and finally

peoples, foreign powers and contraband. As part of the defensive perimeter designed by
the Spaniards in the eighteenth century, Puerto Rico came to be known as the 6th Key
(Llave de las Antillas y de las Indias). As such, the Island received priority for military
matters, especially the building of fortifications. There were another nineteen keys
throughout the empire.
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leveling at 50% by 1865.43 Even though Puerto Rico prospered economically, and its
population grew exponentially during the nineteenth century, the military nature of the
colony remained mostly unchanged.
As Spain strengthened its hold of the territories in the Americas, it sought to
regulate the administration of its possessions. Milicias Irregulares (irregular militia)
existed in Puerto Rico since the very first days of Spanish colonization and conquest in
1508 until 1692, when they were replaced by the Milicia Irregular Urbana.44 Field
Marshall, Campo Gaspar de Arredondo, Capitán General between 1690 and 1695,
resolved to create a territorial division in the Island called partidos urbanos instead of
villas due to the cumbersome process established by the Council of Indies to create the
later. These partidos urbanos (the equivalent of towns and villages) were to be
administered by governor’s appointees with the title “Teniente a Guerra”. The functions
of the Teniente a Guerra included that of auxiliary mayor, justice of the peace and police
chief. With the title of “Sargento Mayor de la Milicia Urbana”, the Teniente a Guerra
was in charge of organizing and training a militia within his jurisdiction.45 In turn, the
Milicias Urbanas were composed of white free males between the ages of sixteen and
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sixty. Their mission included safeguarding public order and territorial defense. 46 The
milicia was the only military body opened to those born in the Island until 1741 when
those born in the Island were permitted to join two of the units of the permanent garrison.
In 1700 there were 1000 men in the Milicias Irregulares Urbanas. As Negroni suggests,
since the permanent garrison of the Island during this period never exceeded 400 men,
the militia was the core of Puerto Rico’s defenses.47 By 1763, the militias counted 5,611
men out of a total population of only 46,197 including women and children.48 One out of
every nine inhabitants was directly involved in the militias. Furthermore these militia
men, unlike the regular army garrison troops, had settled in the Island, were part of
communities, and perhaps more importantly, they were part of families. The men of the
Spanish army were rotated in and out, but the militia was organic to the Island and had
grown roots in it.
In 1765, the Milicia Irregular Urbana was itself replaced by two bodies, the
Milicia Urbana and the Milicia Disciplinada (urban and disciplined militia respectively),
by virtue of the reforms launched by Field Marshall Alejandro O’Reilly.49 O’Reilly
arrived in Puerto Rico on April 8, 1765 entrusted by Carlos III de Borbón to inspect the
46
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defenses and garrisons of the Spanish Antilles. In his report on the conditions of the
Island, O’Reilly dedicated only eleven sections to the political and economic situation of
the Island while writing fifty-three on military matters.50 Finding the defenses in poor
state, the troops demoralized, and the absence of relevant data regarding the Milicias
Irregulares, he recommended their dissolution and the creation of a disciplined entity
divided in two corps using the Reglamento of the Cuban Militias.51 Out of O’Reilly’s
recommendations emerged the Milicia Urbana as a type of police force, and the Milicia
Disciplinada which became the equivalent of a military reserve and the main auxiliary
corps for the regular troops stationed in the Island. The Milicias Urbanas created as a
reserve or auxiliary corps and replacement pool for the Milicias Disciplinadas, and in
charge of police duties and coastal watch, came to consist of roughly 38,000 men by
1832 or 11% of the Island population.52 This figure is impressive by itself but more so
when taking into consideration that it does not include those serving in the Milicias
Disciplinadas which had roughly 7,000 men under arms, or those serving in the
Battallones Fijos (battalions of the Spanish army assigned permanently to the Island).53
Manning the regular garrison of the Island with “hijos de este país”, or those born
in the Americas, was not an accepted practice within the Spanish Empire. Nonetheless,
more often than not, reality superseded legislation. By the 1640s, “hijos de este país”
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were being used to garrison the fortifications in San Juan. Reprimanded for this practice,
Capitán General Fernando de la Riva Agüero (1643-48) responded that without those
born in the Island there would be no one to guard the walls.54 It was not until 1741 that
those born in Puerto Rico were legally accepted into the regular forces assigned to the
Island. By royal decree natives of the Island were allowed to fill up to half the allotted
military positions for the garrison in Puerto Rico. Consisting of a force totaling 400 men
this troop came to be known as the “Batallón de Veteranos” or “Fijo”.55 The Fijo was to
be reinforced by peninsular troops attached to it and supported, initially, by the Milicias
Irregulares and later by the urbanos and disciplinados. After his inspection of the
Island’s defenses, O’Reilly discharged half the soldiers of the Fijo and promoted
augmenting the garrison in the Island with peninsular troops which started to rotate in
regimental strength in 1795.56
The expansion in size and role of the militias and regular troops in Puerto Rico
did not occur in a political vacuum nor was this phenomenon just the result of O’Reilly’s
report and recommendations. Events in Europe and in the Spanish Empire in the
Americas precipitated the growth and relevance of the Puerto Rican militias. The French
Revolution and subsequent revolutionary and Napoleonic wars propelled the wheels of
change in the Americas as much as it did in Europe.57 Undoubtedly, the Napoleonic
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In 1808 the Spanish Empire in the Americas extended from California to Cape
Horn and from the mouth of the Orinoco to the Pacific Ocean. This empire was divided
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invasion of Spain provided for the brief rise of liberalism in the peninsula and in the
Island. By the decree of January 22, 1809, after three centuries of absolutist rule, the
Junta Suprema y Gubernativa de España e Indias provided for the election in the Island
of one diputado a cortes (representative to the courts). The decree also recognized the
American colonies as Spanish provinces.58 It is at this point that political tendencies in
the Island became more contrasting, and not surprisingly this is also the beginning of a

in four viceroyalties and was inhabited by seventeen-million people. Roughly two
decades afterwards, Cuba and Puerto Rico were all that was left of such vast empire.
Many scholars have tried to explain what caused Spain to lose its empire so abruptly.
The most common explanations include Spain’s economic stagnation within the frame of
the industrial and commercial revolutions, and the commercial expansion of Europe
(particularly England), the creole-peninsular competition, the coming of nationalism, the
Bourbon reforms, as well as the impact of the Enlightenment, the French and American
revolutions, and the Napoleonic Wars. A work that emphasizes the role of the Bourbon
reforms in bringing about insurrection, by among other things, ending the de facto
autonomy if not independence of the American territories is; John Lynch, The SpanishAmerican Revolutions, 1808-1826: A Unified Account of the Revolutions that Swept Over
South America and Central America in the Early Nineteenth-Century, (2nd edition)
Revolutions in the Modern World, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1986),
1,2,7-9,23. For the role of the Napoleonic Wars in bringing about independence to the
former Spanish empire see; Jay Kinsbruner, Independence in Spanish America: Civil
Wars, Revolutions and Underdevelopment, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 2000), 3, 6, 37, 157. See also; Timothy E. Anna., Spain and the Loss of America,
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983). Anna argues that “the massive weakening
of the old principles of society and government in the peninsula,” which started with the
Napoleonic invasion of 1808, “made American independence possible” (xii). It was,
however, the restitution of the constitutional regime that made Spanish-American
independence inevitable by “destroying the cohesion of the central government in
Madrid” (245). For a work of synthesis see also; Peggy K. Liss, Atlantic Empires: The
Network of Trade and Revolution, 1713-1826, John Hopkins Studies in Atlantic History
and Culture (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983). The French and American
revolutions, as well as the commercial and industrial revolutions play major roles in this
comparative synthesis. She rejects the role of panaceas for diverse historical events that
have been given to structural, neo-Marxists and dependency theories, as well as general
explanations based on capitalism, imperialism and modernity. Liss rather emphasizes the
role of ideas and individuals and seeks to show how the material and ideological elements
of revolutions, especially how they interplay, are equally important (222).
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long campaign to demobilize those born in Puerto Rico. Criollos and some reformminded peninsulares grouped under liberal and reformist ideas while the merchant class
and the colonial administration became markedly conservative.59 The liberals and
reformists won the general elections held between 1809 and 1813, and during this period
Puerto Ricans earned Spanish citizenship.
The rapid growth of the militias and the political power gained by the liberals in
the Island alarmed the Spanish authorities. In 1810, Capitán General Salvador Meléndez
(1809-20) tried to dissolve the Milicias Urbanas but failed to do so. In effect the Milicia
Urbana expanded from roughly 17,000 men in 1810 to 33,000 in 1813. Furthermore, the
militias in Aguadilla and Mayagüez (North-West and West part of the Island
respectively) came to include batteries with over forty pieces of artillery.60 The urbanos,
which were composed in its entirety of “hijos de este país” had become a formidable
force. With the peninsula in despair due to the French invasion and fearing insurrection
in the rest of the empire, Melendez could not push too hard and risk alienating the
Island’s population nor could he really rescind of the urbanos manpower.
The French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and the wars of independence in the
Spanish Empire compelled political fluctuations and created military needs which at first
benefited the Island. The milicias expansion and the weakness of the crown and the
cortes, allowed the liberals briefly to gain the upper hand, both on the peninsula and in
the Island. That does not mean that the Spanish colonial administration in the Puerto
Rico did not try to curtail the power of liberals and separatists alike. In what is known as
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the “Falso motín de Santa Teresa”, Governor Melendez planed to stage a mock uprising
so he could use the opportunity to move against separatists and liberal elements. The
newly created constitutional government, warned of Melendez’s intentions, alerted the
population which stayed in their houses during the mock uprising of October 15, 1813,
and the ruse failed.61 However, after France’s defeat and the restoration of the absolutist
monarch Fernando VII, the militias came under attack as well as the liberals.
Fernando VII moved quickly to reduce the power of liberals and the role of the
militia in the Island. On May 4, 1814, he returned Puerto Rico to colonial status. Those
born in Puerto Rico lost political representation and their Spanish citizenship. The return
of the king also doomed regular military units in the Island. El Fijo which had
participated in the Haitian Revolution between 1792 and 1793, and was again sent to
Santo Domingo in 1809-12, came under suspicion when it was dispatched to Venezuela.
Sending the Fijo to Venezuela to aid the royalist’s armies drew criticism from criollos in
Puerto Rico which prompted Fernando VII to suppress the body in 1815.62 Despite the
protest of prominent criollos and even the secretary of government in the Island, the Fijo
was not to be reinstated. It is important that even the colonial administration recognized
that dissolving the body was not just unnecessary but counterproductive since it offended
the sensibility of loyal Puerto Ricans.63 Seven decades would pass before the “hijos de
este país” were again accepted into the Spanish army units serving in the Island.
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Emboldened by the return of the absolutist king, Melendez sought to neutralize
the Milicia Urbana and in 1817 created a new reglamento which stripped the urbanos of
firearms restricting them to the use of machete and spears. Moreover, he sought to put
the urbanos under the direct control of the Capitán General circumventing local
authorities. The reglamento also established the separation of whites and morenos who
until then had fought in the same units.64 Thus, the only regular military unit in the
Island which accepted Puerto Ricans, el Fijo, had been suppressed and the all-Puerto
Rican Milicia Urbana was seriously weakened by removing its firearms. As if these
measures were not enough, Melendez proceeded to create a force mirroring the milicias.
The Insituto de Voluntarios existed in the Island between 1812 and 1898 as a
paramilitary corps made of mostly peninsular volunteers. The origin of this corps lay in
the fear of the colonial authorities that sooner or later both the Milicias Urbanas and
Disicplinadas would become the nucleus of a rebel army. Hence the Instituto was
intended to counterbalance and eventually replace the militias.65 In its inception this
volunteer corps was exclusively for civilians born in Spain. Later the Instituto was
divided in two battalions of “Voluntarios Distinguidos”, one for those born in the Island
and another for peninsulares. Merchants and landowners from San Juan made the bulk

suponen; y es preciso conocer su carácter pundonoroso para graduar hasta qué extremo se
creen lastimados por la extinción del regimiento”. Tomás de Córdoba also pointed out
that disbanding the Fijo, closed the military as a career for most of the “hijos de este
país” who could not afford to send their sons to the peninsula.
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of these corps.66 In 1813, Capitán General Melendez dissolved the battalions and
reorganized them into the Cuerpo de Voluntarios Distinguidos. Melendez also decreed
that the new corps was to be integrated by those born in Spain or their first generation
born in the Island and authorized the use weaponry, including firearms, and uniforms
similar to that of the regular Spanish Army while simultaneously banning the use of
firearms among the urbanos.67 The voluntarios, who hailed from the most conservative
families, served as a counterbalance to the urbanos.
The other militia corps, the disiciplinado, was probably saved by the fact that it
was essential for the defense of the Island as to curtail its effectiveness, and by the sheer
lack of peninsular manpower to substitute it. Though the disciplinados survived
Melendez’s purge of Puerto Rican elements from the Spanish military, the demobilization
of the inhabitants of the Island would continue until the whole military and paramilitary
apparatus was firmly controlled by peninsulares and their offspring. The urbanos,
weakened as they were in 1817, continued to fulfill their duties for another five decades
until 1853 when the Capitan General, Lt. General Fernando de Norzagaray (1852-1855)
ordered the suppression of the urbanos in several towns. In 1855 the official order came
to disband the rest of the corps which was finalized in 1860.68 Eventually, Puerto Rican
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militias would be replaced by the Instituto de Voluntarios and the Guardia Civil (Civil
Guard).
In 1820, there was yet another brief wave of liberalism and constitutional
government. With the triumph of the constitucionalistas in Spain that year, the
Constitution of Cadiz of 1812 once more ruled the Island, and the liberales, who
continued to dominate the elections, actively sought to curtail the power of the Capitán
General by separating military matters from civilian affairs.69 The Spanish cortes passed
a law presented by the Puerto Rican representative, Demetrio O’Daly providing for the
separation of civil and military commands in Puerto Rico, and Francisco González de
Linares became the first civil governor of the Island in 1822. This separation of powers,
however, was short-lived; it was annulled in December 1823 with the return of the
absolutist regime of Fernando VII.70 After Fernando VII’s death on September 1833,
María Cristina de Borbón became regent queen on behalf of Isabel II, and named
Francisco Martínez de la Rosa as prime minister. The new peninsular regime
reestablished the cortes and called for new elections to be held on July, 1834.71 The
liberals continued to dominate the elections until 1836 when for the first time
conservative representatives were elected, mostly due to the restrictive system of
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“electores pudientes” or well-to-do voters, which favored the conservatives.72 Even after
the triumph of the conservatives in 1836, Spain saw fit to end American representation in
the cortes and to vest the military governor of the Island with dictatorial powers known
as “facultades omnimodas”.73 This absolutist period lasted until the Revolución Gloriosa
of 1868 which resulted in the overthrowing of Isabel II and her eventual abdication on
June 25, 1870. The return of a semi-constitutional period occurred as the result of a
combination of revolts which shocked the Spanish Empire in 1868. And, at least in
Puerto Rico, constitutionalism was severely limited by the weakness of the liberals who
had witnessed the military and paramilitary apparatus in the Island gradually fall into the
hands of the peninsulares and their conservative allies.
In 1864, the Cuerpo de Voluntarios Distinguidos, which since 1812 had acted as a
counterbalance for the Puerto Rican militias, was reorganized and expanded with the
name of Instituto de Voluntarios. Negroni agrees that the expansion was necessary to
replace the permanent garrison in the Island much of which had been sent to La Española
to suffocate the Dominican rebellion which followed that island’s reincorporation to the
Spanish empire in 1861.74 The need to replace the troops was indeed real. However,
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nothing but the peninsulares’ fear and their mistrust of those born in the Island justified
the replacement of regular troops by the volunteers. Though the urbanos had been
demobilized a few years earlier, the disciplinados were still in place and could have taken
the place of the regular troops. The colonial authorities, nonetheless, decided once more
to insult the militia by strengthening the peninsulares and those born in Puerto Rico who
were known conservatives and ultra loyalists.
On June 7, 1867, an event known as the Tercer alzamiento de artilleros, occurred
in San Juan. Disgusted by not enjoying the same privileges as the artillery men serving
in the peninsula, a group of soldiers from the artillery regiment rioted. Though the
uprising was triggered by the economic inequalities between peninsular soldiers serving
in the Island and those in the peninsula, the governor, Lt. General José María
Marchessi(1865-1867) ordered the execution by firing squad of a corporal and took the
opportunity to exile several separatists, among them, Ramón Emeterio Betances and
Segundo Ruiz Belvis.75 Ironically, exile put these separatist leaders directly in touch with
Cuban revolutionaries in New York and may have triggered the events that led to the
Lares revolt of 1868.
It is noteworthy that the Spanish Glorious Revolution (Revolución Gloriosa or
Septembrina) of September 18, 1868 in the peninsula combined with the Grito de Lares
of September 23 in Puerto Rico and the Grito de Yara of October 10 in Cuba to bring a
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liberal government to Spain. However, even though Spain was flirting with liberalism,
the governor of the Island, General José Laureano Sanz (1868-1870 and 1875) was
markedly reactionary. Sanz engaged heavily in political persecution and banishment to
quiet the liberals, and went so far as to create a Guardia Civil and to vest the Instituto de
Voluntarios with military protections (fueros) while serving as a political body. Under
Sanz the main mission of the voluntarios was to keep the liberals under surveillance and
to counter the Puerto Rican milicias which the colonial authorities had never fully
trusted.76 Furthermore, when the Spanish cortes approved a new constitution on June 6,
1869, it was not extended to Puerto Rico. At this point, the cortes were bent upon
following a colonial policy of assimilation regarding insular possessions.77
After the Lares insurrection, the Insituto de Voluntarios began to expand while
the milicias were being extinguished. Between 1868 and 1870, Sanz reorganized the
Instituto into nine battalions roughly divided by districts. On 27 July 1869, at Sanz’s
urging, the Reglamento de Voluntarios was published. Among other things it allowed its
members to be protected under the “fuero activo de Guerra” during time of war, and the
“fuero criminal” after fifteen years of service.78 These protections effectively awarded
legal impunity to the voluntarios. Furthermore, on November 1, 1868 at the urgency of
Sanz, the Spanish minister of overseas possessions authorized the creation of the Guardia
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Civil in Puerto Rico.79 The Guardia Civil was always limited to internal affairs, meaning
that its mission was to control the population and civil order. Sanz immediately moved to
make of the guardia a loyal and effective repressive tool. Since its inception its members
were from the conservative faction in the Island who immediately proceeded to persecute
the liberals. In its first years, the guardia was composed of roughly 300 men, all of them
peninsulares. Like the voluntarios, the Guardia Civíl soon came to be protected by all
the fueros protecting the military.80
Immediately before the Lares revolt, the Milicias Disciplinadas were composed
of 7,900 men, which as Negroni points out was about the same strength of the Puerto
Rico U.S. National Guard in 1992 when the Island’s population approached four million
inhabitants. Since a lieutenant, an alférez (second lieutenant in the Spanish military) and
a few soldiers from the militia participated in the revolt, the loyalty of the whole corps
was put in doubt. On February 12, 1870, Governor General Sanz ordered the suppression
of the Milicias Disciplinadas’ active service effective March 1870. The troop was
discharged. The cadre of officers was allowed to continue wearing their uniforms and to
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receive monthly payments for service and pension, but for all purposes they had no
reason d’être.81
Military education also came to be reserved for peninsulares and their
conservative allies. Out of O’Reilly’s recommendations a military academy had been
founded in the Island in 1765.82 In 1874 the Academia was reorganized and renamed the
Academia de Infantería with room for sixteen cadets. Though in theory anyone between
the ages of sixteen and twenty-five could apply for admission (fourteen, if the applicant
was a member of a military family), the acceptance requirements effectively banned
those not belonging to the elite from studying in the Academia.83 Moreover, two thirds of
the positions were to be filled by the children of military personnel leaving the remaining
third children of civilians. Since Puerto Ricans were effectively banned from the military
(until 1884) two thirds of the cadets were actually the children of peninsular officers,
and, given the rigorous requirement for admittance, only those in position to secure an
extraordinary education for their children could hope to send them to the Academia. This
elite academy, which provided the best education in the Island until the change of
sovereignty in 1898 was in effect reserved for peninsulares, their offspring, and the
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elite.84 In 1880 the Island was allowed to send students directly to the military academies
in Spain, but being that the admittance process was as rigorous and with the added
economic constraint, the military schools were for all purposes reserved for the Island’s
elites.
For practical purposes, the elimination of el Fijo in 1815, the urbanos between
1855 and 1860, and the disciplinados in 1870, coupled with the strict requirements and
exclusionary policies of the military academy, combined to demobilize the inhabitants of
Puerto Rico with the exception of the peninsulares and their conservative allies.
Moreover, as Puerto Ricans were being excluded from traditional military and
paramilitary institutions, the colonial administration used every opportunity to strengthen
the Guardia Civíl and the voluntarios. The dearth of a military force that could
counterbalance the military institutions in the hands of peninsulares weakened the
liberals who had to be content with whatever liberal reforms emerged from the political
crises which periodically took place in the peninsula.
Out of the reforms that followed the critical period of September1868, emerged
the first political parties in the Island. On November 20, 1870 the Partido Liberal
Reformista (PLR) was founded in Puerto Rico. Farmers, cattle ranchers, industrialists,
storekeepers, professionals and the middle class made the bulk of the party.85 The
liberal-reformists were divided between two philosophies: autonomy and assimilation.
84
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The latter became dominant breaking with a long tradition of liberals seeking autonomy
dating back to the first Puerto Rican delegado a las cortes, Ramón Power y Giralt.
Undoubtedly, the quick suppression of the Lares’ rebels, and the political persecution and
banishment of separatists and liberals alike provided the ground for this apparent rupture
with autonomist ideals.
A few days after the establishment of the PLR, the conservatives followed suit
and created their own party. New elections were held in 1871 and were completely
dominated by the liberals. These general elections conformed to the Spanish constitution
of 1869 which allowed for fifteen diputados a cortes to be elected. The liberals obtained
over 90% of the votes (9,773 versus 1,004) and elected 14 diputados. Sanz, who had
been replaced by the liberal governor Lt. General Gabriel Baldrich (1870-1871) on May
20, 1870, was the only conservative elected running for the district of San Juan where
most conservatives concentrated.86 The conservatives responded promoting instability by
causing riots and accusing governor Baldrich of harboring liberals. Their efforts bore
fruit, and Baldrich was relieved of his charge on September 13, 1871 and replaced by yet
another conservative, Ramón Gómez Pulido, in order to placate the influent
conservatives.87 New elections were held on April 1872 but instead of following the
electoral law of 1870, they were run under a decree recognizing the voting rights of only
free Spaniards, who were at least twenty-five years old, and who were literate or could
instead pay eight pesos to the colonial authorities. Nine of the fifteen delegates elected
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were peninsulares and eight were from the conservative faction. This phenomenon was
known as cunerismo or election by birthplace.88
The liberal delegates elected in that election succeeded in presenting the
irregularities of the 1872 elections before the cortes paving the way for new elections to
be held in August of the same year. The liberals won every district but that of San Juan
where the conservatives concentrated to elect Sanz once more. This period was followed
by a series of reforms including the final abolition of slavery, more extensive male
suffrage, freedom of the press and association, and the elimination of the governor’s
facultades omnimodas. In 1873 the liberals controlled every district as the conservatives
abstained from participating.89 None of these reforms would had been possible without
Amadeo I de Saboya’s abdication to the throne which prompted the Spanish Cortes to
declare the first Spanish Republic on February 11, 1873.90 The government of the new
republic moved to make of Puerto Rico one of the eighteen states included in the Spanish
federal republic and extended all the protections of the Spanish constitution of 1869 to
those born in Puerto Rico.91 These measures were short-lived.
The fall of the Spanish Republic on January 3, 1874 brought the accession of
Alfonso XII and a parliamentary monarchy to the peninsula, but the Island regressed to a
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more absolutist reality. Once more, Laureano Sanz was sent to Puerto Rico as governor
with restored facultades omnimodas. He immediately eliminated constitutional
guaranties as well as freedom of the press and association. Sanz also imposed a new
Bando (decree) banning vagrancy and expelled from the government and teaching
positions those deemed to be liberals. Moreover, following Sanz’s steps, on March 4,
1873, the Capitán General Juan Martínez Plowes had promoted the Instituto de
voluntarios to “active reserve of the Army” and expanded the corps to thirteen battalions
with four companies of 100 men each. The voluntarios were composed of the most proSpanish elements in the Island, and since its members belonged to the conservative party
(later Incondicional Español), they effectively became a political party in arms.92 After
his return to power in 1875, Sanz obtained permission to double the guardia civil, and
used both corps to persecute the liberals.93 Even though Sanz was removed in 1875,
mostly due to international pressure, his successor, General Segundo de la Portilla (18751877) was able to help elect “cuneros” from the conservative families. The conservatives
(“Incondicionales” after 1880) without the participation of the liberals won all the seats
in the general elections of 1876 and dominated all six general elections between 1879 and
1896.94 In just eight years after the Lares Revolt the liberals in the Island had been
weakened to the point that participating in general elections became pointless.
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It should be noted that the autonomists-liberals, boycotting the Ley Electoral
Maura of 1892, which imposed a payment between ten and twenty-five pesos for
electoral rights, did not participate in the general elections of 1893 and 1896. In the
elections of 1891 the autonomistas elected two diputados a cortes including Rafael
María de Labra and Miguel Moya y Ojanguren, representatives from Sabana Grande and
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In 1887, out of the havoc created by the colonial administration’s persecution, the
introduction of “compontes” or corporal punishment and imprisonment of hundreds of
liberals, under the governorship of Romualdo Palacio emerged the Partido Autonomista
Puertorriqueño (PAP).95 Though Román Baldorioty de Castro, founder of the party and
arguably one of the most influential Puerto Rican political figures of the nineteenth
century, desired a more flexible and autonomous relation with the metropolis, the
autonomistas’ assembly chose the views of Rafael María de Labra. Thus, the goals of
this new party were to obtain the same political and legal identity and protections as those
living in the peninsula and to seek the greatest degree of decentralization within the
framework of national unity.96 Even Luis Muñoz Rivera, soon to emerge as one of the
dominant political figures in the Island and faithful friend of Baldorioty de Castro, did
not believe that full autonomy was an attainable goal and urged instead for
decentralization. Weighting the options of the liberals, Muñoz Rivera rejected
annexation to the United States on the grounds that “all Puerto Ricans feel proud of their
Latin blood”. He also rejected the “…separatist rebellion which no one amongst us
defends, and, given the people’s circumstances is an impossible utopia.” 97
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The autonomistas did not participate in the general elections of 1893-96. The
whole period was marked by constant dissension amongst the autonomist leadership and
of electoral boycotting in protest of what they perceive as unfair electoral laws which
severely limited the number of voters. However, on August 8, 1897, an anarchist
assassinated the Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo setting the stage
for Práxedes Mateo Sagasta to assume the presidency of the Spanish government.
Sagasta, as leader of the Partido Liberal Fusionista Español, had agreed with Muñoz
Rivera to grant an autonomous government (régimen autonómico) to Puerto Rico in
exchange for the autonomistas support of his party.98 To reflect the nature of the new
alliance with Sagasta, the autonomist party changed its name to Partido Liberal
Fusionista Puertorriqueño. The republican faction within the autonomist party, led by
José Celso Barbosa abandoned the party and created the Partido Autonomista Histórico
(Ortodoxo).99 Soon after coming to power Sagasta made good his promise to the
autonomistas by securing the Carta Autonómica (Autonomous Charter) on November 25,
1897.
The Carta Autonómica of 1897 was liberal indeed. Sixteen Puerto Rican
delegates were to be elected by popular vote to represent the Island in the cortes of the
98

Bayrón Toro, 105-106. The idea of the political pact comes from Muñoz
Rivera and Rosendo Matiernzo Cintrón who were part of the autonomist commission
entrusted with securing a political pact with a Spanish party. The other members of the
commission were José Gomez Brioso and Federico Degetau, the latter opting for not
participating in the final pact as he espoused federal ideals.
99
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kingdom while three senators were to be chosen by an assembly of elected officials to
serve in the Peninsular Congress. The assembly also elected the eight members of the
Consejo de Administración (Administrative Council), which together with the 32 member
and popularly-elected Cámara de Representantes (Chamber of Representatives)
constituted the Puerto Rican Parliament or legislature. Title VII , article 43 of the charter
guaranteed veto power to the Puerto Rican parliament over decisions reached by the
Peninsular Congress, while Article 2 declared that the “present constitution shall not be
amended except by virtue of a special law and upon petition of the insular parliament.”100
The charter also provided for the creation of a cabinet by the wining coalition or party.
The seven ministries of the new cabinet were of extreme importance and included:
Treasury; Agriculture, Industry and Commerce; Public Works, Communication and
Transportation; Public Education; and Justice and Government, plus a presiding cabinet
member.101 However, as established by Article 41, the governor retained command of
all the armed forces in the Island, and all authorities and offices remained subordinated to
his office.102 Moreover, the charter was declared by royal decree and not by a law passed
by the cortes. Thus, while seeking liberal reforms, Sagasta and the liberals had to
circumvent the most republican of Spanish institutions.
The new regime was inaugurated On February 8, 1898 and general elections were
held in March 27 of the same. Of roughly 120,000 votes the autonomistas obtained over
100
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97,000 versus the conservatives 3,729 votes.103 Sixteen autonomistas, ten from the
liberal faction and six from the orthodox, were elected as diputados a cortes. On April
10 of the same year the first cabinet was formed and the three senators chosen.104 On
April 21, 1898 scarcely two months after the inauguration of the autonomic government,
the Governor General of the Island declared Martial Law. On July 17, 1898
constitutional guarantees were reinstated and the Insular Parliament was inaugurated.
Eight days later the United States invaded Puerto Rico.
The Carta Autonómica and the subsequent electoral victory represent the triumph
of the autonomistas, and throughout the following century it would capture the
imagination of different political groups seeking autonomy or other decolonization
formulas. However, the circumstances of such success must be examined. The granting
of the Autonomous Charter had as much to do with chance (the assassination of Cánovas
del Castillo) as with international and colonial problems plaguing Spain. By 1897, the
Cuban war of independence was in full swing and diplomatic relations between the
United States and Spain had reached a historical low. In 1895, when the Cuban rebellion
started with the Grito de Baire, the U.S. followed a path of neutrality, which actually
favored the Spaniards.105 Support of the Spanish regime, however, was conditional. The
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independent Cuba. This posture was the result of a century-old policy which favoured
and was ready to support Spanish sovereignty over the Island. This rationale was based
on the assumption that a Cuba controled by a weak Spain would be nearly as valuable to
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Spaniards had to facilitate Cuban trade with the U.S. and were not to relinquish Cuban
sovereignty to any foreign country or the Cubans. Moreover, any modification of
sovereignty that “did not result in U.S. acquisition of the island was unaceptable.”106
When it became evident that the Spaniards could not bring an end to the war, the
Cleveland administration took a firmer stand seeking to gain concessions for the Cubans
hoping that such measures would stop the conflict and prevent the independence of the
island. The Cuban rebels themselves had become an unwanted third party.107 By 1897 it
was evident that sooner or later the Cuban rebels would win the war. For three years the
Cubans had been destroying the logistic infrastructure of the island, rendering the
Spanish army incapable of launching major military actions. The rebels “had brought the
Spanish army to the brink of defeat.”108 They were so certain oftheir inminent victory
that they rejecetd Spain’s offering of autonomy.109 Unlike their countreparts in Puerto
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Prime Minister Cánovas del Castillo, emboldened by the death of the rebel
general Antonio Maceo on December 6, 1896 offered very limited autonomy to both
Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Cuban rebels immediately rejected the overture and
eventually so did the autonomistas in Puerto Rico, who also decided not to participate in
the elections. Cánovas del Castillo’s offer convinced most of the autonomistas in Puerto
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Rico, the Cuban leaders had the military means to obtain independence. This situation
left McKinley’s administration with two choices: to accept Cuban independence or to
sanction military intervention. McKinley followed Cleveland’s latest approach. In his
inaugural address he referred to the unrest in Cuba, and stated that a “firm and dignified
policy that would protect the rights of Americans everywhere was needed.”110 The
increasingly aggressive posture of the United States government put Spain in a precarious
position and made the ceasing of hostilities imperative. It is within this context that the
autonomic charter of 1897 came into existence.
Soon after the second class battleship Maine exploded in Havana harbor on
February 15, 1898, the U.S. entered the war and quickly defeated inferior Spanish forces
weakened by years of fighting in Cuba and the Philippines. As a result of its victory over
Spain, and by virtue of the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the United States
gained full control over Puerto Rico, Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippines, and
limited control – by the Teller Amendment - over Cuba.111 As it had been with the short
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lived political reforms obtained throughout the nineteenth century, the lifespan of the
Carta Autonómica was at the whims of the military and political rulers from the
peninsular metropolis. The Puerto Rican delegates were excluded from the peace
negotiations even though the future of the Island was at stake, and according to the
Island’s legal political relations with Spain, as stated in the charter of 1897; they had veto
power over such decisions. That they did not have a voice in the Paris protocols
evidenced the ephemeral and capricious nature of liberal overtures within the Spanish
political establishment.
The failure of the liberales and later of the autonomistas to secure a stronger
presence within the Spanish military in the Island or to restore the Puerto Rican militias
left them in a very weak position from which to negotiate with both Spain and the United
States. The autonomistas were also undermined for reasons beyond their control.
Throughout the nineteenth century the separatists consistently failed to become a
significant threat to the colonial authorities in Puerto Rico. More likely, their failed and
sometimes stillborn attempts to overthrow the Spanish authorities served as an excuse to
demobilize the inhabitants of the Island, to arm the most loyalists and conservative
elements of Puerto Rican society, to curtail civil rights, and to persecute those liberals
who stayed in the Island. Thus, separatists’ attempts served to erode the position of the
liberals who had to prove their loyalty and endure cyclical waves of retrograde political
persecution.

Amendement to the Cubans. The Platt Amendement defined American-Cuban relations
for half a century.
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During the periods of crises that periodically visited the peninsula and the rest of
the Spanish Empire, especially between 1808 and 1824, and 1868, Puerto Rico did not
obtain its independence. Instead of more inclusion, these periods of crisis provided
opportunities for the metropolis to exclude from the Island’s polity groups which had
previously enjoyed limited inclusion, while giving bureaucratic positions and putting the
military into the hands of newly-arrived peninsulares and royalists from the American
mainland. Actually, with the exception of some short-lived liberal openings, those born
in the Island were gradually demobilized and coerced into working for agro-capitalist
enterprises. The demobilization and peonización of those born in the Island were but two
sides of the same coin. Not surprisingly, demobilization occurred while new policies,
such as the reglamento de jornaleros, were established to provide cheap, and in some
cases free labor for the developing agro-capitalist industry.
When the Americans invaded on July 25 of 1898, neither the will nor the skills to
resist them or to overthrow the colonial regime were present among the population of the
Island which had been finally demobilized in 1870. Even, Ramón Emeterio Betances,
who had dedicated his life to winning Puerto Rico’s independence, lamented that Puerto
Ricans were not rising in arms to overthrow the Spaniards and warned that such lack of
initiative would doom its political future making it a perpetual American colony.
Betances lamented:
“What are the Puerto Ricans doing? Why don’t they take advantage of the
blockade to rise en masse? It’s extremely important that when the first troops of
the United States reach shore, they should be received by Puerto Rican troops,
waving the flag of independence and greeting them. Let the North Americans
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cooperate in the achievement of our freedom; but not push the country to
annexation. If Puerto Rico does not move quickly, it will become an American
colony forever.” 112
Eugenio María de Hostos, another exiled Puerto Rican revolutionary and independence
advocate, always decried not been allowed to become an artillery officer because though
he had the will to fight for freedom he did not know how.113
With the suppression of the disciplinados in 1870, civilian participation in the
defense of the Island came to an end and would not be fully restored until the creation of
the United States Puerto Rico National Guard in 1919. The “hijos de este país”, with the
exception of the most unconditional loyalists, were excluded from this vital access to
socio-economic and political power. Captaincies had been passed down from father to
son to grandson, and the capitán de milicias was a respected community member.
Moreover, even though conservative well-to-do volunteers replaced the milicias, they did
not capture the imagination of the Puerto Ricans, nor did they instill the pride the milicias
once did and continue to do. For, if the milicias had existed to protect the Island, the
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entities which replaced them were intended for the suppression of the local population
and the persecution of the liberals. As a matter of fact, every work of Puerto Rican
military history traces the existing U.S. Puerto Rico National Guard units to these militias
which came to be known as milicias puertorriqueñas and purposely exclude the Guardia
Civíl and the Instituto de Voluntarios from their lineage.114
In 1870, with the dissolution of the disciplinados, Puerto Rico’s military and
paramilitary apparatus came to be completely in the hands of peninsulares, and later
shared with their offspring. It has been pointed out that displacement of those born in the
Island by peninsulares precipitated the Lares Revolt and subsequent attempts to
overthrow the Spanish colonial regime, as well as the emergence of a distinguishable
Puerto Rican identity; ironically exclusion from the military has not been analyzed as
displacement, disenfranchisement and hence, a cause of severe grievance against Spain.
In effect, after 1870, as Negroni rightly points out, los hijos de este país were relegated to
the role of prisoners with the Island as their prison.115
The exclusionary policies of the Spanish colonial administration, as early as the
1810s, when the rest of the empire, but Cuba and Puerto Rico, revolted and finally won
independence, created tensions between criollos and peninsulares at the highest levels of
power. The emergence of the Instituto and the final suppression of the milicias sent a
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message to those born in the Island; they were not to be trusted for they were not really
Spaniards. More importantly, the male population that did not belong to the elite found
itself ever more excluded from access to socio-economic power, and even adulthood for
if they could not defend their land, they remained in childlike state, especially given the
colony’s military character and tradition. Removing the natives of Puerto Rico from the
colonial armed forces, a very restrictive polity, and dearth of a common education were
some of the patterns of exclusion that led to the slow development of a distinct national
identity in the Island. Thus it was not the Lares Revolt itself, but the policies followed by
the colonial authorities afterwards what fueled the developing of a distinctive Puerto
Rican national identity or identities. However, this was embryonic as Puerto Ricans still
retained many cultural affinities vis-à-vis Spain such as language and religion. The
developing of a separate identity was also slowed by the criollo elite’s reluctance to move
toward independence, which itself was a consequence of the weakening of the criollo
elite by the demobilization of the inhabitants of the Island. Nonetheless, the landslide
victory of the autonomistas in 1898 shows that the majority of the inhabitants had moved
away from the incondicionalismo español. This is even more important when
considering that the autonomistas of 1898 were not sponsoring the water-down version
defended by the liberals right after the Lares revolt, but a more radical stance which
among other things declared the right of the Puerto Ricans to govern their Island as they
saw fit.
When the first U.S. soldiers landed in the Island, most Puerto Ricans had no
reason to support the Spanish colonial administration. As a matter of fact, initially, the
majority of the people openly embraced the invaders. Soon afterwards resistance against
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the American occupation materialized. Most of the resistance as well as much support
given to the new imperial master was to come from the criollo elites who had played the
power game with the Spanish metropolis and would continue to do so with the U.S. This
time, however, separatistas, autonomistas and anexionistas had learned their lesson.
There would be neither independence, nor autonomy or inclusion into the Union if the
Puerto Ricans did not bear arms either as part of the armies of the new metropolis or as
native militia. Under the new regime, enfranchisement, regaining masculinity and
decolonization were to be sought by all means, including and in fact emphasizing,
military service.
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CHAPTER 2
PUERTO RICAN A LÀ AMERICANA: AN ALTERNATIVE NATION? 1898-1914
The native [Puerto Rican] soldiers have become an object lesson to the
communities in the neighborhoods of their posts… and from that standpoint, as
from many others have undoubtedly been a very potent education influence.
Each man of the battalion will be a committee in himself to spread among the
natives, stories of American prestige…

The soldiers feel a pride in their service

and there is an undoubted stimulant by it toward general loyalty.”116

In the aftermath of the Spanish-Cuban-Pilipino-American War of 1898, the
United States engaged in its first overseas nation-building projects. As de facto ruler of
the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico, the United States sought to transform the socioeconomic and political structures of these countries into something more in tune with
mainstream American tenets. In few places were these efforts as intense and prolonged
as in Puerto Rico. As the United States took over Puerto Rico, it immediately began
sanitary and relief efforts while building a public education system in the image of the
New England school system. The transformation of the Island was not limited to
humanitarian projects. The American colonial administration sought to change the socioeconomic and political structures in Puerto Rico too. In essence the structures created or
re-imagined by the colonial authorities were intended to mold the Puerto Ricans in the
image of Americans. Indeed, the new metropolis’ early attempts to “modernize” the
116

Charles H. Allen, Porto Rico Civilian Governor to Elihu Root, U.S. Secretary
of War, Telegram, Archivo General de Puerto Rico, Fondo: Oficina del Gobernador,
Serie: Correspondencia General, Caja 224, Folio 1595, Mayo 1901.
63

Island and its inhabitants through a nation-building project supposedly guided by
“benevolent assimilation” and “compassionate uplifting”, were part of a comprehensive
plan to “Americanize” the Island and its inhabitants.117 This nation-building project
relied heavily, both directly and indirectly, on the military.
The American colonial administrators, however, were not the only actors in this
play. The criollo leadership, from diverse political tendencies and for different reasons,
initially welcomed the Americans, participated actively in the institutions of the new
metropolis, and urged the acceptance of Puerto Ricans into the U.S. military as well as
the creation of a native militia to garrison the Island. Furthermore, the criollo leadership
developed and championed its own versions of Americanization for the Island. This
chapter analyzes the role of the U.S. military as part of the metropolis’ nation-building
project and the motivations of the criollo elite for supporting Puerto Rican participation
in the new military institutions. Did the combination of an American nation-building
project and criollo encouragement of participation in the institutions of the new
metropolis affect the self-perception of Puerto Ricans and hence their national identity?
Did early U.S. efforts to Americanize the Puerto Ricans transcend cultural differences?
And, did any alteration of Puerto Rican national identities transmute into political
movements or alter political loyalties among the inhabitants of the Island? Furthermore,
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did the new metropolis succeed in reversing perceived patterns of political exclusion
among the Island’s population? By answering these questions this chapter seeks to
underline the links between the military remobilization of the Puerto Ricans, political
enfranchisement, and the development of cultural and political identities in the early
years of American dominance over Puerto Rico.
Several factors facilitated the transfer of sovereignty over Puerto Rico from Spain
to the United States in 1898 and in fact eased the nation-building project as envisioned by
U.S. officials. The war in Puerto Rico was relatively bloodless which eliminated much
of the trauma usually associated with this kind of event. American troops landed in
Puerto Rico on July 25, 1898, and their campaign extended until August 12 of the same
year when Spain and the United Sates signed an armistice. During this period the U.S.
forces engaged the Spaniards on six occasions suffering thirty-six wounded and seven
killed in action while the Spaniards suffered eighty-eight wounded and seventeen killed
in action.118 Moreover, U.S. Army Major General Nelson Miles, commander of U.S.
troops in Puerto Rico, took great pains not to alienate the local population.119 He even
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When it was discovered that Private Louis J. de Haass of the Sixth Illinois
Volunteers had defrauded a restaurant owner by paying with confederate money miles
recommended harsh punishment. After a court-martial de Haas was sentenced to thirteen
months of solitary confinement and hard labor. Trask, War with Spain in 1898, 365.
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went so far as to try to obtain the release of Puerto Rican political prisoners in Spain and
Africa in an attempt to win the goodwill of the Puerto Ricans.120
General Miles took into account the support, or at least the neutrality, of the local
population when designing his plan of action in Puerto Rico. Surprising even his closest
aides, he changed the initial landings, scheduled to take place in Fajardo in the northeast
tip of the Island, to Guánica which is located in the southwest. Much emphasis has been
put on inter-service rivalry and Miles’ obsession with relegating the Navy to a secondary
role in this campaign to explain the landing at Guánica. It is likely, however, that
military and political matters weighed more on Miles than inter-service rivalry. As Miles
informed the naval commander of the expedition, the population of the southern part of
the Island was more inclined to side with the Americans than those near the capital and
that landing in the south would take the Spaniards by surprise, tipping their defenses off
balance.121
Regardless Miles intended to limit the role of the Navy in the Puerto Rican
campaign that was indeed the result of his strategy. After landing at multiple sites along
the southern coast the invading force moved west and north in four different columns
advancing without naval cover. That it was the army which received the most exposure
during the campaign, was part of Miles’ plan. He had informed Secretary of War Russell
A. Algers of the benefits of marching across the country as opposed to marching under
the protection of the fleet’s guns along the coast. He insisted that his troops’ visibility
would attract the support of the Puerto Ricans. In this regard he even opposed the naval
120

Ibid., 366.

121

Ibid., 351-53.
66

bombardment of San Juan on the grounds that it would cause unnecessary harm to
civilians and needlessly alienate a population willing to assist the Americans.122 In
effect, Miles undertook a campaign for the hearts and minds of the Puerto Ricans. His
gamble paid off. The immense majority of Puerto Ricans sided with the invading force
and welcomed the American soldiers as liberators. Puerto Ricans also volunteered as
scouts, provided intelligence, and organized small foot and mounted raiding parties
across the Island which scourged the Spaniards and their allies by burning their
plantations and stores and seizing their property. These actions hindered the Spanish
defense and accelerated Miles advance.123 In early August, the Gobernador General of
Puerto Rico Manuel Macías y Casado, complained to the Spanish Minister of War that:
“The majority of this country [does not] wish to call itself Spanish, preferring American
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domination. This, the enemy knows and is proven to him by greetings and adhesions in
towns that are going to be occupied.”124
Miles’ carefulness in not aggravating the population responded to U.S. designs for
the Island. On May 26, Captain Alfred T. Mahan,125 Secretary of War Alger, Secretary
of the Navy John D. Long, and General Miles held a war council. The U.S. had
considered invading Puerto Rico before Cuba to force the Spaniards to support the war in
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If someone could claim responsibility for the U.S. readiness to accomplish its
project of extra-continental expansion, that would be Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. The
impact of Mahan on the development of U.S. foreign policy was enormous.
Congressmen, presidents, diplomats and high-ranking military personnel, were well
acquainted with his work and many even studied under him and/or befriended the prolific
strategist. Among Mahan’s friends were: Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge, and John Hay, Secretary of State under President William McKinley. In addition,
in 1902, Mahan was elected President of the American Historical Association, the most
coveted position for a historian. American leaders were divided between two
expansionist theories, that of entrepreneur Andrew Carnegie, who applied Herbert
Spencer’s survival of the fittest theory to commerce and business, and that of Mahan.
Carnegie deferred from Mahan in that he saw an industrial competition, not a military
one. For Mahan, however, the fittest often gained ascendancy through military power.
What is more, the industrial and commercial competition and expansion proposed by
Carnegie would lead to rivalry for markets and raw materials, and thus sea power was
needed. Mahan argued that in order to maintain economic power the U.S. should control
vital sea lanes militarily. This approach required securing territorial bases to guarantee
its dominion of the regions important to its commerce. Moreover, military sea power was
needed to ensure that the nation enjoyed peace and industry uninterrupted by wars.
Furthermore, he was convinced that merely utilitarian arguments would never convince
nor convert mankind to join the great mission of the west, the uplifting and remaking of
lesser races. Thus, military preparedness and civilizational discourse were fused in
Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History. See; Alfred Thayer Mahan, The
Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
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Cuba from their own home shores. The navy, however, discarded this plan because it did
not need Puerto Rico to win the war in Cuba. Furthermore, the navy was concerned with
dividing the fleet between Cuba and Puerto Rico which could lead to an unfortunate sea
fight that could alter the balance of maritime power in Spain’s favor. Thus, the U.S.
decided to mount two expeditions in the Caribbean, but not simultaneously. Santiago in
Cuba would be the first target, and Fajardo, Puerto Rico would follow. Once Santiago,
where Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete’s fleet had anchored, had fallen there would be
no need to attack Havana.126
On July 3, the U.S. Flying Squadron destroyed Cervera’s fleet when it attempted
to escape the American blockade, and on July 13, the Spanish garrison in Santiago de
Cuba and its department surrendered. At that moment the war was practically over.127
There was no need to invade Puerto Rico to win the war. The U.S. had achieved such
military superiority over Spain that even Admiral William T. Sampson opposed Miles’
request for armored vessels to escort his transports to Puerto Rico.128 Still, Miles received
the order to proceed to Puerto Rico on July 18, and the Island was invaded seven days
later. The motive for such action was to occupy the Island before the end of hostilities
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prevented the U.S. from doing so. President McKinley’s administration had decided in
early June, to annex Puerto Rico “in lieu of indemnities” and the physical presence of the
U.S. military in the Island would undoubtedly strengthen the U.S.’ position. That Puerto
Rico came to be a colonial possession of the United States did not stem from historical
accident but rather from a calculated design.129
On July 18, the Spanish asked the French government to approach the United
States with a request for a cease of hostilities as a preliminary to peace negotiations. The
French ambassador to the U.S., Jules Cambon, communicated the Spanish request to the
White House in the afternoon of July 26. President William McKinley rejected the offer
for it did not say anything about the Puerto Rico or the Philippines. On July 30, through
the office of the French ambassador, McKinley delivered armistice terms to Spain
demanding that it relinquish control of Cuba and cede Puerto Rico, other islands in the
Caribbean and the Ladrones in the Pacific. Spain answered on August 1, inquiring if any
other territorial indemnification could be substituted for Puerto Rico to which
Washington responded negatively. Defeated in the Philippines and in Cuba and unable to
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win in Puerto Rico, the Spaniards agreed to American terms, and an armistice went into
effect on August 12, 1898.130
By virtue of the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, which officially ended the
state of war between the United States and Spain, the former gained full control over
Puerto Rico, Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippines, and control limited by the Teller
Amendment over Cuba. Spain had officially relinquished control over Puerto Rico and
on October 18 of the same year the change of sovereignty was completed with the
evacuation of the last Spanish troops and the raising of the American flag in all public
buildings. That day witnessed the inauguration of a military government which lasted
until May 1900.
The way in which the Puerto Rican campaign had been conducted and the high
esteem that Puerto Rican leaders and politicians had for the United Sates and its
republican institutions allowed for a widespread sense of goodwill towards the new
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metropolis amongst the general population.131 There was a belief that the Island would
be given independence or be incorporated as a state of the Union. The latter option
seems to have had the most support among both the elite and the masses. As a matter of
fact the annexionist movement dates back to 1898 when the former autonomist leadership
formed two parties, the Federal and the Republican, both with statehood as their goal. As
discussed by Rafael Bernabe, both Republican and Federal leaders in Puerto Rico
believed that the U.S. was not a nation but a political entity, a republic providing space
for many nations and peoples to coexist in equality while enjoying the benefits of
constitutional democracy.132 The leaders of these two parties saw in the Union the most
ample and perennial way of sovereignty. Unsurprisingly, roughly ninety percent of the
population in Puerto Rico (and of course for this number we use the archives and reports
of the metropolis) favored annexation to the United States during the first years after the
war.133

Nonetheless, neither independence nor federated statehood was granted to
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Puerto Rico. Instead the U.S. installed a military government and replaced it with a
civilian colonial administration less than two years later.
As it is evident from the diplomatic correspondence during the war, the United
Sates intended to keep Puerto Rico as a permanent possession. Furthermore, the political
elite and the popular sectors overwhelmingly favored becoming a state of the Union.
This situation begs the question; why did Puerto Rico become a colony as opposed to an
incorporated territory on its way to federated statehood? The type of territorial and
political expansion of the United Sates helps to understand the U.S.’s reluctance to
incorporate Puerto Rico as a territory. As the U.S. expanded westward the indigenous
inhabitants of the continent were eliminated, displaced or forcefully removed. Settlers of
mostly European background re-peopled the new territories and Congress moved towards
statehood once the socio-economic and political structures of such territories were firmly
in the hands of Euro-Americans.134 Though the leaders of the annexionist movement
knew this history, they believed that as a “civilized”, and “Christian” people fit for selfgovernment, the Puerto Ricans would be smoothly incorporated into the Union.135 What
escaped the annexionist leaders was that among the leadership and opinion-making
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groups in the U.S., Catholicism was not considered the religion of the “civilized”, nor did
they believed that Catholics had an aptitude for democratic self-government.136 Worse
yet, the Puerto Ricans were considered to be the result of miscegenation; an unholy mix
of Indian, Black and Spaniard. That the U.S. came to control Puerto Rico in 1898, when
the dictums of Social Darwinism, pseudo-scientific racism, the White Men’s Burden and
Manifest Destiny combined to guide U.S. policies upset the plans of the annexionist
movement in the Island.137
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The peculiar phrase “Manifest Destiny” was first used in an article and
regarding the impending war with Mexico in the Morning Star, December 27, 1845.
Manifest Destiny’s religious character was summarized by Reverend Josiah Strong. In
1895, the Evangelical Alliance published Strong’s Our Country, Its Possible Future and
its Present Crisis, which sold 176,000 copies. The basic characteristics of Strong’s work
were liberal theology, mission at home and abroad, social gospel, and the final
competition of the races with God’s blessings supporting the Anglo-Saxons who were
supposed to command, Christianize and civilize the world. Manifest Destiny had several
contributors in academia. After 1880, John Fiske, a historian and evolutionist, promoted
the vision of history as a dualistic struggle of worldwide proportions between conquering
civilization and retreating barbarism. This very popular author, also a philosopher,
reconciled the traditional religious belief in creation, with the then revolutionary new
principle of biology, evolution. The consequence was a firm belief on the dominion of
advanced races - of which the Anglo-Saxon was the most advanced - over lesser ones.
John Burges, founder of Political Sciences at Columbia University and mentor of
Theodore Roosevelt, was also instrumental in developing racial theories to explain the
destiny of the United States. He believed that the civilized states, founded by various
branches of the Teutonic races, had a “claim upon the uncivilized populations as well as
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Even the most influential American military strategist during this period believed
that the racial composition of the new territories posed a threat to the social fabric of the
United States. One of the most important points in Mahan’s theory was that sea power,
“as a national interest, commercial and military, rests not upon fleets only, but also upon
local territorial bases in distant commercial regions.” These territories, Mahan believed,
had to be extensive and densely populated by a population bound to the sovereign
country by “those of interest which rest upon the beneficence of the ruler; of which
beneficence power to protect is not the least factor.”138 According to Mahan’s definition
the purpose of acquiring colonies should be limited to strategic naval bases, rather than
turning them into a dump for the unwanted-as he believed was the case of Australia. For
this reason, Mahan harbored doubts about annexing the Philippines. He was solely
interested in obtaining the military bases needed to reach the Asian and Latin American
markets, and protecting the sea lines and the racial integrity of the United States.139
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Social Darwinism of Burges, met the Manifest Destiny of Turner, it was time to look for
new frontiers. These views were evident in Roosevelt’s The Winning of the West 188594, as well as in other authors’ frontier novels. See; Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation:
The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Atheneum, 1992),
24, 34-35, and, Stephanson, Manifest Destiny, 83. Also see; LaFeber, The New Empire,
95, 98-99.
138

Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Relations of the United States to their New
Dependencies” in, Lessons of the War with Spain and Other Articles, reprint 1970
(Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1899), 247-249.
139

Ibid.

75

Regarding the new colonies, Mahan argued that the U.S. should follow the
“beneficial and parent-like approach of the British instead of the inhumanly oppressive
Spanish model” for “alien subjects were still in race-childhood.” He concluded that ultramaritime territories could only be secured when “the advantages and interests of the
inhabitants are the primary object of the imperial administration.140 In short, Mahan
proposed to use “uplifting benevolence” to pay for the acquisition of the bases needed to
ensure the prominence of the Anglo-Saxon race. In the process he established a dictum
in U.S. extra-continental expansion.
The McKinley and successive administrations, as well as much of the American
public, came to believe that colonies were needed from a military and economic
perspective but that their inclusion as states of the Union would threaten the racial
integrity of the U.S.141 Consequently, in 1898 U.S. imperialism needed to become
colonial and depart from republicanism. In essence that transformation was also the
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court during the infamous Insular Cases which tested the
relationship between the metropolis and the new territories. In the case of Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), Justice Edward D. White stated that following the doctrine
of automatically incorporating into the Union newly acquired territories would curtail the
ability of the U.S. to obtain territories needed to advanced its foreign policy but
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undesired as part of the Unión.142 That Puerto Rico was simultaneously wanted and
unwanted by the U.S. had an impact on the American as well as the criollo plans for the
Island.
An independent or federated Puerto Rico was not a political option for the
McKinley administration. This situation had led to the passing of the Foraker Act of 12
April 1900. According to historian Estades Font, the situation in Puerto Rico, where
political factions and the population supported the Americans and where a military native
corps and a native Insular Police led by American officers guaranteed U.S. sovereignty,
facilitated the transition from a military to a civilian government.143 Secretary of War
Elihu Root, who initially opposed ending the military government, chose Puerto Rico to
try out the new colonial policy of no incorporation based on the aforementioned
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conditions, and, as recommended by Mahan, he emphasized following the British
imperial model.144
Known for its sponsor’s last name, Ohio senator Joseph B. Foraker, the Foraker
Act of 1900 established a civilian government for Puerto Rico. The colonial
administration was headed by a governor and an executive council appointed by the
President of the United States. Six members of the council were Continental Americans.
The people of Puerto Rico, as defined in Article 7 of the act, would elect thirty-five
members for the insular Chamber of Delegates and a non-voting representative
(comisionado residente) to Congress.145 The Foraker Act also established a political
body to be known as the Puerto Rican people. According to this article, those Spanish
subjects who resided in Puerto Rico by April 11, 1899, and their offspring, would be
recognized as citizens of Puerto Rico, unless they opted for keeping their allegiance to
Spain. By virtue of named citizenship, this political body, the Puerto Ricans, was under
the protection of the United States. The act also declared Puerto Ricans to be American
nationals.146
The Foraker Law disillusioned the leadership of both the Republican and the
Federal parties. When general elections took place on November 6, 1900 to elect the
Puerto Rican representative to Congress and members of the Insular Chamber of
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Delegates, the Federals abstained from participating.147 The Republicans, on the other
hand, immediately took part in the colonial government. The Republicans accused the
Federals of being anti-Americans. Mobs of Republican supporters, known as Turbas
Republicanas, organized under the name of “Comite para la Defensa del Partico
Republicano” (Committee for the Defense of the Republican Party). These mobs
harassed the Federals and the members of the Federación Libre del Trabajo, forcing
Muñoz Rivera and Iglesias Pantín to flee the country.148
Some Federals participated in the elections of 1902 breaking the monopoly of the
Republicans. In the elections of 1904 and 1906, the Federals, former members of the
FLT and some dissenters from the Republican Party, joined together in the creation of
Partido Unión de Puerto Rico, and gained control over the Insular House of
Representatives. Between 1908 and 1914 Unión would not lose a single district or the
office of comisionado residente. In 1912, disenchanted with U.S. colonial policies,
Unión discarded statehood as a solution. Independence, added as a possibility in 1913
would be renounced in 1922. The concept of the Libre Estado Asociado (Free
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Associated State) which had been the dominant one among members of Union since the
1910s became its only solution to the status question in 1922.149
As argued by Rafael Bernabe, the early colonial policies of the U.S. government
paved the way for de facto autonomismo. Even when the anexionistas controlled all the
positions opened to Puerto Ricans in the colonial administration, they could not do more
than to engage in the administration of the colonial regime.150 As discussed above,
criollo political leaders timidly challenged the metropolis and eventually shifted their
political goals. However, they did so within the parameters established by the
metropolitan power. Ironically, by participating in the colonial administration, Puerto
Rican leaders, many of whom were ardent anti-colonialists, showed acceptance of the
colonial regime and, in fact, further legitimized American control over the Island.
There were other reasons for accepting, or at least not opposing, the American
presence in the Island. Puerto Rico may have not moved politically in the direction that
the native political leadership desired, but there had been real political changes for the
masses. One of these changes was the creation of the Partido Obrero Socialista in June
of 1899, led by Santiago Iglesias Pantín. For the first time workers in the Island enjoyed
organized representation. This development was followed by the creation of labor
organizations such as the Federación Libre de Trabajadores. Moreover, suffrage was
extended under American rule. There were roughly 132,000 registered voters in 1898;
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159,000 in 1902; 221,000 in 1910; and over 273,000 in 1914. The voting population of
the Island more than doubled in a single generation.151
The U.S. slowly increased access to political representation, and urban and rural
workers found themselves suddenly enfranchised. Such headway would have not been
possible if the McKinley administration, its successors, and the U.S. courts did not
believe in upholding the principles of freedom of the press, assembly, speech, and
freedom of worship in the territories. The U.S. was engaging in colonialism, but it was
liberal colonialism.152 As argued by Ángel Quintero, the criollo leadership of Unión lost
appeal due to the metropolis’ influence amongst the working class. The working classes
used the liberal aspects of the metropolis, such as suffrage and free-association, to oppose
the “conservative and senõrial,” independence project of Unión and the unflappable proAmericanism of the Republicans.153 Whether intended or not, the new metropolis was
creating political spaces which weakened the economic and political power of the criollo
elites
Puerto Rico, like the other territories acquired during the war, was not to be
incorporated into the Union but that did not mean that the population and the territory
itself should not be molded into something more “American”. In this regard on February
16, 1899, President McKinley accepted the “burden of the Philippines, to safeguard the
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happiness of their inhabitants,” and later included the other territories, as he proclaimed a
campaign of “benevolent assimilation”.154 The United States would rule the new
territories, and in exchange it would civilize and modernize the natives via
Americanization. From socio-economic structures to individuals, the U.S. colonial
administration attempted to reshape the new territories in the image of the continental
United States. The main difference between the continental nation-building project that
led the United Sates across North America to the shores of the Pacific and the one taking
place in the Caribbean was that the new territories would not become fully integrated into
the Union nor would the natives become fully Americans. The new project of extracontinental nation-building would seek to Americanize but not to include the natives as
part of the American nation. In fact, the U.S. colonial policies of assimilation were
aimed at creating satellite nations orbiting the new universe which had the U.S. as its
center. For such a project to succeed the elites in the territories had to be loyal to the
metropolis.
In 1898, the immense majority of the Puerto Ricans were Catholic, spoke
Spanish, and had deep cultural differences with mainstream Americans who were
perceived as being English-speaking, Anglo-Saxon, and protestant, and as discussed in
Chapter 1, the population of the Island was well on its way to develop a strong national
identity mostly due to the exclusionary policies followed by the Spanish colonial
authorities after the Lares Revolt of 1868. It has been noted that the development of
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strong national identities occur in opposition to a more discernible Other.155 In the
aftermath of the War of 1898, the American soldiers in the Island and the subsequent
colonial administrators presented the Puerto Ricans with a different Other. However, if
there were cultural differences between the new metropolis and the natives of the Island,
they were cast aside by U.S. material superiority which allowed the new metropolis to not
only overcome those differences but to project cultural superiority.156
U.S. material superiority enabled it to embark on infrastructure projects, to launch
health and relief campaigns, and to create a public education system where the Puerto
Rican youth could be Americanized. Moreover, political enfranchisement became a
reality for previously marginalized groups, and the criollo elite actively participated in

155
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the political institutions of the metropolis. More importantly, perhaps, is that the military
remobilization of the Puerto Ricans started during the first months of the American
occupation. Thus, health and relief campaigns, the creation of a public education
system, more political inclusion, and the remobilization of the Puerto Ricans worked as
perceived inclusion especially when contrasted with Spanish policies of exclusion and
displacement.
More tangible things than political rights created a favorable opinion of American
rule among the working classes and especially among the peasantry. The popularization
of education in the Island by the creation of a comprehensive public education system
was one of the most important policies followed by the metropolis. As one of the most
effective tools to promote the culture, ideals and beliefs of the hegemonic group in a
given place, the public school system became a major battleground for control of Puerto
Rican loyalty. The metropolis attempted to reproduce in Puerto Rico an education
system similar to that of New England with English as the mandatory and only language.
The teaching of U.S. history and American mainstream cultural values were the
cornerstone of the system. In that regard, the metropolis had the help of criollo elites
which clamored for the establishment of such system.157 On October 30, 1898, less than
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two weeks after the transfer of sovereignty, an assembly of Puerto Rican educators and
prominent figures decided that the American method of schooling should be adopted as
soon as possible if Puerto Rico were to become a state of the Union. Furthermore, as
historian Rosario Natal details, Puerto Rican newspapers were beginning to publish
advertisements in English promoting American universities.158 It would not take long
before the Island’s elites began to send their youth to study in the mainland.
The prompt creation of a public education system by the American colonial
administration was intended to Americanize the population of the Island and to impede
the emergence of a Puerto Rican national identity. For over two decades, the Department
of Education in Puerto Rico remained firmly under American control. The department’s
memorandums and guidelines openly called for policing those native teachers that
strayed from the approved curriculum to include Puerto Rican culture in their lessons, as
well as those who criticized the colonial regime.159 Ironically, the school, a place for
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learning, became a tool for cultural assimilation and political repression. That is not to
say that the public school only served the interest of the metropolis. By popularizing
education the colonial administration weakened the position of the criollo elites, which
served the metropolis, but also created the opportunity for socio-economic mobility
among groups with no previous chance for such a thing.160
Of all the means used by the American colonial administration to promote the
Americanization of the Puerto Ricans one has always been neglected by scholars: the
military. The militarization of the Island under U.S. rule has been studied from a
diplomatic and strategic point of view, however, the role that military institutions
rendered in altering national identities and the influence of these soldiers in the political
development of the Island have been mostly ignored.161
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was under direct military rule between October 18, 1898 and May 1900. Even after a
civilian government replaced the military regime, Puerto Rico continued, but for a few
exceptions, under control of the Bureau of Insular Affairs.162 The BIA was an organ of
the U.S. War Department created in the aftermath of the War of 1898 to administrate the
overseas colonies. Puerto Rico was under direct control of War Department from 1909
until President Franklin Delano Roosevelt placed it under the Department of the Interior
in 1934.
There are two aspects of the role of the military in the Island that need to be
considered. The U.S. military involvement in Puerto Rico had a direct approach and an
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indirect approach, and both roles fomented ties with the Puerto Rican peasantry and
further Americanization. Direct involvement refers to the remobilization of the Puerto
Ricans and their inclusion in the armed forces of the metropolis. Indirect involvement
concerns any interaction of non-military nature between the U.S. Army and the people of
Puerto Rico. While fulfilling the later the military is adopting the role of a governmental
entity. It was the authority on the Island (at least during direct military rule) but it was
also in charge of offering relief to the population especially during catastrophes. In this
regard, the military government soon found itself fulfilling that function after August 8,
1899, when hurricane San Ciriaco destroyed the majority of the crops, thousands of
peasants’ dwellings, and killed roughly 3,400 Puerto Ricans.163 The population received
military rations from the troops garrisoning the Island, as well as medical care. The role
of the U.S. military, however, went beyond immediate relief. As estimated by military
authorities, the Army had to assist a vast portion of the population for several months.164
It was during the relief effort after San Ciriaco that a junior medical officer
discovered the cause of chronic anemia, the worst ailment afflicting the Puerto Rican
163
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peasantry in the early twentieth century. While in charge of the medical detachment in
Ponce, Bailey K. Ashford, a U.S. Army doctor, realized that the poor physical condition
of the Puerto Rican Jíbaro, was not due to the climate but to hookworms. Bailey found
that the worm Ancylostoma duodenale was the cause of the epidemic anemia in Puerto
Rico. The remedy was simple enough; purging the parasites by administering the patients
a concoction of Thymol-a phenol found in the oil of thyme- diluted in alcohol.165
The medical establishment in the Island had long argued that the chronic anemia
or “laziness” affecting the peasants, which was responsible for one third of all deaths in
the Island, was due to the climate, nutrition, bad hygiene or malaria, or a combination of
these factors, and as such, it was endemic in the mountains and coastal plains where the
Jíbaro lived. Ashford recounts that when asked how their relatives had died, most
peasants would respond, and physicians would confirm: “De la anemia- la muerte natural,
of anemia- natural death”.166 Even his wife, who came from prominent criollo families,
explained to him “… that is the anemia of the country. They all die of it eventually.”167
Ashford could hardly believe that a whole “agricultural class” was dying of
anemia.168 He was even more dumbfounded by the upper classes’ lack of interest in
treating such a preventable and curable disease. After years of trying to persuade the
medical establishment to adopt the relative easy cure for pandemic anemia, Ashford was
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finally able to secure the creation of the Porto Rico Anemia Commission with a budget of
5,000 U.S. dollars in 1904.169 After initially setting up the anemia camp in Bayamón,
Ashley decided to move to Utuado, almost at the center of the Island but with roads
connecting to the Northwest, so those more in need of treatment could reach him. That
first campaign treated 5,490 patients.
Not everyone was content with the sanitary campaign of the Porto Rico Anemia
Commission. The effect that curing the Jíbaros could have on the socio-economic and
political realm frightened some elements of Puerto Rican society. Bailey writes that a
would-be assassin, who also had hookworms, entered his hospital in Utuado but was
quickly subdued by him and his assistant and treated for the anemia. The cured man
returned months later to the hospital, and asked Ashford to decide what to do with the
man who had hired him to harm the doctor. Ashford asked him to make sure the Jíbaros
from Utuado did not elect him to any political position.170
For the year 1905-06 the Anemia Commission moved its base to Aibonito,
another mountain town but near the southeast.171 By the end of the second year the
Commission had treated 170,000 patients, and the death rate had been reduced to .12 of
one percent for those treated. Deaths from anemia fell from 11,875 in 1900-1901 to
1,758 in 1907-1908. The campaign lasted seven years. Between 1904 and 1911 over
310,000 people were successfully treated for the anemia. In Doctor Ashford’s account
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that number represented “1,600,000 visits over mountain trails and hot coast-lands to see
the doctor.” 172
Ashford also stated that after compiling the answers given to him by planters in a
survey he devised, the planters estimated a gain of 61% in workers efficiency.173 A
planter from Aguadilla wrote to him that:
I have observed that some of our peasants at a certain period of the year were left
completely without support, for this terrible disease prevents them from working,
and they had to beg in order to live. To-day, however, after cure of their anemia,
they [the peasant and agricultural workers] own something -a little business, a
cow, a nice little house, and, in addition subsist happily and work constantly.174
Ashford also discovered that if the cause of the anemia was parasitical, it was
severely aggravated by the peasants’ malnutrition. He recommended that socioeconomic problems such as extremely low income, which he believed accounted for
malnutrition and ignorance plaguing the Jíbaro, should be addressed to finally eradicate
once and for all preventable diseases crippling the Puerto Rican peasantry.175 Only that
way, he believed, would the Jíbaro awaken from his long sleep and small world and
become an integral part of Puerto Rican society. He wrote: “Yet this is the man of whom
we have to make a citizen, a man with a vote and a say in the affairs of the Island. He has
been the awakening of Rip Van Winkle, and he has awakened into a world that leaves
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him gasping, stunned. He is neither a degenerate nor a fool”176 Adopting a paternalistic
stance, the military establishment in the Island, from infantry to medical officers took the
Jíbaro as a ward to be protected, and reshaped.
A special relationship between the U.S. military and the peasantry started to
develop during the early days of the American occupation as a result of the relief efforts
and sanitary campaigns launched by the military government. As discussed by historian
Estades Font, the motives behind such practices were not exclusively humanitarian. She
explains that controlling tropical diseases was economically and militarily vital for
American expansion. The labor force of the new territories, the occupation troops, and
the civilian population of the mainland needed to be protected from such diseases.177
Most of the relief, sanitary and humanitarian campaigns carried out by the military and
civilian colonial authorities in Puerto Rico targeted formerly disenfranchised groups: the
peasants, Jíbaros, and urban workers. In this respect, these efforts were part of a broader
strategic agenda-- securing the loyalty of the inhabitants of the Island and promoting proAmerican feelings. These sectors of Puerto Rican society were also the main target of
Americanization efforts. Either consciously or unbeknownst to them, the metropolitan
administrators were playing a game of divide and conquer. Be that as it may, the
question remains whether these efforts were rewarded. This type of military involvement
could not be perceived but as a positive gesture. In many respects, the services provided
by the military and its interactions with the population facilitated the development of a
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special relationship between the native population of the Island and the U.S. military and
thus eased the acceptance of American rule.
Military involvement in the Island was not limited to providing aid or functioning
as de facto government. As early as 1899 Puerto Ricans were serving in U.S. army
units.178 This phenomenon was the result of several factors. American politicians begun
to feel the pressure from their constituencies to bring the troops home as soon as the war
was over. Consequently, the elected officials of the states of the American Union, which
had pressured the War Department to send their volunteers into battle before the war
ended, started to urge the McKinley administration to bring back the troops. By August
23, 1898, General Miles was proposing to return as much as a third of the invading force
to the mainland. Shortly after, the War Department decided to send fresh regular and
volunteer troops to conduct the occupation.179 However, after the transfer of sovereignty,
continental politicians demanded the return of these fresh troops too, especially the
volunteer state militias.
The manpower situation was further complicated due to the Pilipino insurrection
which aggravated the shortage of regular U.S. troops. With state officials clamoring for
178
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the return of their respective states’ militias and a well organized insurrection against the
American occupation forces in the Philippines, there was little support for continuing to
occupy Puerto Rico with continental troops, especially when the Americans faced no
organized political resistance and enjoyed the goodwill and support of the general
population. The Island, however, secured from Spain mostly for its military value, had to
be defended. It is within this framework that Puerto Ricans began to serve in the U.S.
military in organized corps.
Puerto Rican politicians were only too eager to volunteer the population for
military service. Cayetano Coll y Toste, a prominent figure in Puerto Rico and a civilian
secretary to Brigadier General George W. Davis, the military governor of Puerto Rico,
claimed that he encouraged Davis to form a battalion of native volunteers to replace the
American troops in the Island while touring Spanish military installations.180 In fact, the
process of organizing a native military had been initiated under Davis’ predecessor,
Major General Guy V. Henry. Additionally, the first proponent of Puerto Rican military
service in the U.S. military was a most unlikely figure, Eugenio María de Hostos.
Historian Rafael Bernabe has discussed many of the political responses to American
imperialism developed by Puerto Rican leaders by the turn of the nineteen century. In a
work that demystifies early independence and statehood defenders, Bernabe argues that
many of the latter where in fact radical anti-colonialists. Even Eugenio María de Hostos
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proposed Americanization of the Island and its inhabitants as a way to lead toward selfdetermination, democracy, and modern republicanism.181
On January 20 1899, Eugenio María de Hostos, as one of the Puerto Rican
commissioners traveling to Washington to discuss the future of the Island, urged
President McKinley to reduce the American occupation forces and to create a native
militia of at least 300 men.182 The same petition included the replacement of the military
government by a civilian one while Congress decided, with the consent of the Puerto
Ricans, the future of the Island.
Regarding education, Hostos proposed that “the military schooling of the people
of Puerto Rico be considered as one of means we need for the education of our people.”
Military instruction, he argued, “is a tool for the physical strengthening and discipline of
the life and character of the Puerto Rican people” 183 He also proposed the establishment
of seven institutes in which military training would be used to promote discipline of the
body and soul, teach strong work ethics and concepts of rights and obligations. In
essence, Hostos believed that the right type of military training promoted civic virtues.
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“…deseo que la enseñanza militar del pueblo de Puerto Rico sea considerada
como uno de los recursos que necesitamos para la educación de nuestro pueblo... la
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He envisioned “civilian schools to be military schools and the military training in our
schools to be civic learning for life.”184
Hostos also defended the Americanization of the Puerto Rican which he
understood as the political modernization of the inhabitants of the Island. In 1900,
disillusioned with the policies of the McKinley administration, he stated that the
president had betrayed the goal of Americanizing the Island.185 Though Hostos preferred
an independent Puerto Rico and ideally part of an Antillean Confederation, he considered
that if the people of Puerto Rico so desire it, the Island should become a state of the
American Union. Furthermore, he believed that Americanization “would prepare Puerto
Rico to effectively assert its independence”. Those thoughts were not contradictory.
Hostos believed in self-determination but feared that centuries of oppression had
weakened the Puerto Ricans to the point to where they might not even constitute a
people. According to Hostos, to exercise self-determination the Puerto Rican needed to
adopt the ideals guiding the creation of the United States, which he considered the “the
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“En vez de un plan de gobierno que habría americanizado a Borinquen en
cuanto el Americanismo es un bien, y la habría preparado para ejercer eficazmente su
independencia en la vida de relación con los demás pueblos de la tierra, McKinley y el
sindicato político que no ven más allá de la continuación del partido republicano en el
poder, no vieron otra cosa en Puerto Rico que el campo de explotación que creían dar a la
codicia de sus parciales o a la vana gloria del vulgo americano” “Carta al Director de La
Correspondencia de Puerto Rico,” October 1900, in Hostos, Los rostros del camino, 15658.
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most complete civilization in existence.”186 For Hostos, military education and service
might very well serve to speed the Americanization- understood as political
modernization- of the Puerto Ricans and their eventual self-determination.
Other prominent politicians adopted Hostos’ philosophy. Rosendo Matienzo
Cintrón, one of the founders of the Republican Party in Puerto Rico, and initially an
intractable promoter of statehood for the Island, shared some of the ideas espoused by
Hostos with regard to Americanization. For Matienzo Cintrón Americanization meant
democratic modernization. Political freedom, democratic rights, secular education,
separation of Church and State, workers’ and women’s rights, and the utilization of
research and science for the betterment of all aspects of human life were all part of his
understanding of democratic modernization.187 This radical position, as argued by Rafael
Bernabe, would eventually lead him to organize the Partido Independencia in 1912.188
Just as many others who admired the founding principles of the United States of
America, Matienzo Cintrón grew disillusioned with the colonial apparatus established in
the Island by the McKinley administration via the Foraker Act of 1900. Like Hostos, he
denounced the “false Americanization” taking place in the Island. He believed that if
Americanization was “democratic modernization” then by imposing a colonial regime to
the Puerto Ricans the government of the United States was engaging in false
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Americanization and thus betraying its founding principles.189 However, strong
opposition to American policies in the Island came late and was, in many occasions,
drowned out by the majority of the criollo political establishment.
With no initial opposition from the criollo leadership, with the blessing of the
military governors, and the real need of manpower elsewhere, the remobilization of the
Puerto Ricans under American rule proceeded swiftly. On March 2, 1899 Congress,
through the Army Appropriation Bill, authorized the creation of a native corps in Puerto
Rico. On March 24, Major General Guy V. Henry, commanding officer of the Porto
Rico Military Department ordered the recruitment of natives to form a battalion. In early
May, the 400 men needed for the Porto Rico Battalion had been recruited, equipped and
trained. On May 20, 1899, General George W. Davis, who had replaced General Henry,
published General Order No. 65 activating the battalion of Porto Rican Volunteers.190
In many respects, the battalion of volunteers was primarily regarded as colonial
troops and only expected to defend the Island.191 The military authorities added a cavalry
battalion and changed the name of the Porto Rico Battalion to the Porto Rico Regiment
United States Volunteers (P.R. U.S.V.) in 1900.192 The name change in name is
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General Order No. 34 of February 12, 1900. The order allowed for the
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stationed in Henry Barracks in the mountain town of Cayey. José Norat-Martínez, ed.,
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significant if only for the fact that the words “United States Volunteers” drove home the
point that Puerto Ricans were now United States nationals as established by the Foraker
Act. Over the following year, the Puerto Rican volunteers replaced the Continental
Americans troops garrisoning outposts throughout the Island.193 In 1905 all American
soldiers in the Island, but their commanders, were natives of Puerto Rico.
The native corps became a regiment of the United Sates Army in July 1, 1908 by
an act of congress.194 It is very interesting that this was the same year when Unión
consolidated its political power. Unión represented a challenge to the American colonial
administration since the party advocated more autonomy or even independence, and as
the polls showed, the ardently pro-American Republicans were losing their appeal. Was
transforming the native regiment into a regular army unit an attempt to secure the loyalty
of the troops or even intimidate the political opposition? These soldiers never indicated
discontent with the political arrangement, but then again, even during World War II, the
colonial authorities had many of the regiment’s members, including officers, under
surveillance. Thus, it is more than feasible that the colonial authorities were in fact trying
to send a message to both their political opposition and the troops.195 These native troops
played a very important role in the acceptance of American rule and on the
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Americanization project itself. Losing their allegiance could seriously weaken the
American position in the Island.
The challenge to American rule did materialize. In 1909, Unión, which
dominated the Chamber of Delegates in Puerto Rico, directly challenged the colonial
administration by refusing to pass the governor’s budget. President William Howard Taft
(1909-1913) moved swiftly to curtail the means of political opposition and obtained from
congress an amendment to the Foraker Act enabling the governor to use the budget from
the previous year if the Puerto Rican Chamber of Delegates did not approve his proposal.
This amendment also authorized the president to place the Island under the War
Department’s Bureau of Insular Affairs.196 Estades Font has emphasized that it was in
the interests of the metropolis and its colonial administrators to weaken Unión, which
was heavily dominated by coffee growers, who after gradually losing socio-economic
influence since 1898 and aggravated by the perpetuation of the colonial status, had turned
anti-American.197 Moreover, she argues that the militarization of the Island was an
integral component of American colonial domination. President Taft’s decision of
putting the Island under direct control of the War Department when local politicians
demanded more autonomy and a path towards self-determination surely supports her
argument.
The question remains, however, why was the metropolis so decisive and harsh in
dealing with the Puerto Rican Chamber of Delegates? Had it not been elected by a vast
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majority of Puerto Ricans and presumably held their allegiance? Furthermore, the U.S.
soldiers in the Island and the police, with the exception of most officers, were Puerto
Ricans in American uniforms. Was not there a possibility that these soldiers and
policemen in charge of the security apparatus might turn against the metropolis if its
policies became too unpalatable? In 1909, the native regiment and the insular police in
Puerto Rico were commanded by American officers. This situation surely strengthened
Taft’s determination to deal harshly with the Chamber of Delegates. As governor of the
Philippines, President Taft had opposed creating a Pilipino regiment led by Pilipino
officers but supported creating it under the command of American officers. He argued
that under U.S. commanders Filipino soldiers would be “entirely loyal” to the U.S. and
would perform efficiently while Pilipino commanders could lead the troops “into either
ladronism [sic] or insurrectoism[sic].”198 The colonial administration’s policies to deal
with Unión show that in fact the metropolis was confident in having the upper hand
regarding the loyalty of not only of the troops and the police but of the majority of the
population.
As previously discussed, Americanization campaigns targeted mostly previously
disenfranchised groups. Likewise the military remobilization of the Island pinpointed
disenfranchised groups and in fact exploited anti-Spanish sentiments. It is very telling
that the first volunteers to serve in the native corps came from the town of Lares, where
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anti-Spanish and pro-independence sentiments had been strong since the second half of
the nineteenth century and the only place where the 1868 revolt against Spain succeeded.
199

Moreover, the majority of those enlisting in the U.S. military were of humble

origin.200 The U.S. military, an institution usually associated with repression, became a
vehicle for social mobility and political enfranchisement in early twentieth-century
Puerto Rico. As part of the Americanization campaign and as a form of colonial
domination that was overt regarding the political classes but nuanced with respect to the
individuals who went through the institutions of Americanization- the military
remobilization of the Puerto Rican served the metropolis very well during the first
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decades of American rule. The American colonial administrators knew this only too
well.
Military Governor, General Davis, in his report to congress stated:
The native troops… may be relied upon for performance of the principal military
service for Porto Rico. They are a selected body of men, and exercise a most
beneficial influence. The inhabitants of the island generally are proud of them,
and the criminals hold them in wholesome fear. 201
Since its inception the Puerto Rican volunteer corps was relied upon to perform
three core missions. First, these soldiers were in charge of defending the Island against
foreign threats. Second, they acted as deterrence, first against criminals and later against
domestic political opposition. And, lastly, and probably more importantly; they were
supposed to provide an example to be followed by the general population.
So impressed was Davis with the performance of the native troops and with how
well the population regarded them that he recommended further reductions of continental
troops which at the time represented less than half or 735 of the 1,635 U.S. troops in the
Island. 202 He believed that with the added 475 officers and men of the Insular Police, a
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According to First Lt. J.S. Battle (11th U.S. Infantry), and first inspector of the
Insular Police, this corps was created in view of the vacuum left by the retreating Spanish
forces and the “the reign of terror was existing everywhere. Armed bands of assassins
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third of the previous Spanish police agents, the Island’s security needs could be easily
met.203
The American leaders liked showcasing their apparent colonial success by
bringing the Puerto Rican troops to Washington. The band and first battalion of the
native regiment participated in the inaugurations of President McKinley in 1901, and in
Theodore Roosevelt’s in 1905.204 But, the main role of these troops was to highlight the
virtues of American rule before their compatriots. The native troops had a very visible
role. They performed as firemen, had their own baseball team, which participated in the
local tournament, while the regiment’s band appeared in public and communal events.
In a telegram dated March 11, 1901, Charles H. Allen, the first appointed civil
Governor of Puerto Rico, communicated to the U.S. Secretary of War, Elihu Root, that it
was advisable to make the Porto Rico Regiment of Volunteers a permanent outfit. Allen
believed that native troops, under the command of continental officers, would be
adequate to garrison the Island. Commenting on troop loyalty Allen wrote: “They
have been tried in almost every emergency except that of meeting in arms people of
their own country. Whether or not they would be found wanting as such an important
moment, should it ever arise, I do not feel competent to say”. Allen continues: “But it
can be said that in many discussions on the subject with the officers that they would be
loyal to the sovereignty of the U.S. and implicitly obey the orders of their
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commanding officers. As an arm of safety their presence is therefore desirable.”205

The

question, whether they would fight against their fellow countrymen, would not have to be
answered until 1950.
Not just their loyalty was expected but by wearing the U.S. Army uniform,
Puerto Rican soldiers were to spread pro-American feelings among the population. The
native soldier, Allen stated, had become:
…an object lesson to the communities in the neighborhoods of their posts…
and from that standpoint, as from many others, has undoubtedly been a very
potent education influence. Each man of the battalion will be a committee in
himself to spread among the natives, stories of American prestige… The soldiers
feel a pride in their service and there is an undoubted stimulant by it toward
general loyalty.206
Several trends that would mark Puerto Rican participation in U.S. Military
institutions are identifiable in Allen’s statements. First, a professional and loyal military
integrated by natives of the Island would guarantee stability for the metropolis. Second,
service in the military was identified with progress and modernity Third, the native
soldiers, by becoming a model for the population, would be an instrument for the
Americanization of the Island further consolidating the command of the metropolis over
its colonial subjects. When a real impasse emerged between the criollos leading Unión
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and the American colonial administrators in 1909, the metropolis flexed its muscles for it
was certain that it could count on the native military apparatus and the general public’s
support. These trends would become more obvious and would be further developed and
challenged by the native leadership during the First World War. However, before the
Great War, the military and paramilitary apparatus in the Island was firmly in the hands
of the metropolis.
Under United States’ rule, access to military institutions for the “hijos de este
país” was reestablished while political participation- to a certain degree- was opened to
the masses. Soon after the war ended, natives of the Island started to replace U.S.
continental soldiers. From the beginning the new insular soldiers did not become part of
a home militia or National Guard but elements of the United States Army tightly
controlled by the American colonial administration. Additionally, the new metropolis
gradually allowed for a higher degree of political participation eventually creating the
space for mass electoral enfranchisement. These two apparently disconnected trends
facilitated the transfer of sovereignty over the Island from Spain to the United States, and,
more importantly, they transformed the character of Puerto Rican nationality. The
inclusion of Puerto Ricans in the armed forces of the new metropolis, and mass political
mobilization, especially of the rural sectors, gradually led towards competing national
identities.
The U.S. also embarked in a comprehensive build up of the public education
system, which was intended to Americanize and modernize the inhabitants of the Island,
while launching massive sanitary and relief campaigns. Hence, although cultural affinity
might have been absent between Puerto Ricans and Americans in 1898, the metropolis’
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control of the education system allowed for the projection of American material
superiority disguised as cultural supremacy. Furthermore, sanitary and relief campaigns
allowed for positive interaction between the new metropolis and its colonial subjects.
Whether these attempts were successful in “Americanizing” the Puerto Ricans is not the
issue. What is important is that even the people living in the most remote corners of the
Island started to learn about the United States and the culture of its dominant groups.
The fact that the military institutions, the political arena, and the public school
system were opened to previously disenfranchised groups began to profoundly alter the
islander’s national identity. Participation in American institutions provided unifying
experiences for the Puerto Rican masses which allowed for the strengthening of their
national identity but with an American touch. Public schools offered a homogenized prometropolis oriented experience for hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans while the
opening of the U.S. military to groups previously excluded from it and other sectors of
Puerto Rico’s society conferred these groups with a sense of inclusion. Access to
education and military positions also offered an opportunity for mobility and the chance
to overthrown old socio-economic hierarchies, a phenomenon that led to the creation of
upwardly mobile classes and neo-elites who owed their well being and thus their political
allegiance to the new metropolis.
Puerto Rican politicians’ participation in the military and civil governments of the
new metropolis further legitimized the American presence in the Island. The former
autonomists became anexionistas and roughly ninety percent of the population in Puerto
Rico favored becoming a state of the Union during the first years after the war.
Recognizing the pro-American sentiments of the population during the early stages of the
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American occupation, the political leadership in Puerto Rico decided to exploit it by
supporting participation in the political institutions set by the new metropolis and
emphasizing military service. Puerto Rican elites and the popular sector participated
actively in the institutions of the new metropolis further legitimizing U.S. sovereignty.
The early American attempts to create a new Puerto Rican via military servicewhich were supported by the criollo elite, including supporters of independence- were
curtailed by the limited scope of the project. There was no dearth of interest or lack of
enthusiasm amongst American officers and criollo leaders to embark on this project, nor
was the general population unenthusiastic. However, the small size of the United Sates
military apparatus, which because of its mission did not require massive armies, limited
the size of the military in Puerto Rico and its effect on the population. Nonetheless, the
re-mobilization of the Puerto Ricans begun during the first years of American rule as
Puerto Ricans came to wear U.S. Army uniforms and replaced Continental troops
garrisoning the Island. Furthermore, a special relation started to emerge between the
military and Puerto Rico’s population as military doctors and engineers combed the
mountains and towns of the Island building sanitary facilities, roads, and schools and
launched massive health and relief campaigns. The First World War would provide the
grounds to retry the projects of Americanization and modernization via military service at
levels previously unimaginable and with more players involved.
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CHAPTER 3
“A NEW DAY HAS DAWNED FOR THE PUERTO RICAN JIBARO”: WORLD
WAR I AND MOBILIZATION OF THE PUERTO RICAN PEASANT

Downtrodden, unthought [sic] for as he [the Jíbaro] has been, he is now in the
limelight. The testing and refining process will be hard for him. But he and his
brother will become the nucleus of a new Porto Rico. The anemic disease warped
man will be a thing of the past. And the domain of the Jíbaro will at last come
into its proper place in the great Economic and Social scheme of this island.207

In 1908, the U.S. government had sought to secure its control over the military
apparatus in Puerto Rico by making the native military corps a regular regiment of the
United States Army by an act of Congress.208 As a corollary to this measure, the Taft
administration attempted to augment the political power of the colonial bureaucracy in
Puerto Rico by giving full control over the Island to the War Department’s Bureau of
Insular Affairs (BIA) and by curtailing the ability of the Puerto Rican Chamber of
Delegates to challenge the presidential-appointed governor.209 After taking these steps,
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In 1909, President William Howard Taft (1909-1913) moved swiftly to hinder
the means of political opposition in the Island and obtained from congress an amendment
to the Foraker Act of 1900 enabling the governor to use the previous year budget if the
elected Porto Rican Chamber of Delegates did not approve his budget proposal. This
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the U.S. colonial administration enjoyed but a few years of relative political calm. Under
American rule, as it had been the case under Spanish control, a crisis tended to highlight
the military importance of Puerto Rico and to accelerate its political development. These
lessons were not missed by Puerto Rican politicians. Another quandary, this time the
First World War, once again provided for faster negotiations between the metropolis and
the colonial administration, the criollo elites, and to a certain degree, the general
population.
In 1917, as the United States prepared to enter World War I, the metropolis
imposed American citizenship upon the natives of Puerto Rico. American citizenship
preceded the first mass military mobilization of Puerto Rican peasants, agro-workers and
urban working classes in Puerto Rico. Since the very early days of American presence in
the Island, the metropolis’ leaders and its colonial administrators had argued that military
training and values would “Americanize” and “modernize” the Puerto Rican. During
WWI, Puerto Rican leaders, who had supported military instruction and service since the
days of the American invasion in 1898, joined the chorus of those who argued that
serving in the military would create a new man out of the Puerto Rican peasant. In this
regard, Puerto Rican politicians and leaders talked openly of using military service to
create a “new modern man out of the Jíbaro”; one modern individual, integrated into the
socio-economic structures of the Island as a productive agent by virtue of his military

amendment also authorized the president to place the Island under the War Department’s
Bureau of Insular Affair. See Estades Font, La presencia militar de los Estados Unidos
en Puerto Rico, 126-29.
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training. In a very real sense, both the criollo elites and the metropolis were engaging in
reshaping the very essence of the Puerto Ricans’ individual and collective identities.
The metropolis and the criollo elites found themselves locked in a battle for
control of the nation-building project via military service. Unlike the early days after the
American invasion, the native political leadership was no longer monolithically blindly
pro-American which led to the emergence of different “Americanization” and
“modernization” projects from the ranks of the criollo elite. Moreover, several factions
sought to transform active participation in the war effort into political gains. During the
First World War, Puerto Rican politicians encouraged military participation of the
Islanders in the U.S. military and support of the war effort, while promoting and
facilitating workers migration to the continental U.S. hoping to alleviate the dire
economic situation of the Island. Supporting the war effort, some thought, would prove
the Puerto Ricans’ loyalty to the U.S. and to the ideals of democracy and freedom.
Others believe that participating in the war would prove Puerto Ricans’ manhood and
adulthood which would put the metropolis in a very awkward position if it continued to
deny them political equality and to ignore their capability of self-government and of selfdetermination.210 Whatever their final reasoning, mass military service became a tool for
different factions which sought to achieve their goals by modernizing the Puerto Rican
Jíbaro- and by extension Puerto Rico- through military training and service.
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Though similar, self-government and self-determination are not the same. The
former refers to a higher degree of self-rule and the liberalization of the colonial regime
which some groups thought it would lead to eventual independence. Self-determination
meant allowing the Puerto Ricans to decide the political status of the Island by
themselves be it inclusion in the Union as a federated state, independence or any other
political arrangement.
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This chapter analyzes the projects and goals of the metropolis and its colonial
administrators vis-à-vis those of the criollo elites and the response of the masses to the
political changes occurring during this period. Was extending American citizenship to
the Puerto Ricans and the subsequent mass mobilization of the peasantry and the urban
working classes a transformative experience? Did a new Puerto Rican emerge from this
experience? Was the military-trained Jíbaro integrated into the modern socio-economic
structures of the Island? Did the competition between the criollo elites and the
metropolitan colonial authorities evolve into a shift of allegiances among the Puerto
Ricans by the war’s end? In other words, was American colonial rule in the Island as
strong as it had been before the war? And, was the first mass mobilization of Puerto
Ricans accompanied by true political transformations?
On June 28 1914, the assassination of the Hapsburg heir, Archduke Franz
Ferdinand in Sarajevo by the Bosnian-Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip activated several
European alliances finally triggering the First World War. By August 4, five European
empires were at war and would soon drag many other nations into the conflict.211 On
April 6, 1917, after years of carnage and with both belligerent alliances unable to win a
decisive victory in the Western Front, the United States entered the conflict on the side of
the Entete. On March 2, 1917, Congress had passed the Jones Act, also known as the
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By August 4 1914, five major empires were at war. The Austro-Hungarian
Empire was in war against Serbia, the German Empire against, France Russia and Britain.
The latter formed the Entete and were eventually joined by Japan, Italy and the United
States among others. Austro-Hungary and Germany were known as the Central Powers
and were joined by the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. By the end of the war over
20,000,000 soldiers and civilians had been killed, the Austro-Hungary, German,
Ottoman, and Russian Empire had collapsed, and dozens of nations emerged to take their
places. See Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History (New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 1994), 14-17, 32-34, 473-80, 497-523.
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Jones-Shafroth Act. This law granted American citizenship to the natives of Puerto Rico,
and served as the Island’s constitution until 1952.212 Unlike its antecedent, the Jones Act
allowed Puerto Ricans to elect their own territorial legislature and provided for universal
male suffrage.213 That Puerto Ricans became American citizens in 1917 have been
attributed by many to the need for soldiers as the U.S. entered the First World War.214
However, citizenship was as just one of the provisions included in the Jones Act. The
passing of the Jones Act was the result of years of constant negotiations between Puerto
Rican and American leaders.
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The Jones Act granted American citizenship to all Porto Rican citizens and to
American citizens who became Porto Rican citizens after moving to the Island and
residing in it for a year. The Act established a period of six months to reject American
citizenship. It included legislation to allow underage children whose parents had
previously rejected Porto Rican citizenship or who were of foreign nationality, to claim
U.S. citizenship in adulthood. Article 5c., allowed for “erroneously informed” peoplethose from parents who had chosen to keep Spanish citizenship in 1900 and did not know
they could become U.S. citizens- to claim such status. See Ley Orgánica Jones,
Artículos 5, 5a, 5b, 5c., in Fernós López-Cepero, Documentos HistóricosConstitucionales de Puerto Rico, 79-82.
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Articles 25-28 of the Jones Act established the Porto Rican legislature
allowing for the creation of a senate and a house of representatives. The members of the
legislature were required to know how to read and write in both English and Spanish.
The Senate would be composed of two senators for each of the seven electoral districts
and five senators not attached to any district. The House would consist of 39
representatives, one per district, and another four not linked to any district. The President
of the United States, however, still had an extraordinary amount of power. For instance,
he had the authority to appoint the governor, the education commissioner, and the
Island’s Supreme Court judges. See Ley Orgánica Jones, Artículos 5-5a 25-28 in Fernós
López-Cepero, Documentos Históricos-Constitucionales de Puerto Rico, 93-96.
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Including the last-appointed Continental American Governor of Puerto Rico,
Rexford G. Tugwell. See Rexford G. Tugwell, The Arts of Politics As Practiced by
Three Great Americans: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Luis Muñoz Marín and Fiorello H.
La Guardia (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958), 35-36.
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American citizenship for the indigenous people of Puerto Rico- known then as
Porto Rican citizens- had been contemplated by U.S. leaders well before 1917. President
Theodore Roosevelt continually proposed granting American citizenship collectively to
Puerto Ricans, but did not find much support in Congress. As a result of the political
crisis of 1909 in Puerto Rico, officials at the War Department studied the possibility of
granting citizenship to the Puerto Ricans. They came to the conclusion that even though
the status would be well received, collective citizenship was a premature step since the
majority of Puerto Ricans, they argued, were illiterate and unprepared for full political
rights. As an alternative, the Office of the Secretary of War suggested facilitating the
individual acquisition of U.S. citizenship by natives of the Island who were educated and
owned business or land.215 This recommendation was aimed at appeasing the local
landlords and merchant class. Senator Elihu Root opposed collective U.S. citizenship on
the grounds that Puerto Rico could not be admitted as a federated state and hence such
move would create two classes of citizens- a practice he believed to be inconsistent with
U.S. democratic traditions.216
Despite opposition from prominent Congressmen, projects to grant U.S.
citizenship to the Puerto Ricans were presented before Congress in 1912 and 1913.
President Taft, (and later President Wilson) the BIA and most of Congress supported
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This opinion was shared by Secretary Jacob McGavock Dickinson (March
1909-May 1911) and Secretary Henry L. Stimson (May 1911-March 1913), though
Stimson shifted his position later. See, Estades Font, La presencia militar de los Estados
Unidos en Puerto Rico, 204-06, citing; “Hearing Upon the Bill Proposing to Amend the
Present Organic Law of Porto Rico, January 31, 1910, to February 24, 1910”, Library of
the Bureau of Insular Affairs, National Archives Building, Washington, D.C.
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Estades Font, La presencia militar de los Estados Unidos en Puerto Rico, 207,
citing; Senator Elihu Root to Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, December 7, 1911.
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such measure. Taft’s appointee, Governor George Colton (1909-1913), also endorsed
taking this step which he thought would improve the United States’ image in Latin
America.217 Colton’s support for citizenship was not an aberration. His successor,
Arthur Yager (1913-21) was even more vociferous regarding this matter.218 These
projects, as well as the support for granting American citizenship to the Puerto Ricans
shown by Taft, Wilson, the BIA (reluctantly), Congress, and opinion-making groups in
the mainland responded to both local and international considerations.
In Puerto Rico, the emergence of a radical wing within the dominant political
coalition- Unión, which under the leadership of José de Diego demanded independence
under an American protectorate, coupled with the creation of the Independence and the
Socialist parties in 1912 and 1915 respectively to underline the socio-political unrest
festering in Puerto Rico.219 Furthermore, in 1913 Unión, though still working towards
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President Taft appointed Colton as Governor of Porto Rico in mid September
1909. According to the New York Times, Colton who at the time was serving in the
Philippines as customs collector, had work in a similar role in the Dominican Republic,
spoke Spanish fluently and had diplomatic ties with many Latin American leaders. See
“The New York Times, 13 September 1909;” accessed 12 August 2008; available from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html; and, Governor George Colton to Secretary
of War, December 13, 1912, in Font, La presencia militar de los Estados Unidos en
Puerto Rico, 208.
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Yager served as governor of the Island from 1913 to 1921. He was appointed
by President Woodrow Wilson, a fellow Democrat and a former classmate from John
Hopkins University. Yager had a Ph.D. in political sciences and had headed Georgetown
College in Kentucky. He served throughout Wilson's terms in office, and was succeeded
by Warren G. Harding’s appointee Emmet Montgomery Reilly. See “Puerto Rico Under
Dr. Yager: Citizenship in the New Bill,” The Progress of the World, American Review of
Reviews: An International Magazine XLIX, no. 1 (April 1914): 399-400.
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In the general elections of November 3, 1914, Unión, which had controlled all
districts in the Island since 1906, lost the districts of Mayagüez, Aguadilla and Ponce to
the Republicans. However, it continued to be the dominating political force obtaining
over half the total votes cast, wining 51 municipalities out of 75, re-electing Muñoz
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autonomy, had made independence its final solution to the status question after a period
of self-government under American tutelage.220 However, as early as 1915, convinced
that the U.S. would never grant independence, nor statehood to Puerto Rico, Luis Muñoz
Rivera- moderate leader of the Unionistas and Resident Commissioner in Washington
between 1910 and 1916- came to believe that a type of self-government or autonomy in
the likes of Australia’s or Canada’s was the best option for the Island.221 That the
dominant party in the Island had renounced inclusion into the Union highlights the
growing discontent with American rule in Puerto Rico. The metropolis, it seemed, had
squandered the general goodwill and pro-Americanism prevalent in the aftermath of the
war of 1898.
On the eve of World War I it certainly looked as if the metropolis’ control over
the Island was becoming precarious. Many Puerto Rican political leaders opposed the
Rivera as Resident Commissioner in Washington, and securing 19 of 35 seats in the
Chamber of Delegates. Bayrón Toro, Elecciones y partidos politicos de Puerto
Rico,143-45.
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The Socialist Party, led by Santiago Iglesias Pantín, and its union, Federación
de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, were associated with the American Federation of Labor
presided by Samuel Gompers. The Socialists defended Americanization and permanent
union with the United States. See Bayrón Toro, Elecciones y partidos políticos de Puerto
Rico, 148-49. Between 1913 and 1922 Unión’s dominant plan to change the political
arrangement of the Island consisted of three stages: first, securing autonomy; second,
exercising such autonomy; and finally, demanding independence. Historian Rafael
Bernabe explains that this platform was more likely intended to restrain de Diego and his
most radical wing than the party’s actual goals. See Bernabe, Respuestas al
colonialismo,48-49.
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Most of the discontent with the metropolis was voiced through La
Correspondencia which was first the newspaper of the radicals within Unión and later of
the Partido de la Independencia (Independence Party). President Woodrow Wilson made
clear that the Unionist Party would have to abandon the goal of independence to get the
administration's approval to amend the Foraker Act. Muñoz Rivera conceded and
autonomy became the goal of the Unionist Party. See Bernabe, Respuestas al
colonialismo, 49-51.
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granting of American citizenship without statehood or a general referendum on it.
Muñoz Rivera, though originally one of its main architects, opposed passing the Jones
Act if it included U.S. citizenship. He believed that such action would freeze the political
development of the Island while doing little to eliminate the colonial relationship between
the U.S. and Puerto Rico. Nevertheless on May 23, 1916 the U.S. House of
Representatives approved the legislation and sent it to the Senate, but it did not reach the
Senate floor before the Congress recess.222
Some of the provisions of the Jones Act irked Muñoz Rivera. One of his main
concerns was that the version sent to the U.S. House of Representatives included
restricted suffrage based on literacy and taxation.223 Also, while extra powers would pass
to the Puerto Ricans, such as the right to have a two house elected legislature; the bill
included veto power for the governor who remained a presidential appointee. Moreover,
collective U.S. citizenship was in fact imposed on the Puerto Ricans who were not
allowed to have a referendum on this matter. They had the right to reject U.S. citizenship
but doing so would turn them into foreigners in their own land. The Unionistas, who had
abandoned statehood as a goal in 1913, saw collective American citizenship as a
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In view of the failure of the Senate to consider this bill before recess, President
Wilson decided to cancel the elections in the Island scheduled for November 1916 so
there could be an especial election once the Jones Act was approved the following year.
See, Bayrón Toro, Elecciones y partidos políticos puertorriqueños, 147-48.
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Restricting suffrage on the basis of literacy and taxation was opposed by all
political parties as it would deny voting rights to 165,000 registered voters from a total of
roughly 250,000. Bolívar Pagán, Historia de los Partidos Políticos Puertorriqueños
(1898-1956) Tomo I, (San Juan, P.R.: Academia Puertorriqueña de la Historia, 1972),
174-75.
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drawback.224 Muñoz Rivera probably understood that the irreversible nature of
collective U.S. citizenship for the Puerto Ricans could have a defusing effect with regard
to political tensions, which could hinder the chances of advancing his party’s political
goals. By then, the colonial administrators also understood the political value of granting
collective U.S. citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico.
Probably no one was more adamant about granting American citizenship to the
Puerto Ricans than Governor Yager. Yager’s campaign to bring U.S. citizenship to all
Puerto Ricans was closely followed in the continental United States. In 1914 the
American Review of Reviews observed that Puerto Ricans should be granted American
citizenship and measures of self-government to reward their “continued improvement
under American tutelage.” Additionally, American citizenship, the journal stressed,
would eliminate “the germ of nationhood” fostered by the ill-conceived Porto Rico
citizenship.225 The article continued by stating that complete self-government- meaning
independence- was not an option because the Puerto Ricans “… are a Latin American
people with the characteristics and traditions of their forebears still clinging about
them.”226 This journal also made clear the dominant attitude towards the Island among
opinion-making groups and the true reasons for the change of heart regarding granting
U.S. citizenship to the Puerto Ricans:
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The Unionistas believed that granting American citizenship would killed the
chances of independence by definitely incorporating Puerto Rico as a territory. Jose de
Diego, Speaker of the House argued as such. See Bolívar Pagán, Historia de los Partidos
Políticos Puertorriqueños (1898-1956) Tomo I, (San Juan, P.R.: Academia
Puertorriqueña de la Historia, 1972), 173-74.
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American Review of Reviews: An International Magazine, 399-400.
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Ibid.
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The interest of our own country and Porto Rico demand this perpetual connection.
It is for Congress therefore to make the people of this tropical isle reasonably
satisfied with our rule; for the Stars and Stripes cannot permanently wave over a
discontented and rebellious people.227
Quenching social and political unrest in the Island and restoring a positive image
of the United States in Latin America had moved American leaders and opinion makers
to favor U.S. citizenship for the Puerto Ricans as early as 1909.228 The outbreak of
World War I probably accelerated the passing of the Jones Act, however, it is doubtful
that Congress granted citizenship to one and a half million Puerto Ricans just to have
more manpower for a war in which they were not yet involved, especially when at the
time “dark races”, including Puerto Ricans, were not trusted as fighting troops.229 When
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This journal highlighted that in 1914, over 200,000 children were attending
public schools in the Island. In 1914 Congress abolished tariffs on sugars which crippled
the industry in the Island. American Review of Reviews: An International Magazine,
399-400.
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Estades Font, La presencia militar norteamericana en Puerto Rico, 126-27,

212-15.
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The War Department limited African American participation to eight
segregated combat regiments. 380,000 African Americans either volunteer or were
conscripted during WWI. However, 89% of those soldiers were assigned to labor units
instead of combat ones. The all-Black 93nd division distinguished itself fighting
alongside the French Army, but this was poorly received by the Southern-dominated
Wilson administration and military commanders who argued that the French were giving
away military accolades to Black soldiers unnecessarily and unmerited. The American
Expeditionary Force Command in Europe even insisted that the French banned African
Americans from fraternizing with white French women because they worried of the
social unrest the return of these Black soldiers might cause in the United States. After
WWI was over, the War Department concluded that in future wars African American
and, by extension, other “dark” races should be limited to labor tasks. Based on distorted
accounts of the African-American performance during WWI, the military developed
policies based on racial stereotypes, a military version of white supremacy. See John
Sibley Butler, “African Americans in the Military” The Oxford Companion to American
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the United States took over Puerto Rico in 1898, the rationale used to retain the new
colony, as well as the Philippines, was that Puerto Ricans were not capable of selfgovernment mostly due to their racial composition, and centuries of Spanish
obscurantism. Contemporary imagery of the inhabitants of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the
Philippines, presented them as ape-liked black beasts, or as black children in need of
Uncle Sam’s guiding (white) hand.230 It is not coincidental that the U.S. Armed forces
began to heavily restrict the role of African Americans in the military after the SpanishAmerican War. Precluding African Americans from combat positions was but the local
manifestation of an imperial ideology justified on the grounds of the incapability of
darker races for self-government. Conversely, all the prejudices used to explain
segregation and the “inferiority” of African Americans were applied to the new
territories. In this sense, Puerto Ricans became Blacks and Blacks became Puerto Ricans
with all the prejudices and structural disadvantages that such conversion entailed for both
groups.231 Racial prejudice led military planners to prefer excluding Puerto Ricans from
the military, at least as fighting troops.

Military History, ed by John Whiteclay Chambers II, (Oxford University Press, 1999), 79; and, Jack D. Foner, Blacks and the Military in American History (New York: Praeger
Publishers Inc, 1974); and, Richard M. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Forces:
Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969), 2627; and, Morris J. McGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1981).
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For a collection of cartoons and caricatures explaining the development of
American stereotypes of Latin America and the Caribbean see, John J. Johnson. Latin
America in Caricature. “The Texas Pan American Series” (Austin and London:
University of Texas Press, 1980).
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To see the trajectory of the policy of excluding African Americans from
combat positions see, Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Forces, 26-27.
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Neither is it feasible to argue that Congress granted citizenship to Puerto Ricans
in order to deter a German attack on the Island.232 Attacking Puerto Rico, regardless of
the citizenship of its inhabitants, would have meant both an attack on U.S. soil, and a
flagrant violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and hence a major causus bellis. The U.S. did
not need Puerto Ricans to become American citizens to exercise its right to protect the
Island which was an American possession recognized as such under international law.
However, the strategic location of Puerto Rico at the heart of the archipelago of islands
blocking access to the Panama Canal indeed influenced the rapid passing of the Jones Act
in1917. A friendly native population that could assist in the defense of the Island,
mostly by not joining or welcoming invading forces, was deemed imperative by the U.S.
Navy and the War Department.233 Thus, is more than likely that the need to prevent
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In 1900, Congress approved the creation of the General Board of the Navy to
advise the Secretary of the Navy on long range naval strategy. Based on rumors that
Germany was seeking to buy the Dutch Virgin Islands, or any suitable island that would
provide it with a naval base in the region, the General Board designed an Atlantic Battle
Plan for 1900-1919. According to the battle plan, the U.S. Navy expected the German
Empire to challenge the Monroe Doctrine. In the initial planning, Great Britain,
compelled in 1901 to accept American dominance over the projected Isthmian canal,
would remain neutral. The German forces would probably attack Culebra Island off the
east coast of Puerto Rico, forcing the U.S. Navy into an unfavorable battle, and would
then proceed to New York or Chesapeake Bay. American fears were not unfounded. As
a matter of fact, in the early twentieth-century the German Navy conducted naval
exercises that for the first time had as the imaginary enemy, the United States instead of
Britain. Moreover, those exercises largely confirmed the assumptions of the U.S. Navy
battle plan. See Robert L. Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865-1900, 2nd
ed. The American History Series, (Arlington Heights Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc.,
1985), 132; and, Langley, The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire
1900-1934, (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 21, quoting:
Holger Herwig, Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning,
1889-1941 (Boston: Little Brown, 1976), 101-09.
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In 1898, General Miles’ had relied on the active support of the Puerto Ricans
to quickly defeat the Spanish forces holding the Island. The need to hold and preserve
Puerto Rico, as well as maintaining a large friendly population to defend the Island, was
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unrest in such an important possession accelerated granting American citizenship to the
Puerto Ricans. It is clear that American politicians recognized the calming effect that
granting citizenship and somewhat broadening political rights would have in the Island.
Moreover, by granting them American citizenship, Congress and President Woodrow
Wilson were affirming that the U.S. intended to hold the Island in perpetuity since there
was no precedent for an American territory populated with American citizens to be
allowed to separate from the Union.234 Puerto Rico had to be held as an American
possession for its militarily value, and American citizenship might very well do the trick.
Finally, Wilson’s approach to international mediation, his “New diplomacy”
based among other things on “Self-Determination,” was incompatible with the outright
colonial status of Puerto Rico. In December 7, 1915, Wilson declared before Congress
that it was imperative to solve the Puerto Rican question by granting them a higher
degree of self-government. More importantly, Wilson tied the passing of the Jones Act
being drafted to national security and defense preparedness. He argued that it was also a
matter of credibility; the world was watching whether the U.S. was serious about self-

first argued in 1890 by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, who later rose to the rank of
admiral and served as president of the Naval War College. Mahan believed that a U.S.
fleet based in Puerto Rico would make it very difficult for a foreign power to sustain
operations in the western Caribbean just like the British naval base in Malta precluded the
enemies of the British Empire from operating in the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, its
possession was vital to defend the envisioned Panama Canal, as well as the U.S. Pacific
Coast. This strategy became a dictum within American strategists well into the 1960s.
See Alfred Thayer Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain and Other Articles (Freeport,
N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1899, reprint 1970), 29, 245, 247-49.
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The type of citizenship granted by the Jones Act is known as statutory
citizenship, meaning that citizenship was granted by an act of Congress and not by the
Constitution; hence it was not guaranteed by the Constitution.
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determination and freedom.235 In his October 26, 1916 closing campaign speeches,
Wilson became the first statesman to commit his government to the pursuit of a League
of Nations and to “articulate a comprehensive synthesis of Progressive Internationalism
and the New Diplomacy”236 based upon the principles of the equality of nations, selfdetermination, peaceful settlement of disputes, freedom of the seas, disarmament and
collective security while making a call for social justice for women, children, and
workers.237 Securing the loyalty of the Island’s population and international credibility
moved Wilson to adamantly support U.S. citizenship for the Puerto Ricans and some
measures of self-government in 1915.238 Wilson’s promises would be well-received and
tested in Puerto Rico. The Jones Act was finally signed into law on March 2, 1917 and,
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Wilson also made reference to the Philippines in his speech. See Bolívar
Pagán, Historia de los Partidos Políticos Puertorriqueños (1898-1956), 172.
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Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New
World Order (Princeton University Press, 1992), 97-98, 116-17.
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The way in which President Wilson approached war readiness lifted the hopes
of many liberals, progressives and radicals at home and abroad. One welcomed measure
was the Revenue Act of September 8, 1916, which practically placed the entire burden of
preparedness on the country’s wealthiest class. Wilson neither obtained a liberal
settlement nor was he able to secure American participation in the League of Nations.
Furthermore, the excesses committed by Postmaster General Burleson, the Espionage
Act, and the violations of freedom of speech cost Wilson the support he had enjoyed from
the liberals and the socialists- which were responsible for Wilson’s victory in 1916- and
the Democrats lost the congressional elections of 1918. Wilson tried and failed to win
the support of the Republican Senate and in the process further alienated his former
supporters. The Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles and American participation in
the League of Nations. Wilson’s dream of a New World Order and the end of the
Balance of Power System did not materialize, at least during his lifetime. See, Ibid.
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In his first annual message to Congress on December 2, 1913, Wilson had
expressed his positive opinion with regard to granting American citizenship to the people
of Puerto Rico. Speech reprinted in, Bolívar Pagán, Historia de los Partidos Políticos
Puertorriqueños, (1898-1956), 171-72.
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for the most part, it was welcomed by the Puerto Ricans.239 Muñoz Rivera did not live to
see the passing of the bill. He had returned ill to the Island in September 1916 and died
on November 15. At least, his concerns about restrictive suffrage, which were shared by
all political factions, especially by the Socialists, were addressed in the Senate and the act
finally approved came to include male universal suffrage.240
On April 6, 1917, triggered by Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine
warfare and the public outrage created by the Zimmerman telegram, the Unites States
declared war on Germany.241 Three days later the Porto Rico House of Delegates, in a
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Republicans and Socialists celebrated the passing of the bill as a victory and
stepping stone towards equality. The Unionistas, under the leadership of its new
president, Antonio R. Barceló, welcomed the act but saw it just as a measure of selfgovernment before the last stage of their political solution- independence, was attained.
Though officially the Unionistas talked about self-determination their leaders started to
publicly call for independence after the Jones Act passed. See Bolívar Pagán, Historia
de los Partidos Políticos Puertorriqueños (1898-1956), 179-86.
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U.S. citizenship and majority of age were the only requirement. See Bolívar
Pagán, Historia de los Partidos Políticos Puertorriqueños (1898-1956), 179.
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Johann von Bernstorff, the German ambassador in the United States forwarded
a coded message originally sent by the German Empire Foreign Secretary on January 16
1917, to Heinrich von Eckard, German Ambassador in Mexico. Attempting to knock
Great Britain off the war the German High Command had decided to resume unrestricted
submarine warfare but feared that such action might draw the United States into the war.
The telegram instructed the German ambassador in Mexico to propose a military alliance
to the Mexican government. He was authorized to offer the Mexican government aid in
recovering Texas and the territories lost during the Mexican-American War of 1846-48.
The British government intercepted the telegram and made it public in the American
press on March 1, 1917. Thomas J. Knock has argued that Wilson moved closer to
intervention due to his failure to secure a negotiated settlement to end the European
conflict. Based on this failure, on the belief of the war coming to an end, and
disheartened by Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare, Wilson decided to go to war
to secure a position for the U.S. in the peace negotiations. The President believed that he
would succeed in forcing the European leaders to accept a liberal settlement and the
League of Nations by appealing to the people of Europe. See Knock, To End All Wars,
116-17; and, Gilbert, First World War.
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message to President Wilson offered the “…absolute solidarity of the people of Puerto
Rico to you and the great American Nation in the conflict with Germany”242
Immediately after the declaration of war, Puerto Rican leaders volunteered their service
and that of their fellow countrymen, expressed their desire to enlarge the Porto Rican
Regiment to brigade, and requested the acceptance of Puerto Ricans as volunteers. The
Secretary of War, while praising their loyalty and patriotism declined the offer.243
On May 18, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1917 calling for all
males between the ages of 18 and 32 to fill out registration cards.244 The territories of
Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico were not included in the original Selective Service Act.
Amid the furor and the demonstrations of patriotism taking places across the United
States, the Puerto Rican legislature asked Congress to extend the draft to the Island.245
The local newspapers regarded this request as an act of patriotism from the Puerto Rican
legislature, and President Wilson promised to remedy the situation.246 The date for the
initial registration day in Puerto Rico was not a matter decided solely by Wilson and
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Declaration reprinted in, El Águila de Puerto Rico, 10 April 1917.
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Seceretary of War, Memorandum, Feb 25, 1918 (Centro de Investigaciones
Históricas, Proyecto Caribeño, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras), Caja 30
Cartapacio 7 Documento 1, B. Hereafter CHIPC.
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C.I.H.P.C., Caja 18 Cartapacio 1 Documento 10, A.
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House Committee on Public Lands, Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular
Possessions, A Bill to Amend the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, Election of Governor:
Hearings on H.R. 3309, 80th Cong., 1 sess., (Amherst: University of Massachusetts,
Microform Collection), 19 May 1947, 35-36. HHereafter, H.R 3309
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C.I.H.P.C., Caja 18 Cartapacio 1 Documento 10, A.
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Congress. On June 6, Yager informed the chief of the BIA, Arthur McIntyre247, that his
administration was working out the system of registration and that they could be ready
“to have the date fixed during the later part of July although it would be necessary to
have 10 or 15 days for publicity work among the Jibaros [sic] and illiterate men of the
mountain”248 Yager’s statement underlines the fact that the colonial administration was
indeed eyeing the peasantry to form the bulk of the National Army in Puerto Rico. A
presidential proclamation set registration day in Puerto Rico for July 5 of the same.249
Puerto Ricans responded enthusiastically to the draft.250 On that first registration
day, 104,550 Puerto Ricans registered for the draft. Eventually, 236,853 men inscribed
for selective service and 17,855 were called to service. All of those called, except for
139, reported for duty. A few days after the first registration day Governor Yager
declared: “This [the number of registered men] is larger than the official estimate and I
think it is a great compliment to the people of Porto Rico that they should have met this
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A native of Alabama, Frank McIntyre, served on the Mexican border, until the
war with Spain of 1898. He was part of the invading force sent to Puerto Rico. From
1899 to 1902, McIntyre served in the Philippines. In 1905 he was sent to the Bureau of
Insular Affairs, served as Acting Chief at least since 1910, and became the Bureau’s
Chief proper in 1912, a position he occupied until 1929. That same year he became a
brigadier general. McIntyre was a late comer with regard to granting collective U.S.
citizenship to Puerto Ricans.
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Yager to McIntyre, June 6, 1917, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30, Cartapacio 7,
Documento 1, J.
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C.I.H.P.C., Caja 18, Cartapacio 1, Documento 10, A; and, Muratti, History of
the 65th, 8.
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Muratti, History of the 65th,8. All of those called, except for 139, reported for

service.
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situation so patriotically.”251 The first training camp for Puerto Rican officers began in
August of the same year. The 200 slots allowed for the officers’ camp had been filled
with celerity by the elite and professional class.252 The speed with which the war effort
in the Island advanced and the eagerness to show support led Yager to comment that the
“patriotism of the island has been stirred and intensified by America’s entrance into the
Great War as shown by the eagerness with which the people responded to the recent
draft”. Yager was quick to find the root of these demonstrations of patriotism stating that
Puerto Ricans were “as eager to get into the “big war game” as any other class of citizens
under the Star and Stripes.”253 For Yager it was clear that citizenship, even if of a
different class, had bought much goodwill and secured the loyalty of the Puerto Ricans at
a critical historical junction.
There were challenges to Yager’s narrative of patriotism among the Puerto
Ricans. In a letter to Frank McIntyre, Chief of the BIA, the Governor expressed his fear
that an independence leader may attempt “some propaganda in the matter of renouncing
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Yager to McIntyre, July 10, 1917, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30, Cartapacio 7,
Documento 1, I.
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Doctors, dentists, engineers, lawyers, professors, businessmen, industrialists
and landowners became the bulk of the Puerto Rican officers’ corps. See, Nadal,
Guardia Nacional, Sucesora de las Milicias Puertorriqueñas, 42. Yager was not easily
impressed with the volunteer s showing up for the officer camp. He wrote the chief of
the BIA: “700 applicants for the officer’s training camp, not the best quality. I’m sure
that many more young men of a better class than this could have been secured.” See,
Yager to McIntyre, July 20, 1917, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30, Cartapacio 7, Documento 1, H.
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Memorandum, February 25 1918, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30 Cartapacio 7
Documento 1, B
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American citizenship for the purpose of avoiding the draft law.”254 Even after the show
of “patriotism” during registration day to which he made reference in previous letters,
Yager suggested having the first draft after September 2, 1917, when the allotted time for
renouncing U.S. citizenship would have expired.255 He was also concerned about having
a representative of labor on one or more of the General Board of Exemptions under the
selective draft because Santiago Iglesias Pantín, “would be the one and he would do it
selfishly.”256 As his correspondence indicates, Yager and the metropolitan authorities
were not oblivious to the challenges to American sovereignty and policies in the Island.
However, the plans for mobilizing the Puerto Ricans continued inexorably and for the
most part, undisturbed.
On late September, 1917, in the Tapia Theater in San Juan, behind a banner
reading “Go Ahead Porto Rico” and surrounded by members of the colonial government,
the mayors of the Island and Antonio R. Barceló, the Unionista president of the newlycreated Puerto Rican Senate, two white-dressed women escorted Governor Yager’s
daughter while she drafted the first ballot in the island.”257 This overly-symbolic
ceremony marked the beginning of Puerto Rican mass participation in the armed forces
of the United States. Most of the press, both in the continental U.S. and the Island
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Newspaper Clip, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30 Cartapacio 7 Documento 1, E; and,
Nadal, Guardia Nacional Sucesora de las Milicias Puertorriqueñas.
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reported that the day had been marked by “rejoicing and celebration through the
Island.”258
In accordance with the Jones Act, elections were held in the Island on July 17,
1917. Again Unión came up as the dominant political force obtaining over half the votes
casted (90,155 out of 175,006) while the Republicans tallied 60,319; and the Socialists
24,468. More importantly, the Unionistas elected Félix Córdova Dávila as Resident
Commissioner in Washington D.C., a position held by Muñoz Rivera until his death.
Unión also elected 13 senators and 24 representatives to the new Insular Legislature,
which gave them a majority in both houses.259 José de Diego, leader of the separatist
faction within Unión, became speaker of the Insular House of Representatives and
Barceló, Unión’s president, became leader of the Senate.
Since Yager supported more self-government for the Island and liberal reforms
but not statehood, an unwritten alliance developed between the Governor and Unión
during the war period. Ironically, the Republican Party, which preached 100 percent
Americanism and desired nothing but federated statehood, found itself at odds with
Yager who seemed to favor some liberal reforms for the colony but not much else. The
Socialists, however, suffered the harshest antagonism from the governor- the attitude was
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In1916, Martin Travieso, Unionista, and Manuel V. Domenech, Republicano
had been named Secretary of Puerto Rico and Commissioner of the Interior respectively.
These were the highest ranking Puerto Ricans in the executive council and for the first
time Puerto Ricans have a majority in the council. Bayrón Toro, 147 In the elections of
1917, The Republicans elected 5 senators and 14 representatives while the Socialists
elected one senator and one representative. Unión won 52 municipalities and recovered
the Aguadilla district-lost in 1914. See, Bayrón Toro, Historia de los partidos políticos
puertorriqueños, 149-52.
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reciprocated.260 This not to say that participating in the war was opposed by political
groups alienated by Yager’s courtship of the Unionistas. The situation only provided for
far more complex approaches towards the war effort, but nonetheless favorable ones.
Mobilizing the Puerto Ricans came to be the means to different ends for the Republicans
and Unionistas, as well as for the metropolis, which sometimes found itself at odds with
Yager’s own project.
President Wilson envisioned the creation of a National Army that would unify the
multi-ethnic United States into one nation. Fearing that the more than 15 million
immigrants who had reached the United States between 1900 and 1915 might not support
the United States (especially the German-American population), Wilson’s administration
launched a campaign promoting 100 percent Americanism. He believed that the war
would end the hyphenations of ethnic and national groups in the United States. Wilson
proclaimed: "Any man who carries a hyphen around with him carries a dagger that he is
ready to plunge into the vitals of the republic.”261 The blind patriotic mind-set promoted
by the Wilson administration under the “100 percent Americanism” rubric is evident in
the efforts of the Committee on Public Information to promote “unanimity of thought and
action that would translate into victory on the battlefield and the realization of the melting
pot ideal at home.” 262 If the war was to bring an end to all hyphenations and the
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As explained by Barbara L. Tischler, slogans, parades, speeches, posters, and
news articles were among the means used by George Creel's Committee on Public
130

emergence of a single American Nation, it would have to be fought on cultural grounds
as well as on actual battlefields.263 The War Department took Wilson’s unifying rhetoric
to heart.
As the war in Europe continued, military plans accelerated in the U.S., and the
War Department authorized the creation of the 94 Infantry Division to be composed of
four Porto Rican regiments.264 Though unconvinced of their value as first line combat
troops, the War Department believed that mobilizing the Puerto Ricans would prove
useful. These soldiers could relieve Continental American soldiers from non-combat
assignments freeing them for combat duty, while inspiring loyalty among the population
of the Island. The political and economic value of mobilizing as many Puerto Ricans as
possible was well understood by the War Department. Frank McIntire, Chief of the

Information seeking to create patriotic consensus in the U.S. ethnically diverse
population. “While Creel did not use the term officially, the ideology of 100 percent
Americanism permeated his writings and speeches”. Creel wrote that what the war
required was: “no mere surface unity, but a passionate belief in the justice of America's
cause that should weld the people of the United States into one white-hot mass instinct
with fraternity, devotion, courage, and deathless determination.” Tischler, “One
Hundred Percent Americanism,” 164-176.
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Creel noted that other wars "went no further than the physical aspects, but
German 'Kultur' raised issues that had to be fought out in the hearts and minds of the
people as well as on the actual firing-line." Tischler, “One Hundred Percent
Americanism,” 164-66, 174-76, from, George Creel, How We Advertised America: The
First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information That Carried
the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe (New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1920), p. 3-5.
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The 94 Division would consist of four regiments 373, 374, 375, 376, the first
two were assigned to the Tactical Brigade 187 while the 375-Colored, and the projected
376 were to form part of Tactical Brigade 188. A Home Guard “Guardia de la Patria”
was also established to take over defense of the Island in the unlikely case the Porto
Rican division was sent overseas. Negroni, Historia military de Puerto Rico, 422-23,
440-45.
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Bureau of Insular Affairs, wrote a memorandum to the chief of War Plans Division
informing him of the political, economic, and social benefits of mobilizing Puerto Rico’s
“…large surplus population, that is, a population for who in the present there is no
continuous employment.”265 Dealing in strict utilitarian terms and after making clear that
his views were not of a military nature, McIntire reported that the men who had gone
through military training in the Island “…have been very much improved, physically and
otherwise, and are better off for having had it and to that extent are of greater economic
value.”266
Not only did the colonial administration expect military training to improve the
value of the trainees as workers, but while in service, their absence from the employment
pool should alleviate the Island’s chronic unemployment. With regard to the impact
these men would have in the Island’s socio-political structures, McIntyre argued that their
training “will have given them a new point of view, their return to the civil life will
establish a different and better element in the body politic.”267 It is clear that the BIA
believed that the trainees, even if full Americanization proved impossible, would be at
least more pro-American after receiving military training with the added bonus of also
becoming more productive.
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The Republicanos, who continued to preach complete Americanization and
becoming a State of the Union as Puerto Rico’s only choice, were quick to adopt the “100
Percent Americanism” campaign launched by the Committee on Public Information.
This was evident by their leaders’ actions and words as recorded in the Insular
Legislature. More importantly, through their newspaper, El Águila de Puerto Rico, the
Republicanos more than echoed Creel’s campaign of blind patriotism and
Americanization.268 Exhortations and instructions to: “Prove that you are a 100%
American” and slogans such as: “Today is an honor to say: ‘I am an American’” were
accompanied by drawings of whole Puerto Rican families, boys dressed in military
garment, an older father with his hat off, and a mother carrying a baby; all, solemnly
watching the Puerto Rican troops marching under the American flag.269

El Águila, like

many other local newspapers, routinely published long stories about recruitment, Puerto
Ricans serving in Continental units, “heroes” who had fallen in Europe, the training of
the Puerto Rican troops, and the commissioning of officers in the Island.270 Throughout
the war period, the narrative espoused by the Republicanos was of full cooperation with
the war effort while underlining what they believed was the unbreakable ties between the
United States and the Island. They also defended the idea of modernizing the Jíbaros
268

A semi-bilingual publication based in Ponce, El Águila de Puerto Rico, was
published between January 8, 1902, and July 3, 1931. It reappeared on January 1, 1934,
but ceased to exist two months later. It always functioned as an organ of the Republican
Party.
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See, El Águila de Puerto Rico, 6-9 October 1918.
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El Águila congratulated “our old friend don Pedro Albizu Campos, whom in
the recent graduation of cadets from the Officers Training Camp at Las Casas, earned the
rank of First Lieutenant in the Army reserve.” See, El Águila de Puerto Rico, 8
November 1918: and, 10-14 April 1917, 10 October 1918; and 6 December 1918.
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through soldiering. The Republicanos were among the most ardent proponents of
showing the Puerto Rican’s Americanism, social and political maturity, and readiness to
become a state of the Union by participating in the war.
The Unionistas, divided between separatistas and autonomistas, wanted the war
effort and the mobilization of the Puerto Rican to lead to independence or more selfgovernment respectively. Hence, they approached every aspect of the mobilization in the
Island as if they were raising a Puerto Rican Army and not a contingent for the U.S.
Army. As plans were put into action, and the Puerto Ricans started to mobilize for war,
Córdoba Dávila attempted to secure that the units raised in Puerto Rico were truly Puerto
Rican that is, composed, trained and led by Puerto Ricans. In this regard, he wrote to the
Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker (March 9, 1916-March 4, 1921), offering the creation
of new regiments but also requesting that more Puerto Ricans be trained as officers and
that those serving in the regular army be allowed to transfer to the Island.271 By midMay, 1918, the War Department approved the voluntary transfer of Puerto Ricans serving
in the continental U.S. to Puerto Rico. Soon, Puerto Rican officers and noncommissioned officers serving in the regular army began to apply for transfers to the
“Porto Rican detachment, National Army, Porto Rico”.272 Meanwhile, Yager was trying
to secure the creation of a Puerto Rican national guard despite the opposition of the War
Department which preferred that all resources be directed towards the creation of the
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Puerto Rican division as part of the National Army.273 Yager’s attempts to secure the
creation of a Puerto Rican National Guard followed the initiative of his predecessor,
Governor Colton, in 1910.274 Like Colton, Yager believed that the creation of the
National Guard in the Island would enhance the islander’s loyalty toward the U.S. by
instilling a sense of national pride, which the the added bonus that such action would also
be beneficial regarding the Puerto Rican’s political attitude towards the metropolis and its
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Responding to Governor Colton’s inquiries with regard to the legality of
establishing a National Guard in the Island, the office of the Attorney General of Porto
Rico responded affirmatively based on recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, i.e.
Kopel vs. Bingham, 211 U.S. 469, which stated that:
It may be justly asserted that Porto Rico is a completely organized Territory,
although not a Territory incorporated into the United States, and that there is no
reason why Porto Rico should not be held to be such a territory as is comprised in
Section 5278.
The office of the Attorney General also informed the governor that the means for
appropriation of moneys to support a territorial militia in the Island already existed.
“Your present inquiry obviously relates to the word “Territory” as used in Section 1661
U.S. Revised Statutes as amended by the Act of February 12, 1776, and the act of June
30, 1906:
That said appropriation shall be apportioned among the several states and
Territories, under the direction of the Secretary of War, according to the number
of senators and Representatives to which each state, respectively, is entitled is
entitled in the Congress of the United States, and to the Territories and District of
Columbia such proportion and under such regulations as the President may
prescribe.
If Porto Rico is a Territory within the meaning of Section5278, Revised Statutes, it would
seem to follow that it is likewise a Territory within the meaning of Section 1661 as
amended.” He also informed Colton that the Comptroller of the Treasury had decided
that under the Act of July of 1862 and August 30, 1890, and March 4, 1907, that Porto
Rico was entitled to allotments for territorial organized militia. This letter responded to
the War Department’s reasoning that it could not make the required appropriations for a
territorial militia in Puerto Rico because the Island did not constitute a territory of the
United States. See, Acting Attorney General of Porto Rico, I.R. Brown to Governor of
Porto Rico, March 26, 1910, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 29 Cartapacio 12 Documento 9.
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relation to the Island.275 In 1910, just as in 1917, the Department of War did not heed to
the governor’s plans.276
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With regard to the creation of a native militia Colton argued: “Certain things
have occurred and are occurring which, I believe, will remove any anti-American spirit
that may have existed in the island. I am certain that no such spirit is prevalent today,
and while I do nor deem it a matter of supreme importance, still I think the organization
of a body of territorial militia here would have a very beneficial effect and tend to support
and increase the sentiment of national pride in the fact that Porto Rico is a part of the
Unites States which is arising among the people of the island. It would be unfortunate if
this trend of affairs should be checked by the appearances of distrust on the part of the
Federal Government.” See, Governor Colton to Colonel McIntyre, Acting Chief Bureau
of Insular Affairs, September 24, 1910, CIHCP, Caja 29 Cartapacio 12 Documento 8.
Among the benefits of instituting a National Guard in the Island were the promotion of
loyalty and patriotism by giving the “Porto Ricans the same opportunity to serve their
country, and also knowledge of the principles of the U.S. military tactics, which would be
of great benefit to the Federal Government in case of need in the tropics of ___ troops”
would encourage Porto Ricans to learn English. I.R. Pierson to Governor Colton, April
9 1910, CIHPR, Caja 29 Cartapacio 12 Documento 16.
276

Frank McIntyre, Acting Chief of the BIA, informed Colton that the “Acting
Secretary of War [Jacob M. Dickinson] is not altogether favorable to this proposition
[creation of a National Guard in the Island].” On the other hand, McIntyre stated that the
Army Chief of Staff, Major General Leonard Wood “is wholly favorable to the proposed
organization, and not only believes in the propriety of it, but believes, from a military
point of view, it would be an extremely valuable organization. I think, therefore, it is a
question of short time when the department will adopt General Wood’s views.” McIntyre
also suggested the Governor to begin working in passing the necessary militia law in the
Island to initiate the process and assure him that the department will be ready to assist
him with the appropriations. See, Frank McIntyre Acting Chief of Bureau to Governor
Colton, September 16 1910, CIHPR, Caja 29 Cartapacio 12 Documento 5, B. General
Wood’s views were at odds with the War Department’s. Appointed by President Taft in
1910 as Army Chief of Staff (a position that among other things provided advice to the
Secretary of War) Wood tried unsuccessfully to break the bureau system currently
favored by the War Department. The Secretary of War, Jacob M. Dickinson, had earlier
notified Taft that “the Department has been consistently opposed to the establishment of
a militia force in Porto Rico for the reasons indicated by the Judge Advocate General [the
judicial arm of any of United State Armed Forces including the Air Force, Army, Coast
Guard, Marine corps and Navy] and is to-day of the same view.” See, Acting Secretary
of War to President William H. Taft, July 23, 1910. CIHPR, Caja 29 Cartapacio 12
Documento 7. After their original reasoning for denying the Island the right to a
territorial militia was debunked, the officers of the War Department found a new
rationale to oppose such measure. Supporting the secretary’s position the JudgeAdvocate-General wrote that the “military force, largely composed of natives of the
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Where to train the Puerto Rican soldiers was one of the first battles the Unionistas
fought over control of the mobilization process. For the metropolis the issue became a
matter of economic value, racial prejudice, and part of the Americanization campaign. In
November 19, 1917, the Washington Post announced that 8,000 white Puerto Ricans
were to be sent to Camp Jackson in South Carolina- to the 81st Division, while “4000
[Puerto Rican] negroes” would be sent to Camp Upton Yaphank in New York as part of
colored division.277 Based on comments from War Department’s officials the article
stated:
It is also felt that by training them in connection with our own citizens the Porto
Rican soldiers will come to feel themselves as part of the Army of the United
States. The psychological influence will be considerable factor in making the
Porto Rican American soldier in no way distinguishable from the men from New
York, Michigan, or California. They will be led in English under native Porto
Rican and American officers.278

island, has been continuously stationed there, and as this force has been found adequate
to all emergencies, it has not been regarded by the Executive as a measure necessary to
the general welfare or to the preservation of civil order in the island that the organization
of a new and untried military force should be attempted…” Therefore “…it is not
advised that the time is opportune for the establishment of a militia force in the island of
Porto Rico.” Apparently, the Secretary of War did not consider prudent to arm more
Puerto Ricans, who may or may not be completely loyal to the metropolitan authorities.
See, Militia in the Island of Porto Rico: Memorandum by the Judge-Advocate-General.
Elbert F. Baldwin to President Taft, July 13, 1920, CIHPR Caja 29 Cartapacio 12
Documento 6.
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These men were not only expected to look like any Continental Americans but they also
were supposed to come out of their training thinking and behaving like them. The War
Department was indeed bent on fulfilling Wilson’s idea of creating one American nation
through the military.
Though Yager himself believed that military training would create a new Puerto
Rican he came to oppose sending the recruits overseas for training. In a letter to the
Chief of the BIA, Frank McIntire, Yager urged him to train the troops in Puerto Rico. He
stated that it would be humiliating to the soldiers and their officers to send them straight
to the Continental U.S. because: “Perhaps, 1/3 of these men who will be accepted for
service never worn shoes in their lives. They wear nothing but a cotton shirt and cotton
trousers and have nothing else to wear unless it is furnished to them.” 279 What Yager
described was the typical clothing of the Puerto Rican Jíbaro from the mountains and the
agro-worker of the sugarcane fields. He had faith in the redeeming qualities of scientific
military training but feared that to the common Continental observer they would look
“like a bunch of ragamuffins and tatterdemalions out of which an observer who doesn’t
know the actual condition here would think it utterly impossible to make them
soldiers.”280 He insisted that if training in Puerto Rico was not possible, then, whatever
the cost, the Puerto Rican recruits should be given “at least some preliminary training and
organization, equipped, uniformed and fed for a while and on regular army rations.”281 It
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is evident from Yager’s statement that the bulk of the Porto Rican soldiers were coming
from the files of the malnourished peasantry.
Yager, with the aid of the Unionistas also made the case for the unfairness of
training abroad when the Island could use the economic injection of building training
facilities and hiring the required civilian staff and services to run the camps. McIntyre
responded by informing Yager that it was too expensive to train in the Island and that
““wherever [Puerto Rican] troops are trained they will be a great economic advantage to
Porto Rico due to large war pay, allotment to dependants, and insurance.” 282 Moreover,
playing on Córdova Dávila’s request that the Puerto Ricans be allowed to fight in a truly
Puerto Rican unit, McIntyre informed him that were they to train in the Island “… they
would be sent abroad in small units contingents to fill vacancies in units abroad and
would lose their identity as Porto Rican troops.” 283 He also reminded Yager that
training in the U.S. would “ make them better men on returning to Porto Rico, physically
and otherwise, this, even though they should not go abroad at all for service.”284

This

statement, besides pointing out the transformative experience the BIA believed military
training to be, is also indicative of the expected nature of a Puerto Rican contingent’s
participation in the war- they were not considered fit to join the fight in Europe, even
after training in the U.S. alongside Continental Americans. Despite the BIA’s opposition,
Yager’s and the Unionistas’ efforts, especially Córdova Davila’s personal plea to
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President Wilson, paid off and the War Department agreed to train the Puerto Ricans in
the Island. Córdova Dávila soon took credit for keeping the troops on the Island.285
To house the trainees, a large military training facility was built in Puerto Rico
between 1917 and 1918. Located in Santurce, east of San Juan, and with an area of 537
acres, Camp Las Casas served to train over 500 Puerto Ricans as officers of the United
States Army and roughly 18,000 soldiers.286 It is very telling that the camp bore the
name of fray Bartolomé de las Casas- the Dominican friar who in 1522 wrote A Brief
Account of the Destruction of the Indies” (Brevísima relación de la destrucción de Las
Indias) detailing the Spaniards’ atrocities committed against the indigenous population of
the Americas. Las Casas’ defense of the native peoples of the Americas earned him the
title “Champion of the Indians”. By choosing his name for the training camp, both the
colonial administration and the criollo elites were satisfied. The former, subordinated to
285

Córdova Dávila claimed that with the support of hundreds of cablegrams from
businessmen, and the mayors and legislators of the Island, he insisted to be allowed to see
Wilson who granted him a short interview. He finally convinced Wilson to support
training Puerto Rican troops in the Island. Córdova Dávila also tried to convince the War
Department to buy Puerto Rican coffee for the military. Due to the inexpensive nature of
Brazilian coffee and the high cost of the coffee produced in Puerto Rico, the War
Department refused Córdova Dávila’s proposal but accepted to at least buy local coffee
for the Puerto Rican troops. See, Porto Rico Progress, 8 March 1918.
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After the second training camp at Las Casas (February 1-15 May 1918) came
to an end 13 Captains; 46 First Lieutenants; 133 Second Lieutenants (classified as
Caucasians); and 6 First Lieutenants and 49 Second Lieutenants (Classified as Blacks)
obtained commissions to served in the Infantry Section of the National Army. The first
camp (27 August-27 November 1917) conducted at Henry Barracks graduated 27
Captains, 47 First Lieutenants, and 106 Second Lieutenants- all Caucasians. The third
and last training officer Camp ((21 June-6 November 1918) commissioned, 23 First
Lieutenants and 255 Second Lieutenants. A total of 726 officers were trained and
commissioned in Puerto Rico between August 27 1917 and November 6 1918. See,
Report by, Capt. Luis Raul Esteves, Acting Adjutant General, May 27, 1918.
Headquarters 2nd Porto Rico Training Camp, Las Casas, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30 Cartapacio
4 Documento 1, K.; and, Negroni, Historia militar de Puerto Rico, 440.
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the Bureau of Insular Affairs, itself modeled on the Bureau of Indian Affairs, could very
well see themselves as protectors of the Puerto Ricans, whom many regarded as Indians,
at least institutionally.287 The latter could go beyond that role and pin the friar’s name to
redeeming Hispanic and Catholic values.288
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Under the motto “Kill the Indian save the Man” Captain Richard Henry Pratt
opened the fist Indian Industrial School in Carlisle Pennsylvania Indian School in 1879.
Schools following this model multiplied throughout the United States until the early
1910s. Imagined as a social experiment its main purpose was to assimilate and
acculturate young Native Americans. In essence, by distancing them from their
communities, the program sought to uproot the students’ “Indianess” and create a new
man out of the Indian. After the United States took over Puerto Rico in 1898, natives of
the Island were sent to these schools. The "Porto Rican Indians", a group of sixty-plus
Puerto Rican youngsters were sent to Carlisle Indian industrial boarding school. A small
group of men were the architects of the idea to send Puerto Rican children to the Carlisle,
Tuskegee and Hampton Industrial Schools. Richard Henry Pratt, John Eaton, and Nelson
Miles knew each other well. They had in common their service in the Civil War and
Indian Wars, and were in charge of Indian Scout Units, as well as Buffalo Soldier Units.
Pratt convinced leaders of the U.S. government of the worthiness of his social experiment
with the children of Indian chiefs. Eaton became the first Secretary of Education of
Puerto Rico and was intellectually responsible for the plan to Americanize the Puerto
Ricans using Pratt’s approach. The way the idea was sold to the Puerto Rican families
who agreed to send their children to the school made them believed that Carlisle was a
type of university. In fact those sent to Carlisle belonged to educated elite. Ill-treated
even while in route to the schools, the students wrote letter complaining that they were
being treated as “Indians despite [them]selves”. Those who could, sent their children to
other schools, and Pratt himself sent some of the students to regular schools. However,
though maltreated the majority of the “Porto Rican Indians” sent to Carlisle stayed in the
school and finish their courses. Sonia M. Rosa-Vélez, ¿Qué pasó con los becados? La
saga de los estudiantes puertorriqueños en la Escuela Industrial para Indios de Carlisle
(Innedited Essay) Author’s Library; and, Sonia M. Rosa-Vélez, The Puerto Ricans at
Carlisle Indian School: An Experiment in Americanization Through Education.
(Forthcoming Essay) Author’s Library; and, Sonia M. Rosa-Vélez, Acquiring the
American Spirit: Americanization Through Education and the Puerto Ricans in the U.S.
Government Minority Boarding Schools, 1899-1930, (Forthcoming Essay) Author’s
Library.
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Benedict Anderson has pointed out that the final replication of the former
master’s ways came in the obsession of the new states with legitimizing themselves
through archaeological excavations that allowed scholars and administrators to connect
them vertically to vanished civilizations and horizontally to European metropoles.
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 120-127. Puerto Rico was not the
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Yager and Córdova Dávila were also allied in their efforts to secure the opening
of spaces in the military for traditional and emerging criollo elites. In July 1915, the War
Department’s judge advocate had to send a memo stating that there should be no different
legal status between Puerto Rican West Point graduates and their Continental American
counterparts. Citizenship, the judge argued, was not a requirement to serve as an officer
of the U.S. Army. The appointment of Luis Raul Estevez as a 2nd Lt. in the Porto Rico
Regiment of Infantry quickly followed this decision.289 The Porto Rico Regiment,
however, with all its excess personnel, the waiting lists to join, and its colonial nature was
not the best place to advance in rank. As soon as the United States entered the war,
officers of the regiment started to resign their commissions so they could enter the regular

exception. In fact a courtship with the indigenous past began way before the creation of
the Commonwealth in 1952. After the creation of the Commonwealth, public-funded
archeological excavations tried to recover the Pre-Columbian past. These efforts have
continued and in present day they include DNA testing to find the percentage of native
blood in the Island’s population. Dr. Juan Martinez Cruzado, a geneticist from the
University of Puerto Rico Mayagüez, conducted a DNA survey for this purpose.
According to the study funded by the U.S. National Science Foundation, 61 percent of all
Puerto Ricans have Amerindian mitochondrial DNA, 27 percent have African and 12
percent Caucasian. (Nuclear DNA, or the genetic material present in a gene's nucleus, is
inherited in equal parts from one's father and mother. Mitochondrial DNA is inherited
only from one's mother and does not change or blend with other materials over time.)
According to Martinez Cruzado’s study a majority of Puerto Ricans have native blood.
Moreover, there is further evidence that Taínos were not extinguished in the 1600s. After
200 years of absence from official head-counts, a 2,000 people Taíno community
appeared living in a north-western mountain region in a military census from the 1790s.
See, Juan C. Martínez Cruzado, “The Use of Mitochondrial DNA to Discover PreColumbian Migrations to the Caribbean: Results for Puerto Rico and Expectations for the
Dominican Republic,” [KACIKE: Journal of Caribbean Amerindian History and
Anthropology]; accessed 28 December 2008; available from
http://www.kacike.org/MartinezEnglish.pdf.
289

War Department Judge Advocate General, E. H. Crowd, Memorandum to
Chief of Staff, July 2, 1915, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30, Cartapacio 6, Documento 6, H.
142

army and advance in promotion.290 The need of instructors for Las Casas also opened the
door for non-commissioned officers (sergeants) of the Porto Rico Regiment to obtain
commissions as officers. 291
The mass mobilization of the Puerto Ricans, the manpower committed to the war
effort in Europe, and the occupation of Haiti and the Dominican Republic made the
metropolis and especially the colonial administration in Puerto Rico more dependent on
the criollo elites. Mobilizing the Puerto Rican peasantry, and carrying out other extrainsular services for the BIA became a means for the elite to assert their political power
and to move forward their political goals.292 Securing the training of the traditional
Puerto Rican elites and the emerging professional classes as officers would serve to
preserve a certain social hierarchy since such training would place them in command of
the thousands of peasants and workers mobilized for war. The criollo elites and the
emerging professional classes were to have a role in the war as long as it was a leading
one.
Yager, who was not shy to use colonial subjects to run his share of the American
Empire, fought hard to secure that they received the training that would allow them to
carry out their colonial duties. As early as May of 1917, he had tried to arrange for an
extra five presidential appointees from the Island to attend the U.S. Naval Academy at
290

Yager to McIntyre, July 10, 1917, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30, Cartapacio 7,
Documento 1, I.
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Yager informed the BIA’s Chief that he was, “… looking for someone to aid
the Governor of Saint Thomas to deal with Mr. Jackson and sugar laborers but the war
and Santo Domingo have taken many of Porto Rico’s best men.” Ibid.
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Annapolis. The Governor was not alone in these efforts. As Puerto Rican representative
to Congress, Córdova Dávila also pressed this matter and wrote to President Wilson
asking that he give five of his fifteen presidential Annapolis appointments to Puerto
Ricans claiming that Hawaii and Alaska, territories smaller in population than Puerto
Rico, had already that many. In July 24, 1918, Wilson responded (to Yager) negatively
but expressed willingness to remedy that situation.293 By early 1919 new legislation was
in placed allowing for an extra five appointees to be nominated by the Resident
Commissioner.294 The Resident Commissioner made good use of his power of
appointment.
Again, as with any other opening of the U.S. military to Puerto Ricans, the press
celebrated the event. On July 3, 1919 the newspaper El Tiempo, published an editorial
congratulating Córdoba Dávila “for his efforts to secure this new evidence of confidence
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La Democracia (San Juan), 2 August 1918, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30, Cartapacio 7,
Documento 2 F.
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P.G. Miller, Commissioner of Education to Córdova Dávila, August 7, 1919,
C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30, Cartapacio 6, Documento 6, G. Public Law 160 – with 6700-6 of
March 3, 1903 allowed the Governor of Puerto Rico to nominate one midshipmen to
Annapolis while the Resident Commissioner could select five nominees. (PL 8, 66th
Congress 6700-With-27 of July 11 1919); See C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30, Cartapacio 7,
Documento 2, A. The colonial administrators also sought to secure equal treatment to
their children born or residing in the Island. See, P.G. Miller, Commissioner of
Education, to Col. C.B. Hodges, asst. to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs,
D.C.: Requesting his son and Osvaldo de la Rosa be admitted to West Point. Puerto
Ricans were not the only colonial subjects attending the elite military institution, Emilio
Aguinaldo Jr. was among the Pilipino cadets sent to the West Point. By 1924, eleven
appointees from the Philippines and four Puerto Ricans had received commissions from
the military institution. Osvaldo de la Rosa and Virgil Miller graduated from West Point
in 1924. Luis Raul Esteves had graduated from West Point in 1915 and Francisco
Cintrón in 1918: both remained in the Puerto Rico National Guard in the post war years.
See Frank McIntire Letter to Governor Horace Tower, June 16, 1924, C.I.H.P.C., Caja
30, Cartapacio 6, Documento 6, B.
144

in the American citizens of Porto Rico.”295 The article stated that the new legislation and
Córdoba Dávila’s work indicated a “ veritable union between the Island and the
Nation, and which; at no distant day, will be crowned by the complete felicity of
our people.”296 Gauging the meaning of the event El Tiempo reminded its readers that the
only ones entitled to nominate candidates for Annapolis were the senators and
representatives of the U.S. and the delegates from the incorporated territories. That
Puerto Rico was “put on the same level as the states and territories in so far as the quota
for the Naval academy” should show the “Independentistas of the tropical republic”297
how the:
Great Republic, of which we form a part, is each day giving us another proof
of confidence in us, opening the doors of all institutions of the country to
Porto Rican American citizens and putting them on the same place as citizens
of the mainland…298
Obtaining capable personal to help the BIA fulfill its colonial duties was one of Yager’s
priorities when he fought for more access to military institutions for the Puerto Ricans.
Securing the loyalty of the criollo elites and the Island’s population while bettering the
international image of the United States were added bonuses. For the most part, Yager
played his cards right throughout the war period, and his efforts to secure more spaces in
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the military for the Puerto Ricans were generally applauded. Only the issue of race
gained him real criticism during this period.
The United States military was still a segregated organization during WWI. In
this regard Continental officers and Yager himself expressed pro-segregationist views to
McIntyre. In one of his letter Yager informed him that it had been necessary to “keep
the blacks out because of prejudice [sic] amongst the soldiers of the regiment themselves
who did not want blacks in the regiment.” 299 However, Yager argued, “blacks are
anxious to join regiment and I’m told they make excellent soldiers under white officers
and I’m confident a full regiment of them could be formed in the island.”300 In further
correspondence Yager complained: “Many Porto Ricans seem to feel that the Governors
and officials in the states consider all Porto Ricans as Negro troops: but that of course
touches the sensibility of the white people here.”301
Judging by the local press and politician’s statements, Yager’s worries seemed
unfounded. It is more than likely that he was expressing his own fears of racial mixing
than that of the Puerto Ricans. The Governor, referring to “our race problem, just as
they have it in South Carolina” agreed to train Black and White soldiers together if
absolutely necessary but warned that “they must be separated.”302 To be fair, whether or
not Yager wanted to segregate Puerto Ricans in the military by race was mostly irrelevant
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since it was the policy of the U.S. Army to segregate troops racially. To that effect the
Regiment 375 was designated to train and field Black Puerto Ricans.303
Regarding the decision to segregate the troops in the Island, the newspaper
Justicia, commented: “Under the administration of Arthur Yager the line separating the
men of color is finally established in Puerto Rico” followed by “…the old racist fart
from Kentucky accused of being the instigator”.304 The editorial continued by arguing
that “the complete triumph [of the U.S. and the Allies] will also defeat all privileges.”305
These comments, in a newspaper that consistently challenged Yager’s administration
show the complex nature of the Puerto Rican opinion-making groups with regard to the
war effort. Puerto Rican participation in the armed forces of the metropolis was strongly
encouraged, and there was consensus about wanting to see the U.S emerge victorious, but
that did not blind leaders from the leading political parties to the fact that many of the
303

El Diluvio, one of the most vociferous critics of the Yager Administration took
special interest in the 375th Porto Rican Colored Regiment and wrote a series of articles
detailing their training and progress. They are not the less intelligent, nor the less smart,
neither the ones less disposed to learn and ready to defend with honor the name of Puerto
Rico. They are “ … the more apt, humble and the most attentive of the recruits are those
of the 375” The editorial also mentioned that “the boys of the 375 will one day respond
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Republicans, took especial interest in the well-being of the Porto Rican Negro Regimentthe 375. He wrote to Col. Frank C. Wood, commander of the 375 expressing his
willingness to accept that the “national citizenry were divided in organizations and
racially” but hoping that when the men’s willingness to sacrifice in “defense of their
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freedoms espoused by Wilson were not enjoyed by Puerto Ricans. Moreover, local
politicians continuously sought to link inequalities, prejudices and injustices at home with
the ideals espoused by Wilson when making the case to go to war.
The attitude of Puerto Rican leaders and opinion-making groups was similar to
that of African-American leaders, including W.E.B. DuBois, who during World War I
supported the war effort by encouraging black participation. Black leaders, who had
argued that disdain of dark races was the real cause of the war, identified the United
States and the Allies as the lesser of two evils, and thus, as their best chance for
advancement. African-American leaders adopted a policy of “first your country, then
your rights” and of “Close Ranks” with “our fellow white citizens.”306 In Puerto Rico,
the narratives were similar. The differences in the movements can be seen in the fact that
the issue of race, as determined by skin color, was not the main concern of Puerto Rican
leaders. Furthermore, since the Island had an undecided political status, there were
several approaches to what came after closing ranks “with our co-citizens from the
North”. Nonetheless, just as African-American leaders, so Puerto Rican leaders hoped to
advance their respective agendas after showing the willingness and readiness of their
people to come in the defense of the U.S., and the ideals of freedom and democracy in
times of need. They expected that participating in a war sold as crusade against
totalitarianism, colonialism and militarism would bring decolonization and equality at
home.
Another difference between Puerto Rican and African-American leaders, even if
both wanted to use military training to erase racial biases and prejudice, was that the
306
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former wanted to remake the very essence of the Puerto Rican through military training.
The criollo elites were not the only ones bent on reshaping the Puerto Ricans. As the
recruits began to make their way into Las Casas for training, an editorial in The Porto
Rico Progress, a publication adamantly pro-metropolis, observed: “So a new day has
dawned for Porto Rico’s Jíbaro.”307 The training acquired in the military, the editorial
argued, would prepare the Jíbaro to join the drive towards a modern Puerto Rico.
Downtrodden, unthougt [sic] for as he [the Jíbaro] has been, he is now in the
limelight. The testing and refining process will be hard for him. But he and his
brother will become the nucleus of a new Porto Rico. The anemic disease warped
man will be a thing of the past. And the domain of the Jíbaro will at last come
into its proper place in the great Economic and Social scheme of this island.308
The same journal, and other newspapers reported that the majority of those
joining the U.S. Army were Jíbaros who wore shoes for the first time in Camp Las
Casas after induction.309

El Buscapié affirmed: “After the War, these soldiers will be

our greatest leaders, teachers, and champions of freedom and democracy.”310
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According to these reports the most troublesome piece of clothing for the
trainees were the army boots. Quartermasters had trouble finding shoes for the majority
of the men who had never worn shoes and as result “have feet almost as broad as they are
long”. So had the trainees trouble getting used to blisters- even if they followed their
own steps “…with a gratified smile…” Commenting on the need to stop drills often to
allow the Jíbaro-trainee to rest his feet the editor continued, “perhaps is not a rigidly
military proceeding but the men so treated are going to fight to destroy militarism.
Porto Rico Progress, 5 July 1918.
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Commenting on the attitude of the public when seeing the Porto Rican soldiers, the
editorial continued:
…nobody can watch them without feeling a revolution in their blood and in the
spirit which moves them to support in any possible way our soldiers, be it with a
simple smile or with exhortations of courage and steadfastness.311
Addressing the poor physical state of the inductees Francisco del Valle Atiles,
wrote for Buscapié, a publication that constantly celebrated the expansion of the U.S.
into the Caribbean and Latin America and the role of Puerto Rico as the center of the
imperialist venture; that military training would correct the “organic poverty” shown by
the physical examination of the recruits. He was quick to add: “While the Puerto Rican
may be lacking in physical condition due to malnutrition and disease, he
overcompensates in spirit” a trait he identified with Hispanic gallantry. Moreover, in a
Puerto Rican version of Arielismo,312 this editorial argued that the Puerto Rican “requires
of the material and industrial might of the Continental American,” (identified as the
311
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Ariel was published in 1900 by Uruguayan writer José Enrique Rodó and gave
way to Arielismo as a literary and political movement. Arielismo offers an idealized
picture of Latin American culture which is marked by noble spirituality and gallantry as
opposed to the United States which represents materialism. Rodó took William
Shakespeare’s The Tempest to represent this cultural and spiritual divide between the
United States and Latin America. The main characters in Rodó’s versión are Ariel and
Calibán. Ariel symbolizes Latin Americas’ noble spirituality rooted in the Greco-Roman
ideal of beauty and the Christian value of charity. On the other hand, Calibán (which is
an anagram for Canibal) represents U.S. expansionism and utilitarianism. Latin
America’s spirituality, according to Arielismo, would help to create a better society by
allowing the best men to flourish and lead the masses. The U.S., however, engrossed in
materialism, and lacking Ariel’s spirituality, is presented as utterly unable to escape
mediocrity. See, José Enrique Rodó, “Ariel,” [Brevario de la Juventud (Valencia,
España: Editorial Cervantes, 1920): The Project Gutenberg EBook]; accessed 28
December 2008; available from http://www.pgdp.net.
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Anglo-Saxon), to correct such deficiencies.313 After assimilating such Anglo-Saxon
characteristics, the Jíbaro inductee would create a space for the “two great cultures of the
American hemisphere–the Hispanic and Anglo-Saxon- to coexist.”314
According to these narratives military training would fuse material and moral
progress, national, and cultural identity into one being, the Jíbaro. These ideas gained
strength throughout the war. This interpretation of the potential role of military training
for modernizing Puerto Rico via the military training of its peasantry was found in almost
all the local newspapers and was voiced by all political parties, especially the Republican.
The autonomist faction within Unión, however, benefited more from it than any other
political group. Indeed the Unionistas, who held political control during the war years,
benefited more than any other political faction from the ambivalent narratives used to
promote the war effort in the Island.
Soon after the Armistice, The Porto Rican Progress reported derisively that the
Unionistas claimed that the “Puerto Rican soldier has created a New Americanism”, one
that allowed for “these two great cultures” to co-exist.315 In fact the New Americanism
espoused mainly by the Autonomistas and certain Separatistas from Unión, challenged
both the Republican criollos- who would accept nothing but the complete assimilation of
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the Puerto Ricans, and the assimilation project of the metropolis. The Unionists’
approach to the constructed identity of the new Puerto Rican and the New American was
so appealing that those publications which were in fact organs of the Republican Party or
staunchly pro-metropolis, published several editorial and commentaries which essentially
made the case of the Unionistas, mostly due to the ambivalent or conflicting nature of
national discourse and patriotism.
Eager to cooperate with the war effort and the defense of the “Nation”, the Red
Cross, Club de Damas (women’s clubs or associations), and in many cases, the
townspeople made sure that the departing recruits received care packages. A newspaper
commented that “all soldiers arrive with a bill book with the inscription “Adelante
Soldado Portorriqueño.” And many of them received, besides the normative ration of
cigars, cigarettes, and some cash, items which appealed to their national spirit, such as
cloth with the inscription “Recuerde el Carolina” (Remember the Carolina) and the words
of La Borinqueña, considered at the time a national hymn that would become the
national anthem in 1952.316 It is obvious that the feelings towards the nation and the
understanding of the nation itself were, to say the least, complex. A Jíbaro told a
reporter that his wife and children were crying when he left for training, but that he said
to them that “it was for the Patria and the Patria would protect them if I fought to protect
her.” 317

It is clear that this Jíbaro-soldier expected his sacrifice not to be in vain. In his
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See Porto Rico Progress, 5 July 1918. El Carolina, a ship carrying Puerto
Rican workers to the United States, became Puerto Rico’s U.S.S. Maine during the war
after being sunken by a German submarine a few miles from the east coast. Dozens of
Puerto Ricans drowned as a result of the attack.
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Another commented about his wife and children: “they’ll be all right. The
Gobierno will take care of them.” Ibid.
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understanding, he was not fighting for a foreign power; he was fighting for his
motherland, and in case he made the ultimate sacrifice, the motherland would take care of
his offspring. Luckily, he would not have to make such sacrifice.
By October 31, 1918 three of the four regiments authorized for the Porto Rican
division had been trained and manned with 10,600 officers and soldiers. On November
11 an armistice between the Allies and the German Empire came into effect ending
hostilities in Europe.318 Amid fireworks, dancing, the colors of the U.S. and of the allied
nations, out of the gates of Las Casas came marching the 12,000 soldiers and trainers of
the Porto Rican contingent of the National Army. The celebration climaxed with a
military review of the Porto Rican Division in the Plaza 2 de Marzo in Condadocommemorative of the Jones Act of 1917.319

Knowing that demobilization would come

rather sooner than later The Porto Rico Progress upped the ante and announced that the
men from Las Casas “ no matter what their future may be, cannot help being better men
for the few months of training they have had.”320
On December 18, 1918 demobilization orders arrived, and on January 1919, the
Puerto Rican division had been completely demobilized. The soldiers training in the
Island did not see combat. A soldier lamented after receiving his discharge papers and
examining the document and the blank space reserved for “battles, engagements, and
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skirmishes”: “If there were only three or four names in that line, how proud I’d be.”321
The political leaders who sought to advance their goals through war participation would
have strengthened their positions tremendously if the Puerto Rican Divisions had reached
the European theater and bled alongside the Continental-American and Allied soldiers.322
The old Porto Rican Regiment at least saw its role extended during the war.
Brought to full strength in 1914, the regiment had been sent to defend the Panama Canal
in 1917.323 It is significant that these troops were sent outside the Island to take over
defense of Isthmian Canal. Not only was the Canal vital for American projection of
power and national security, hence the importance of receiving such assignment, but the
role of Puerto Rican troops ceased to be solely of a domestic nature. The local press
deemed sending the regiment overseas a gesture of confidence in the Puerto Ricans.
Reflecting their new political identity, upon their return to Puerto Rico, the men of the
“Porto Rican Regiment” found their unit’s name changed to the “65th Infantry, U. S.
Army,” courtesy of the National Defense Act of 1920.324 Significantly, the term Porto
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Puerto Ricans were being recruited in New York and other cities in the U.S.
El Águila reported that in some cases when asked their names from recruitment purposes,
some Puerto Ricans answered, “Yo soy Puertorriqueño” to which the recruiter answered:
“All right, puertoricans [sic] are Americans: so, you most fight for your Nation.”322
According to the article, after being told they were U.S. citizens, most went willingly.
Many of the Puerto Ricans recruited in New York were sent to the 396th, AfricanAmerican units. They fought attached to French units in the Western Front in France.
Among them was Rafael Hernandez, one of Puerto Rico's greatest composers.
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In three days the 654 vacancies of the Porto Rico Regiment were filled with
volunteers. McIntyre to Yager, March 13, 1914, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30 Cartapacio 4,
Documento 1, I; and Muratti, Historia del Regimiento 65, 9.
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Rican was dropped as the regiment was included in the renumbering of federal units.
World War I brought Puerto Rico American citizenship, and the Island’s regiment
received a permanent niche in the regular army of the United States.
Demobilization came swiftly but that was not to be the end of the “Porto Rican
contingent.” The three regiments from Las Casas were reorganized in 1922 as part of
the Army Reserve Corps. In 1919, Secretary of War Baker authorized Yager to organize
an infantry regiment and a cavalry battalion, officially creating the Porto Rico National
Guard. In 1923, this corps was reorganized into the 295 Infantry Regiment, P.R.N.G.
Responding both to the prestige that came from wearing a military uniform and to
economic hardships, neither the National Guard nor the regular army units in the Island
lacked volunteers to fill their ranks, and, in fact, there were waiting lists to join such
units.325
As the victory celebrations subdued, Puerto Rican politicians tried to cash on any
political leverage they believed to have earned because of their support of the war effort.
Still convinced that the soldiers who trained in the Island would become the nucleus of a
new Puerto Rico, some moved to secure that any benefits granted to the Great War’s
veterans in the U.S. were also extended to the Puerto Rican veterans. Roughly a month

was named the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry U.S.A. See Muratti, Historia del
Regimiento 65, 6.
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As early as 1906, a group of young men organized themselves in companies
hoping to become the nucleus of the national guard in Puerto Rico but failed to receive
approval from the colonial authorities. José R. Nadal, Guardia Nacional, sucesora de las
milicias puertorriqueñas (1962). 15ta. Asamblea 6ta. Sesión Legislativa Ordinaria
Cámara de Representantes, R. de la C. 7097, 20 de Agosto de 2007, Presentada por las
representantes Ruiz Calás y González Colón Referida a la Comisión de Asuntos Internos,
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after the Armistice, Diluvio, which had been very critical of Yager’s administration
throughout the war period began a campaign promoting the inclusion of Puerto Rican
soldiers as beneficiaries of the Secretary of Interior Dane’ proposed benefit for veteranswhich sought to provide soldiers with the opportunity to buy farmlands with low-interests
loans. Diluvio’s editor, Norberto Escabí, argued that in Puerto Rico there were over
200,000 cuerdas326 of public lands- and hundreds of thousands more in private absentee
idle hands that could very well be put to good use by the more than 15,000 soldiers whom
in their majority were peasants. The editorial warned that the majority of the Puerto
Rican soldiers had developed new worldviews, habits, and ideas through the hard training
and labor of the military camps, and, consequently, the old standards of living would not
satisfy them now. 327 It is clear that the editorial was appealing, and not so subtlety, to the
perennial fear of socio-political unrest harbored by the colonial authorities. Diluvio also
called for putting a stop to the Puerto Rican labor exodus. It argued that the training of
the soldiers and the farmland legislation should help to create the necessary conditions so
the labor exodus would become unnecessary.328
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“Pronto tendremos que afrontar el que la desmovilización del primer
contingente de doce mil soldados portorriqueños, que acudieron presurosos al
llamamiento de la nación, cuando peligró la libertad. La mayoría de esos labradores han
aprendido a vivir una vida nueva. Todos, o su inmensa mayoría, han cambiado
completamente sus puntos de vista. Lo que ayer les pareció natural; los standards [sic] de
vida que aceptaron antes sin proferir un aqueja, con los nuevos hábitos e ideas
adquiridas en la dura y provechosa labor del Campamento, no puede, no podrá
satisfacerlos. Diluvio, November 16, 1918
328

Diluvio accused the colonial authorities in the Island of the most virulent and
silly Jingoism. That same issue published a caricature of the effects of immigration with
the caption: “Juan Boricua, no salgas aunque el Diablo te lleve; mira aquí cómo sales, …
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Some steps were taken to prepare the soldiers for their return to civilian life. As
part of the demobilization process the soldiers attended a series of talks and seminars. C.
Hendrickson, director of Agriculture of the Food Commission, Félix Reina and F.G.
Rodil, a functionary and the Director of Education respectively, spoke to the men of the
374 and 375 about re-entering civil life. By means of these talks, the trio stated, they
wish to prepare the soldiers to continue to work on food conservation and food crop
development. Among other topics they covered food control, production of food
substitutes, and development of new agricultural industries. Hendrickson and Reina
commented that it was for the soldiers to exploit what they were to learn and to create a
new “relation of Porto Rican soldiers with the agricultural life,” while Rodil discussed the
opportunity of “making Porto Rico a self-supporting country.”329 The soldiers indeed
received a tall order. Moreover, it is very telling that the publications advocating the
extension of rights to Puerto Rican veterans and covering their demobilization-training
were the Socialist-leaning, Diluvio, and the staunchly pro-metropolis, Porto Rico
Progress. Unionistas and Republicanos were too busy positioning themselves in order to
further their respective political goals.

mira aqui como vuelves.” The Puerto Rican worker was shown leaving in high spirits
and wearing his best clothes and coming back extremely dilapidated and beaten up. See
Diluvio, November 16, 1918. In late November 1918, El Águila condemned the
treatment received by Puerto Rican workers aboard the ship “City of Savannah” in route
to New York. Their arrival to New York coincided with the Armistice which prompted
the local authorities to stop them from disembarking. Sent back without proper supplies
and care, and mistreated by the crew many returned sick, and several workers died. El
Águila de Puerto Rico, 23 November 1918; and Diluvio, 2 November 1918
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The Unionistas were quick to demand a solution to the status issue suggesting that
Puerto Rico be allowed to send a delegate to the Peace Assembly to demand
independence for the Island. As the Unionistas started to call for resolving the status
question, Republicans and colonial administrators attacked them as selfish and
irresponsible in view of the earthquake and tidal wave that punished the Island in
November 1918, and the subsequent cholera epidemic that crippled the west coast.330
The next month, Representative Cayetano Coll y Cuchí, who after de Diego’s death in
1918 became the most prominent separatist among the Unionistas, passed a memorial
and resolution in the Insular Legislature urging President Wilson to support selfdetermination for the Puerto Ricans. Coll y Cuchí’s resolution stressed that failing to act
positively would undermine the moral grounds of the American representatives in the
peace negotiations and thus jeopardize their mission. Puerto Rico, he argued, “… has
demonstrated it s fitness and capacity for self government, that is being at present and
always has been denied the island.”331
Coll y Cuchí reminded the president that Porto Ricans:
…let out a cry of joy when the American Congress extended its laws to the island
territory and called its sons to arms in order that they might play part in the great
task of giving liberty to the world.

And our soldiers gathered in the camps and

our riches flowed into the vaults of the government without the slightest doubt
delaying the decided impulse of our spirit. Thus was seen the rare spectacle of a
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people who was itself not free hastening to give the blood of its sons to defend
other nations.332
The Porto Rican soldiers, he continued, “…left their homes to fight for democracy,
resting in the belief that when the war was over, victory won, and peace established,
Porto Rico would be given the same freedom for which it fought.”333 He skillfully linked
Wilson’s international rhetoric to Puerto Rico’s issues. The resolution continued: “Our
culture and civilization and the pride of our glorious race oblige us to decline to accept as
legitimate a government that does not spring from our own will.” He proceeded by
denouncing that the elected representatives of Puerto Rico were subject “to the veto of
one man who was neither born in our land nor expects to find here the final peace of
death.”334
The easy passing of the non-binding resolution emboldened the Unionistas who
the next week tried to pass another one. This time they sought approval for a resolution
calling on the President and Congress to allow the organization of a Republican form of
government in the Island.335 Don Manuel Rossy, Republican leader of the house, still
espousing 100 percent Americanism, declared while denouncing the bill: “I am an
American citizen and I stand for American sovereignty. That is my Americanism.”336 He
argued that Unionistas had poorly worded the resolution to disguise their true goals,
332

Ibid.

333

Ibid.

334

Ibid.

335

Porto Rico Progress, 13 December 1918.

336

Ibid.
159

independence. The Speaker of the House, Miguel Guerra, had tried to convince
legislators to pass it unanimously by appealing to the need of a more liberal and
democratic government. Defending democratic and nationalist aspiration he declared
that the day for Puerto Rico to voice its desire for self-government had indeed arrived.
Frustrated by the intransigence of the Republicanos, Ponce’s Representative Manuel
Lastra challenged Rossi to claim full responsibility before the people of Puerto Rico for
the defeat of a plan for a more liberal government.337 Rossi riposted:
You, [the Unionistas] stand for the Republic of Porto Rico, and we stand for
statehood in the Union. We travel different roads and we seek different ends. We
will not be on [sic] at this late hour to content ourselves with a loosely worded
proposition that leaves in doubt the kind of sovereignty we want.338
After a heated discussion, Guerra replied to Rossy’s comments. He made a distinction
between the old Americanism, which Rossy represented, and the new spirit of
Americanism. Guerra explained that while holding in high esteem the old Americanism,
and while being loyal to the teachings of American statesmen, the younger generation
and their new Americanism believed in the future of Puerto Rican nationality. Indeed the
debate turned upon who was more American in an attempt to show who best understood
the path that the Puerto Ricans ought to follow.
Officially, Unión did not demand independence. However, their leaders spoke
openly about it and spared no effort in fighting against statehood. Undeterred by the
failure of the resolution, Coll y Cuchí challenged the metropolis declaring to the press
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that, “year after year we have demanded independence or statehood… Without achieving
any…” and, “the Jones Act, let’s be honest, does not satisfy the aspirations of the
portorrican [sic] people.”339 Coll y Cuchí linked Puerto Rico’s need of “independence
nationhood” to Wilson’s “self-determination” rhetoric. He added that Córdova Dávila’s
proposal in the U.S. House of Representatives to create a referendum to decide the
political status was not a surprise and that “we [the Unionistas] had always believed that
after the war ended, there would be the opportunity to move the Island towards that goal
[independence].” The reporter himself was quick to link the goal of the separatistas in
Unión to a long line of revolutionaries and champions of independence.340 There was
much opposition to any referendum on the status question, especially while Unión
retained political power. During the war Buscapié had derided the idea of having a
plebiscite to define the status arguing that the hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans
who enlisted in the military draft had already decided that issue.341
For a while it seemed as if the Unionistas would be able to realize their goals with
considerable support from the general public. The general election of 1920 witnessed a
triumph for Unión. Of 249,431 votes cast, the Unionistas obtained 126,446. They re-
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elected Córdova Dávila, 15 senators and 26 representatives. Their two candidates were
elected to the new executive positions of Public Service Commissioners. Only the
senatorial district of Ponce remained in Republican hands, which with 63,845 votes cast
in their favor also won in 16 municipalities, and elected 3 senators and 9 representatives.
The Socialists won 8 municipalities with 59,140 votes and elected 1 senator and 4
representatives.
Unión was the dominant political party in the Island, but its success hid the deeprooted divisions splitting its members into almost irreconcilable bands: those who wanted
independence- initially led by José de Diego, and succeeded by Cayetano Coll y Cuchí,
Barceló and Córdova Dávila among others; and those who wanted to secure autonomy
and who still spoke of pro-Americanism, led by Juan B. Huyke and Martín Travieso. The
Unionistas had personal divisions as well. Córdova Dávila himself, however, spoke of
the possibility of becoming a state of the Union if statehood was granted with the “same
dignity and grandiosity” of the other 48 states.342 In 1920, Barceló traveled to the United
States with the purpose of gauging how much had changed in Washington with the
election of the Republican candidate Warren H. Harding as president. He proudly
declared: “Let me go to Washington to demand independence”. But once in New York
he showed the ambivalence and division of his own party by declaring that the
Unionistas’ immediate goal was to obtain the right to elect their own governor and that
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they were happy and proud of having U.S. citizenship. Moreover, he declared that Puerto
Rico would accept independence or statehood, as final solutions to the status question.343
In his inaugural speech in July 29, 1921, Harding’s appointee, E. Montgomery
Reily, let Puerto Rican leaders know that he would not tolerate foreigners inciting
political unrest among Puerto Ricans or demanding independence. Reily stated that as
long as the Stars and Stripes flew over the United Sates, it would continue to fly over
Puerto Rico. He also warned the Socialists by declaring that he would not allow labor
leaders to incite unrest among workers. Montgomery Reily’s inaugural speech was wellreceived by the Republicans. It made the Socialists weary and left the Unionistas feeling
betrayed. On August 3, the leadership of Unión met in assembly. At the end of the
meeting, a crowd accused Córdova Dávila of collaborating with the new governor and
knowing beforehand what Reily would say in his inaugural speech. As the crowd
chanted “Viva la independencia,” Córdova Dávila yelled back: “Viva Puerto Rico
Americano.”344 Though this was not the end of Unión, Reily’s persecution of Unionistas
whom he deemed separatists and his exaltation of those he believed wanted only limited
self-government would finally destroyed the party, at least as a counterweight to the
Republican Party.
On January 1922, Congressman Philip Campbell, Republican from Kansas, and
Senator William King, Democrat from Utah, introduced the Campbell Bill. This bill, for
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the first time mentioned openly the creation in Puerto Rico of a Estado Libre Asociado,
which unlike the one created in 1952, included an American Commissioner in Puerto
Rico and a governor to be chosen by the elected Puerto Rican legislature, not by the
people.345 With the leaders of Unión in disarray as a consequence of internal divisions
and the latest political developments, they temporarily adopted the Estado Libre
Asociado as their goal. Soon the bill showed signs that it would produce no results. In
April 1922, a faction of Unión decided to create the Partido Nacionalista
Puertorriqueño, which was constituted on September 17. Fearing that a SocialistRepublican alliance might end their political dominance, the Unionistas sought an
alliance with their archrival, the Republicanos. For the elections of 1924, Republicans
and Unionistas formed an alliance- Alianza Puertorriqueña. Republican Party dissidents,
incensed by the alliance with a party dominated by autonomists and separatists, allied
themselves with the Socialists to form a coalition.346 The Puerto Rican soldier and the
heavy burdens put on him, as well as the promises made to los hijos de este país quickly
disappeared from the politician’s mind as they ushered the Island into an era of political
alliances. Incessant fighting for political survival and dominance left no room or interest,
for little else.
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The combination of political developments, in the form of American citizenship
for the Puerto Ricans and an elective legislature in 1917, and the military mass
mobilization of the Island’s peasantry and urban workers, further complicated the
relationship between the metropolis and the colony. The War Department, through the
BIA, would have preferred to continue treating the Island as a giant reservation.
American citizenship, however, invested the Puerto Ricans with more legal rights and
recourses, making unilateral and unpopular policies easier to challenge by the different
political groups in the Island. The immediate goals of the War Department and the
Wilson administration (securing the loyalty of the Puerto Ricans by granting them
American citizenship and silencing critiques of imperialism) were achieved. But this
victory would prove a double-edge knife in the long run.
Mass participation of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. military, the newly created Puerto
Rico National Guard, and the willing support of the newly elected Puerto Rican
legislature for the war effort, temporarily cemented American control over the Island, and
more importantly, over the islanders’ loyalty to the metropolis. As some supporters of
the metropolis argued during the war years, the unwillingness or inability of the vast
majority of the Puerto Ricans to resist becoming American citizens and their
determination to participate in the war reflected the impact that the institutions of the new
metropolis had had on the Puerto Ricans. That same institutional influence would lead
the Puerto Ricans to expect more political and socioeconomic opportunities, if not
equality. Oblivious to the transformation occurring in Puerto Rico, the metropolis was
slow to respond to these challenges and no major political changes would take place after
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1917 until yet another war, the Second World War, highlighted, once again, the strategic
importance of the Island.
The mass mobilization of the Puerto Rican peasantry and urban workers, and the
initial enthusiasm shown by the inductees hid the fact that control over the military
apparatus in the Island was no longer the exclusive prerogative of the American colonial
administrators. The traditional and emerging criollo elites, as well as the professional
classes, had to be called upon to train and lead the massive army of peasants soldiering in
the Island. Out of sheer necessity, the metropolis broadly opened the officer’s corps to
los hijos de este país providing in the process the tools for the local elites and emerging
professional classes to attain and consolidate political power. criollo leaders, which for
different reasons and with different goals in mind supported the war effort, by the war’s
end, had succeeded in wresting exclusive control over the nation-building project via
military service from the metropolitan authorities. This situation, even if not immediately
apparent in the post-war years, would eventually put the local elites in a better political
position than they had been before the WWI.
The passing of the Jones Act and the imposition of American citizenship upon the
Puerto Ricans coupled with the death of Luis Muñoz Rivera temporarily weakened the
Unionistas. The coming of the war brought the temporary resurgence of the Republicans
who were the first to marry the war effort and the 100 percent Americanism campaign, to
their own political goal, statehood. By the war’s end, however, by turning President
Wilson’s promise of ending the hyphenations in the American nation into a call for a
New Americanism that promoted creating a new Puerto Rican out of Hispanic gallantry
and Anglo-Saxon industrialism, the autonomistas within Unión had found an image they
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could use to sell their third way, the Libre Asociación, to the general population. This
was in essence a return to Hostos and Matienzo Cintron’s idea of Americanizing the
Puerto Rican, which meant creating a modern political individual without losing the
essence of Puertorriqueñismo,347 only this time, economic modernization superseded
political modernization. The autonomistas had found a new philosophy and an agent to
incarnate it. There could be a space for the Anglo-Saxon and Hispanic cultures to
coexist. The Jíbaro would be that new man and Puerto Rico that new space. The
autonomistas of the 1920s were not able to fully exploit or develop their new popular
philosophy, but the seed had been planted for the generation coming of age during the
war, and they would retake this narrative decades later.
Over 18,000 Puerto Ricans served in the U.S. armed forces during WWI.348
After the Armistice these soldiers were quickly demobilized and returned to the hills and
coastal valleys.349 Neither the metropolis nor the colonial administration created
vocational or capacitating projects to make good on the promises of creating a new
modern Jíbaro. The promises of a new Jíbaro, integrated into the economy as its driving
force, and as the “new teachers of freedom and democracy,” remained mostly unfulfilled.
However, the creation of the Puerto Rico National Guard in 1919, and transforming the
provisional regiment into a regular U.S. Army regiment, (el 65), absorbed some of the
best soldiers and restarted the military in Puerto Rico as a professional career.
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Many of the future career officers (and certainly the vast majority of the troops)
identified themselves simply as Jíbaros from Cabo Rojo, Cayey, Lares, here and there…
and became an important emerging socio-economic and political group. These soldiers
and officers did not interfere directly in politics, as they followed the strict subordination
to civilian authority practiced by the U.S. Army. criollo politicians, however, tried to
employ the soft enticements of the military (prestige, manliness, heroism) and its tangible
aspect (economic improvement) to boost different political projects, from simply
redefining the parameters of the colony to full decolonization. But this would have to
wait.
The metropolis had secured the islanders’ loyalty in part by giving them
citizenship but the fact that the Island remained mostly dormant after WWI, even after
the promises of integrating the Jíbaros as the axis of progress did not materialize, was a
function of the temporary economic boom brought by the war. The Great Depression
would bring unrest to the circum-Caribbean basin in the 1930 and mark the end of
economic and political stability in the American informal empire and its Caribbean
colonies, especially Puerto Rico. Yet another war would force the United States to once
again mobilize the Puerto Ricans. The challenges to the metropolis would be stronger
and more direct. Overreliance on the criollo elites to mobilize and control the peasantry
and urban working classes would continue to undermine the metropolis’ control over the
military apparatus and the political structures in the Island. A new challenge in the form
of nationalist clandestine paramilitary units would be, more than a military challenge,
recognition of the political value of the military in the Island’s society.
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In his late years and by then a general, Luis Raul Esteves commented that he
believed that Camp Las Casas served as the “first blood transfusion received by our tired
people. Not only did it [military training] awaken our Jíbaro, but it taught him how to
live a better life.”350 Esteves had doubted that the “malnourished jibaritos” he
encountered at Las Casas would ever be ready to serve as combat troops and longed
serving with his Continental unit- the 23rd Infantry. However, his opinion changed:
I witnessed our boys’ physical transformation becoming aware of their disciplined
spirit and military pride inherited from our ancestors; I changed my mind and felt
proud of serving with Boricua troops...351
Esteves’ assessment may have been lost to the dominant political leaders in the early
1920s, but the emerging leadership, among them Luis Muñoz Marín and Pedro Albizu
Campos, were not to forget what they witnessed or experience during the Great War.
The Jíbaro, who had been presented at best as a romantic figure and at worst as a reason
for the Island’s backwardness had proven that his alleged shortcomings were a function
of the structural social inequalities inherent to the Island and not a characteristic of his
persona. As mature leaders, both Albizu Campos and Muñoz Marín would try again to
re-create the Puerto Ricans’ national identity and the Island’s socio-economic structures
by virtue of military training. Their different paths would eventually lead to an armed
struggle between los hijos de este país.
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CHAPTER 4
ECONOMIC WRETCHEDNESS AND THE NATIONALIST
CHALLENGE: PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OVER MODERN PUERTO
RICO
Nationalism [has] organized and mobilized the vital strength of Puerto Rico to
counter the enemy. The nation has passed from passive resistance to
counterattack. The entire nation has condemned these killings and it is firm in its
resolution that they will not repeat themselves... It is the plan to exterminate the
Puerto Ricans. [But]Nationalism has destroyed all Yankee inventions. The
enemy has now left only the traditional arms of assassination. The country will
vindicate the killings of its heroes, Pagán, Quiñones, Rodríguez-Vega, and
Santiago. The Yankee Chief of police, Colonel Francis Riggs, has declared to the
nation that there will be war. The Nationalists recognized his frankness and pick
up the glove. There will be war. War against the Yankees!352

The 1930s in Puerto Rico were marked by economic distress and political
instability. The economic misfortunes of the Island were not simply a matter of the
metropolis’ economic problems extending to its colonies. Puerto Rico’s problems had
started previously to the Great Depression and were linked to the exploitative colonial
352
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nature of its situation. As the depression castigated the U.S. mainland, it simply
aggravated a preexisting condition in the Island. Puerto Rico’s dire economic picture; an
alternatively unemployed or overworked, underpaid, malnourished rural population and a
rapidly impoverishing urban sector, stirred discontent which was ultimately aimed at the
metropolis and its colonial administrators.
As the most recognizable face of poverty, hunger became the rule for the Puerto
Rican urban workers and peasantry, the economic situation turned into a political one. A
rapidly deteriorating situation gave way to a reign of political violence in the mid and late
1930s. A virulent Nacionalista anti-American campaign and the colonial authorities’
belligerent and sometimes criminal persecution of the Nacionalistas marked this
historical period. The Nacionalistas, however, were not passive victims; they fought
violently to the point that the Island came to be called “America’s Ireland” or the “Ireland
of the Caribbean.” 353 In fact, before U.S entrance into WWII, the metropolis and its
colonial administrators used the militarized Puerto Rico Insular Police to fight a brief war
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in Puerto Rico against the Nacionalistas leaders, their paramilitary units, and simple party
members. The fear of social unrest during the early 1930s, followed by a brief reign of
political violence forced the federal government to take a closer look at the Island’s
economic and political situation. Hence, while violence closed some roads to Puerto
Rico’s socio-economic and political development, it also opened other avenues.
This chapter analyzes how the economic distress afflicting the Island fueled
political discontent and how such discontent was in turn used by emerging political
leaders, Pedro Albizu Campos and Luis Muñoz Marín, to further different decolonization
processes. The history of the rise of Pedro Albizu Campos and the Nacionalistas is well
known.354 An electrifying leader decides that only a violent struggle would free the
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Island of the American grip (which he believed was the cause of all of Puerto Rico’s
troubles). He thus wages war against the metropolis and the colonial authorities hoping
that the Puerto Rican masses will rise and expel the Americans. On the other hand, Luis
Muñoz Marín, the bohemian “Bard of politics” and patrician heir of Luis Muñoz Rivera,
would spend the 1930s vacillating between socialist ideals (especially the socio-economic
restructuration of the Island) and his belief in independence, but always condemning
violence. Both Albizu Campos and Muñoz Marín benefitted and suffered immensely
from the same conditions plaguing the Island.
I argue that what transpired during these years of political violence was also a
battle for control of Puerto Rican identity. It is obvious that Albizu Campos had no
chance of militarily overthrowing the colonial government. Although tactically
insignificant from a military point of view, the Nacionalistas’ daring attacks against the
metropolis’ agents fulfill their intended role; these attacks gained local and international
attention to Albizu Campos’s cause. His movement, however, had little possibility of
success if it could not polarize the Puerto Rican’s self perception vis-a-vis Continental
Americans. Using Hispanic and Catholic iconography for his party and paramilitary
units, and emphasizing Spanish traditions and conservatism, were but a call to the Puerto
Ricans to see themselves as completely different from Continental Americans. Albizu
Campos was appealing to what he believed was Puerto Rico’s true national identity.
Eventually the Nacionalistas would challenge not only the American presence but also
the legitimacy of the Insular Police and the U.S. Army and National Guard Units in the
Island as truly Puerto Rican or as national institutions representative of the Puerto Ricans.
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On the other hand, Muñoz Marín, though a self-proclaimed Nacionalista and
ardent advocate of independence, rejected violence, preferring political means and
preserving good relations with the United States to achieve that goal. Though his
fortunes indicated otherwise in the mid 1930s, shortly before U.S. entry into the Second
World War Muñoz Marín would emerge as the dominant political leader. However, his
political goals would be compromised, both by the requirements of the global war and by
his new source of political power; the tens of thousands of votes he received from the
rural masses and from the urban working classes.
Before Muñoz Marín emerged as the leading politician in the late 1930s (a role he
continued to fill well into the 1960s), he had to fight his way to the center stage of insular
politics, and in the process, he would find his own political path. As explained in the
previous chapter, for the elections of 1924 the Unionista leader, Antonio R. Barceló made
a political alliance with the staunchly pro-American Republicanos to form the Alianza
which faced the Coalición made up of Santiago Iglesias Pantín’s Socialistas and
dissenting Republicanos who had created the Partido Constitucional Histórico (originally
known as Republicano Puro). This move secured the prevalence of Unionistas and
Republicanos over the emerging Socialistas in 1924.355 Before the general elections of
1928, however, the Alianza lost a significant number of Republicanos who joined the
rank and file of the Coalición. Though the Alianza again dominated the elections, the
355

Unión obtained 132,755 votes and the Republicans 30,286; the Socialists
56,103, and Constitucional Histórico 34,576. Altogether, the Alianza received 163,041
votes versus 90,679 cast for the coalition. The Alianza won 71 municipalities while the
coalition secured 4 and elected 2 senators and 3 representatives. The Nationalist Party
participated in the election, as well as the Federal party and splinters of the principal
parties but did not win a significant number of votes anywhere. See Bayrón Toro,
Elecciones y partidos políticos de Puerto Rico, 163-66.
174

Coalición, especially its Socialista wing, were weakening the Alianza’s grip on Puerto
Rican politics.356 Soon after the elections, the Unionistas from the Alianza, unhappy with
having to equally divide government positions with their minority Republicano partners,
splintered into two groups, and Barceló moved to dissolve Alianza.357 On January 1932,
what was left of Alianza joined the Republicanos Puros led by Manuel F. Rossy forming
the Partido Unión Republicana. With this stroke Barcelo’s Unionistas lost the right to
continue calling their party Unión. After failed legal attempts to regain their name and
party insignias, the Unionist leaders rebranded themselves as Partido Liberal
Puertorriqueño (PLP).358
Shortly before the election of 1932, the reunited Republicanos, and some
Autonomistas from the former Alianza, entered into a pact with the Socialistas in what
came to be known as the Coalición Republicana Socialista. It certainly seemed as if the
political career of Barceló was coming to an end. The dire situation faced by the
Liberales left Barceló with no option but to act boldly, and he soon moved to embrace
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publicly the ideal of independence. Many within the Liberales were in fact Autonomistas
but by taking up eventual independence as part of their platform, the PLP gave the
impression of unanimous thought with respect to the Island’s political future. During the
campaign, a firebrand Independentista Muñoz Marín emerged as an inspiring young
leader. His articles in La Democracia, his father’s newspaper, gave him a tribune from
which to attack the colonial administration and political opponents. Running for the
Liberal Party, he was elected as “Senator at large” (por acumulación). Though the
Liberales obtained more votes than any other party, the Republican and Socialist
coalition dominated the elections and split the most important positions in government
(that of resident commissioner in Washington, president of the senate, and speaker of the
house) among them.359 The staunchly pro-American and anexionist Republicanos and
Socialistas were returned to power. Or so it seemed.
Though the Liberales did not dominate the elections, their performance was quite
impressive. The electoral power gained by the Liberales derived from two sources.
First, the popularity of their leading figures, the hardened veteran Barceló and the young,
charismatic Muñoz Marín made the PLP a very recognizable organization. Second,
Muñoz Marín’s anti-monopoly and pro-labor rhetoric was very appealing to the masses
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During the general election of 1932 registered voters increased to 452,783
(from 321,163) since for the first time women were allowed to vote in the Island made
possible by Public Law 74 sponsored by Senator Manuel A. García Méndez. Of 383,722
votes the PLP obtained 170,168; Unión Republicana 110,794 and the Socialistas 97,438.
The Nacionalistas obtained 5,257 and Albizu Campos running for senator at large
secured 11,882 votes. As a result Santiago Iglesias Pantín became Resident
Commissioner (a position he occupied between 1933 and 1939). The presidency of the
Senate and the House went to Rafael Martínez Nadal and Miguel A. García Méndez
respectively. See Bayrón Toro, Elecciones y partidos políticos de Puerto Rico, 168, 177,
181.
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due to the extreme economic conditions plaguing the Island. It did not take long for
Muñoz Marín to identify the economy as the principal issue in the minds of most Puerto
Ricans.
Under American control, land concentration and the proletarianization of the
peasantry had advanced hand in hand in Puerto Rico.360 The monopolization of lands by
absentee-owned sugar corporations meant that most of the Island’s arable land was
dedicated to grow and export that crop which in turn made the Puerto Ricans dependent
on imports for foodstuffs. Land concentration, high population density, and dependence
on exports for foodstuffs exacerbated economic hardships in Puerto Rico. This process
gradually led to the pauperization of the Puerto Rican peasant, especially the cane worker
and his family.361
The economic situation in Puerto Rico deteriorated tremendously in the late
1920s. In 1928, hurricane San Felipe crippled the coffee industry which saw its
production reduced from 32 million pounds to just five million the next year and the loss
of its remaining European markets.362 In 1930, the Brookings Institution, an independent
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As explained by historian Cesar Ayala, the proletarianization of the Puerto
Rican peasantry was a function of land scarcity and high population density. This
process accelerated as a result of the passing of the Hollander Bill of 1901, and by the
implementation of U.S. tariffs in the Island which finally killed the coffee industry in
Puerto Rico, and forced small-peasants and subsistence-farmers to sell their lands. Cesar
J. Ayala, American Sugar Kingdom: The Plantation Economy of the Spanish Caribbean,
1898-1934, (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999),
159-61, 164-65.
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Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato, 17.
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public policy think tank, presented the 700 page study, Porto Rico and its Problems.363
The study described the economic situation of the Island as “deplorable” with rural
families’ annual income averaging between $250 and $275.364 Urban families earned a
little more, but in these areas the cost of life was higher, and there were fewer
opportunities to have home orchards to supplement dietary requirements.365 In addition,
the Organic Acts used to govern Puerto Rico (Foraker and Jones) required that imports be
carried exclusively by the U.S. merchant marine, the most expensive in the world, which
made foodstuffs in the Island between 8 to 14 percent more expensive than in New York.
The cost of food on the Island was aggravated by the fact that daily wages in Puerto Rico
were less than $1 while in New York they were $4 to $10.366 In fact, manufactured
goods were so expensive that “in 1930 only one person in four had ever worn shoes.”367
On September 26, 1932, another hurricane, San Ciprián, caused 225 deaths, and left over
363

Based in Washington the Brookings Institution was a non-profit public policy
think tank. In the 1930s it was recognized as both liberal and scientific. The Brookings
Report, “Puerto Rico and its Problems”, a 700 page document was written after two
years of research by seven scholars and professionals under the guidance of Victor S.
Clark, formerly Puerto Rico’s Education Commissioner. The report stated that the
Island’s condition was deplorable. According to the Brookings Report, excessive,
inefficient government, and partisan politics were to blame for Puerto Rico’s maladies.
But the main cause of Puerto Rico’s troubles, according to the report, was
overpopulation. See, Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 82-84.
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Dietz, Economic History, 127.
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Ibid, 129-28.
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Ironically, Dr. Bailey K. Ashford’s crusade to eradicate the hookworm-caused
chronic anemia of the Puerto Rican peasant was undermined by the lack of this basic
item. By 1925 a study found that although the death rate related to hookworm had been
dramatically reduced, the incidence of the disease had not. See Dietz, Economic History
129; And Ashford, A Soldier in Science, 37-54. .
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3,000 wounded and more than 100,000 Puerto Ricans homeless. San Ciprián also ruined
the small producers’ minor fruit crops on the north coast.368 When the Great Depression
made its way to the colony, Puerto Rico was in no shape to withstand its assault.369
While most politicians continued to engage exclusively with matters of political
arrangements and patronage- such as the political status of the Island and positions in the
colonial bureaucracy, Muñoz Marín was preoccupied with the economic and social
maladies affecting the peasantry and urban working classes. In fact, he challenged the
Brookings Institution’s conclusions which blamed overpopulation as the main cause for
Puerto Rico’s socio-economic distress, instead holding capitalism and the sugar
corporations accountable for the situation.370 The Liberales benefitted immensely from
Muñoz Marín’s early understanding of the masses’ dire situation. Furthermore, on the
mainland, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected president bringing with him a very
liberal agenda to the White House. The coalition of Republicanos and Socialistas would
soon find their politics out of tune with the reformist drive of FDR’s administration. The
Socialistas and Republicanos may have dominated the elections in the Island, but it
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Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato, 28.
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In 1935 the percentage of the male population with no economic activity in the
Island (10 years and over) reached and all time high of 24.2%. The percentage of women
engaged in economic activity, on the other hand, had slowly increase going from 15.8%
in 1899 to 34.3 in 1935. 150,000 heads of families were unemployed Dietz, Economic
History, 131, 153, Table 2.14.
370

The report’s recommended making the sugar industry more competitive
instead of limiting land ownership, export quota or raising workers’ salaries. The report
recommendations were in opposition to Muñoz Marín’s understanding of the problems.
For him, the root of the problem was capitalism and the sugar corporations, and thus he
was bent on enforcing the anti-monopoly federal law limiting corporation land ownership
to 500 acres. See Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 82-84.
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would be Muñoz Marín who would be seen constantly in Washington and as having
FDR’s administration’s ear.371
The Liberales were not the only political faction benefitting from economic
hardships. The Nacionalistas, who had reorganized their party in 1930 and elected Pedro
Albizu Campos as their president, also participated in the elections of 1932.372 They
hoped to elect Albizu Campos to the senate, which seemed a reasonable proposition
since his frequent public speeches were usually attended by a multitude of people. The
Nacionalistas, however, were extremely weak to the point of requiring the unrequested,
albeit welcome, assistance of the Republicanos to obtain the 30,000 signatures needed to
inscribe their party.373 After obtaining only 1.4% of the votes in the general elections of
1932, and failing to elect Albizu Campos as senator at large (who with 11,882 votes
doubled his party’s tally) the Nacionalistas withdrew from the electoral process.
Obtaining independence for whatever means became the mission of the Nacionalistas.
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The Coalición found themselves as the Washington outsiders as their policies
were incongruent with those of the New Dealers. Muñoz Marín had many contacts with
the continental press, including Eleanor Roosevelt’s biographer, Ruby Black and Ernest
Gruening. The latter was the first director of the Office of Islands and Territories, an
office which took over the War Department’s Bureau of Insular Affairs responsibility
over Puerto Rico in 1935. See Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 113115.
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Ibid., 87.
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The Nacionalistas had obtained 329 votes in 1928 and where thus required to
re-inscribe the party. The Republicanos sought to weaken the Liberales by splitting the
pro-independence vote between the two. Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el
Nuevo Trato, 43.
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The 1932 elections were the last ingredient in the radicalization of Albizu Campos
and his followers.374 Soon after the elections Albizu Campus challenged the legitimacy
of American sovereignty over the Island basing his claims on the legal relationship
between Spain and Puerto Rico before the 1898 invasion as established by the
Autonomous Charter secured by Luis Muñoz Rivera in 1897.375 If American
sovereignty was illegal, then the U.S. had no right to exert any authority over Puerto Rico
nor was the Puerto Ricans’ duty to obey or cooperate with what then constituted an
occupation force. Slowly but surely, what amounted to political tensions would turn into
an open shooting war between the colonial authorities and the Nacionalistas.
On July 1, 1933, the newly elected president of the United States, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, replaced the competent governor James Beverly with the inadequate Robert
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Members of the Nationalist Party, put off by Albizu Campos’ radical
extremism, left the party and founded the Partido Independentista on October 21, 1934.
On September 23, 1934 the Partido Comunista Puertorriqueño was also founded and
later joined the International Communist. Bayrón Toro, Elecciones y partidos políticos
de Puerto Rico, 183.
375

Albizu Campos based his arguments on the provisions of Title VII, article 43
of the Carta Autonómica of 1897 which guaranteed the veto power of the Puerto Rican
parliament over decisions reached by the Cortes of the Kingdom where over a dozen
Puerto Rican delegates sat with both voice and vote. Article 2 declared that the “present
constitution shall not be amended except by virtue of a special law and upon petition of
the insular parliament.” Since the military disbanded the Insular Parliament, and there
were no Puerto Rican delegates present to sign the Treaty of Paris of December 10, the
passing of sovereignty over Puerto Rico to the United Sates, the Nacionalistas argued,
was a violation of the legal relationship between Spain and Puerto Rico and thus illegal.
The discussion on this subject continued well into the 1940s and reached the U.S.
Congress. See House Committee on Public Lands, Subcommittee on Territorial and
Insular Possessions, A Bill to Amend the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, Election of
Governor: Hearings on H.R. 3309, 80th Cong., 1 sess., (Amherst, University of
Massachusetts: Microform Collection), 19 May 1947, 15-16,19. (Hereafter, H.R 3309).
To read the document in its entirity see Antonio Fernós López-Cepero, Documentos
Históricos-Constitucionales de Puerto Rico, 19-37.
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H. Gore.376 During Gore’s short term there were no less than eighty-five worker strikes
and labor conflicts, and a bomb was found in the governor’s summer residence in Jájome.
The Coalición, which had won the elections of 1932, threw its support behind the
governor who sought to quench labor protests using the Insular Police. The Liberales
and most of the press openly challenged and ridiculed the incompetent governor. The
Coalición’s support of the governor, who defended anti-labor initiatives, started to create
a schism between workers and the Socialist Party. Within this context, Albizu Campos,
however briefly, gained support among workers. His harsh and well deserved attacks
against absentee corporations, the Federación Libre de Trabajadores (which he accused
of betraying the workers), and against the Insular government, gained him the attention of
the sugar cane workers. In 1934 a general strike of sugar cane workers in Puerto Rico
allied this labor sector (for the very first time) with the Nacionalistas and effectively
ended the era of political stability in the Island.377 The workers requested the assistance
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Gore had contributed $10,000 to FDR’s campaign and placed his three
newspapers at the disposition of the president. He did not have any real experience that
prepared him to govern the Island. He thought of Puerto Rico as Florida’s insular junior
partner unaware that their economies were not complimentary but in competition with
each other. His lack of understanding of Puerto Rico’s political arrangement led him to
make a series of early mistakes while his disregard for the islanders’ idiosyncrasies soon
gained him many enemies. See Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato,
68-109; and Luis M. Díaz Soler, Puerto Rico, sus luchas por alcanzar estabilidad
económica, definición política y afirmación cultural. 1898-1996 (Isabela, P.R., 2000),
210-211.
377

In 1937 Esteban Bird calculated the yearly wages of cane cutters in Puerto
Rico and their average family. He concluded that the cane cutter dedicated 94% of his
income to food. At this rate the daily budget for food per family member was 12 cents.
This was only 4 cents more than the daily food expense for feeding a hog in the United
States. See Ayala, American Sugar Kingdom, 159-161, 164-65, 239, citing, Esteban
Bird, The Sugar Industry in Relation to the Social Economic System of Puerto Rico. In
1930, 400,000 or 25% of the population lived in lands dedicated to sugar cane production
which were 13.3% of the total land. That translated into sugar cane taking 50% of the
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of Albizu Campos, who negotiated on their behalf. However, shortly after the strike was
resolved, Albizu Campos lost their support. Fixated in obtaining the Island’s
independence, the Nacionalistas had not developed a labor ideology that could win them
the loyalty of the working classes permanently.378
Aware of Gore’s inability to govern the Island and the endless cycle of strikes
FDR feared that Puerto Rico was on the brink of anarchy. Persuaded by Muñoz Marín’s
personal plea, he chose retired general Blanton Winship to replace Gore.379 Winship
assumed this role on February 5, 1934, and brought Elisha Francis Riggs with him to
serve as chief of the Insular Police. Riggs had served in Nicaragua where he helped
Anastasio Somoza with the organization of his police and paramilitary apparatus. Under
Winship, the militarization of the Insular Police acquired special relevance especially
after 1935. The police was issued machine guns and riot control gear and their training

arable land and 35% of the agrarian population. See Mathews, La política
Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato, 150.
378

The Nacionalistas were “neither anticapitalists nor prosocialist.” The Party
made no demands for reorganization of the economic structure beyond the transfer of
ownership of the means of productions to Puerto Rican capitalists. See Dietz, Economic
History, 161-62; and Díaz Soler, Puerto Rico, sus luchas por alcanzar estabilidad
económica, definición política y afirmación cultural, 214-15.
379

Muñoz Marín had been the most vociferous opponent of Gore, even
publishing an article in La Democracia entitled, “Governor Gore You are a Damn Liar”,
on September 6, 1933. The article was in response to Gore’s denial to FDR that he had
requested for undated letters of resignation from all appointees to important government
positions. Gore called the story a “Liberales fairy tale.” Gore’s removal was attributed
to Muñoz Marin’s efforts by the local press. In effect, a local journalist wrote: “He has
overthrown his first governor!” and over 50,000 people received him in San Juan when
he returned from Washington on January 21, 1934 coinciding with the news of Gore’s
replacement. Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 107-08, 115; and
Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato, 111-13.
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was intensified under Winship’s personal supervision.380 One of the darkest chapters in
Puerto Rican history was about to be written.
Labor conflicts and the Nationalist challenge notwithstanding, there was little
evidence to indicate that political violence in the Island would increase sharply. FDR’s
administration had taken some steps to relieve the political pressure in Puerto Rico.
Besides removing the publicly ridiculed Gore, FDR changed the administrative
arrangement of the Island. On March, 1934, the president signed Executive Order 6.726,
which transferred supervision of Puerto Rican affairs from the War Department to the
Department of the Interior headed by Indian rights’ advocate Harold Ickes.381 Within the
Department of the Interior the newly created Division of Territories and Island
Possessions (DTIP) took over the role of the Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA). The DTIP
was itself entrusted to Ernest Gruening, a long-time friend of Muñoz Marín.382
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By 1937 special training for the Insular Police was given by the Chief of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in Puerto Rico, Edgar K. Thompson and agent Myron E.
Gurnes. Machine gun marksmanship, firing with tracer bullets and from a cover position
were among the subjects taught at Fort Buchanan by the FBI agents. See, Ojeda Reyes,
Vito Marcantonio y Puerto Rico, 76-78. And Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic
Revolution, 120.
381

The BIA was completely abolished by the Reorganization Plan No. II in July
1, 1939 and replaced by the Division of Territories and Island Possessions of the
Department of the Interior which operated between 1939 and 1950. It was later known as
the Office of Territories and still later the Office of Territorial Affairs. See “Records of
the Office of the Secretary of the Interior” [National Archives and Records
Administration, Center for Electronic Records]; accessed June 6 2009; available from
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/350.htm; and Estades Font,
La Presencia Militar de Estados Unidos en Puerto Rico, 120-23.
382

In the mid-1920s Gruening had published in The Nation a series of articles
penned by Muñoz Marín. Muñoz Marín drove Gruening to Washington for his
confirmation. See Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 131.
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War Department officials opposed the transfer which they blamed on special
interests while defending the department’s record as Puerto Rico’s fair champion.383 The
transfer, however, went into effect on May 22, 1935. Removing the last vestige of
military rule over the Island, however, was a symbolic gesture that appeased politicians
but had little value for the vast majority who were more concerned with feeding, clothing
and housing their families. This is not to say that FDR’s administration was oblivious to
the economic hardships troubling the Island and fueling political unrest.
In 1933, to combat the effects of the Great Depression in the continental U.S. the
Federal Emergency Relief Administration came to exist by virtue of the Federal
Emergency Relief Act. Initially, the program was extended to Puerto Rico in what came
to be known as the Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA). Though the
director of the PRERA immediately set to work, his efforts were hindered by Gore and
the Coalicionistas who sought to control the institution for political ends.384 On May 28,
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An official from the War Department declared: “This transfer has long been
agitated by special interests bent upon commercial and political exploitation of Porto
Rico. The sinister machine of the sugar lobby against Porto Rico has long been strongly
resisted by the Secretary of War and the BIA. The great demons of the politicians for
Porto Rican patronage have also been resisted. It was over their protests [the
administrators of the BIA] that the Harding administration paid a political debt by
appointing a Missouri politician [E. Montgomery Reilly- who was actually from Texas]
as governor of Porto Rico. It was over their protest that the present administration paid a
political debt by appointing a Floridian [Robert H. Gore].” C.I.H.P.C., Caja 30
Cartapacio 10 Documento 4, A, Clip from The Washington Herald, June 7, 1934.
Senator Millard Tydings was behind the creation of a single bureau for all insular affairs
within the Department of the Interior. Harold Ickes and Santiago Iglesias Pantín, the
Puerto Rican representative in Congress, had urged the change for years.
384

The Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA) began its work in
the Island in 1933 with the main objective of reducing unemployment. Harry Hopkins
named James R. Bourne as the agency’s director. Though Bourne and his wife quickly
set to work and to distribute aid, their projects were not on a big scale. Furthermore,
since they hired many people associated with the Liberals, Coalition leaders accused
185

1935, an executive order created another agency to tackle the deep-rooted economic
problems in the Island.385 The new office, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction
Administration (PRRA), was directed by a prominent Puerto Rican, Carlos Chardón. It is
worth noticing that in the case of Puerto Rico, “relief” was substituted for
“reconstruction”. The word selection underlined the extreme conditions vexing the
Island. The mission of the PRRA was ambitious, and its focus on reducing
unemployment and poverty provided the chance to also remove causes of unrest. The
them of using federal funding to strengthen the Liberales. See Mathews, La política
Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato, 130-33, 150.
385

“It was to meet these conditions --- to relieve unemployment ---- to remove as
far as possible the causes of agricultural depression — to create new sources of wealth
and income — to establish new standards of living— that there was created by Executive
Order on May 28, 1935, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (P.R.R.A.), as
the agency through which sight be expended such Federal work relief and emergency
funds as were available for Puerto Rico, towards the attainment of the above objectives.”
The objectives of the program were defined by the President in a letter dated August 1,
1935: "The Administration's program intends not merely immediate relief but permanent
reconstruction for the Island. To this end the projects in contemplation will see to insure
every person on the Island a position of reasonable independence and security. The
economy of the Island is, of course, agricultural and the solution of its problems must be
in terms of agricultural rehabilitation. It will therefore be sought to secure for each citizen
a place on the land which will give him a fair share in the fruits of his own labor and a
position of independence and security. This will require the establishment of many
persons on small farming units. It will also require that these small farmers be insured
adequate processing and distributing facilities at reasonable cost. Diversification of
agricultural production will be sought by the program in order that the Island may
approach a self-sustaining status. Cheap and available electric power, good roads,
reforestation and adequate housing are also essential to the Administration's program...I
am anxious that the Government of the United States shall discharge fully its
responsibilities to the Puerto Rican people...." Immediately after the Executive Order
was signed, by virtue of which the P.R.R.A. was created, the offices of the agency were
established and in December 1935 the whole reconstruction administration program was
already functioning. See, “Information Research Section, Puerto Rico Reconstruction
Administration, December, 1938” [National Archives and Records Administration,
Center for Electronic Records]; accessed 19 March 2009; available from
http://newdeal.feri.org/texts/578.htm.
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socio-economic reconstruction plan for Puerto Rico was designed by Carlos Chardón,
Rafael Menéndez Ramos and Rafael Fernández García, but it had much influence from
Muñoz Marín and some even referred to it as Plan Muñoz.386 Yet, the PRRA’s offices
were not fully staffed until the end of the year. Meanwhile, political unrest continued to
escalate.
On July 4, 1935, the Nacionalistas initiated a bombing campaign by detonating
bombs in the PRRA’s office in San Juan and several other government buildings. A few
weeks later a bomb went off at the U.S. Court Building in Puerta de Tierra followed by
the bombing of a police station. The bombings continued throughout the summer, but so
far there had been no casualties.387 Meanwhile, ever more radical, Albizu Campos
carried on with his island-wide tour. On October 24, 1935, the Insular Police detained
Nacionalistas armed with revolvers near the University of Puerto Rico in Río Piedras
where students were protesting against Albizu Campos, who had called the male and
female students “effeminate” and “prostitutes” respectively for failing to be at the
vanguard of the fight for the Island’s independence.388 On their way to the police station
a gunfight between the Nacionalistas and the police left four Nacionalistas and a
policeman dead and forty wounded. There had been outbursts of political violence in the
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See Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato, 167-196. And
Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 131-36.
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Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 137.
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Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo Trato, 248-49.
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previous years, but nothing came close to the outright war that had just started between
the Nacionalistas and the Insular Police.389
During the nationalists’ funeral, on December 8 of the same year the Nationalist
Party declared the formation of the Ejército Libertador, and warned that for every dead
nationalist an American would be killed.390 In fact, Albizu Campos declared that the
whole party was now a liberating army and reminded his followers of the “Sacred Oath”
they had taken to defend the fatherland.391 The next month, the Nationalist Party ordered
the general drafting into the military of all nationalists over eighteen years old as an
immediate necessity for “national security”. Albizu Campos issued a party resolution “to
389

There had been outburst of violence before but not like these acts. On April
12, 1932, Albizu Campos and some 800 followers stormed the Puerto Rican legislature
after being informed that the single star with five stripes flag designed by Puerto Rican
exiles in New York in 1895, had been made the official flag of the Island by the Insular
Legislature. In the scuffle trying to reach the legislative chambers the rail of the stairs
collapsed and a Nacionalista died. Santiago Iglesias blamed the police for being to
lenient and attributed their leniency to the fact that the Nacionalistas were from middle
and upper classes, had they been from the working class, Santiago Iglesias commented,
“all their heads would have been cracked.” Albizu Campos threatened the Insular Chief
of Police with death if a single nationalist died during the 1932 elections. See Negroni,
Historia militar de Puerto Rico, 450-54; Mathews, La política Puertorriqueña y el Nuevo
Trato, 248-49; Bayrón Toro, Elecciones y partidos políticos de Puerto Rico, 182; and
Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 89-80.
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Puerto Rico Area, Headquarters 2nd Corps, Report on Monthly Summary of
Subversive Activities, December 1935- March 1936, [Copy sent to LTC Charles K.
Nelson, GSC Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, D.C. by Joe N.
Dalton, Major, General Staff Corps, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Written by O.H.
Cole, Col. 65th Infantry] March 2 1936, C.I.H.P.C. Caja 18, Cartapacio 4, Doc. 2 A.
Hereafter, Report on Monthly Summary of Subversive Activities, C.I.H.P.C. C.18, Ct. 4,
Doc. 2 A.
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Albizu demanded that party members took an “Oath of Honor” in which they
swore to defend the Nationalist’s ideal with their lives and belongings if necessary and to
give unquestioning loyalty to “the leader”. See Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic
Revolution, 87, citing Ferrao, Pedro Albizu Campos y el nacionalismo puertorriqueño,
395.
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declare military service compulsory for all members of the party” who would join the
nationalist paramilitary force, Cadetes de la República, trained by Albizu Campos and
José Enamorado Cuesta since 1932.392
What started as political unrest had turned into violence, and the situation
appeared the control of the Insular Police, in fact threatening to become a military
problem. Albizu Campos had decided to defy U.S. sovereignty by force which made the
creation of paramilitary units necessary. The Cadetes de la República and the Ejército
Libertador, however, were not much of a military challenge. In fact, it seems that the
role they would eventually play in Puerto Rican politics stemmed from Albizu Campos’
recognition of the political value of the military in the Island’s society. It is apparent that
Albizu Campos understood the symbolic power of military service and the impact it had
on the self perception of Puerto Ricans. After all, he was himself a WWI veteran and
former U.S. Army officer.393 In order to fully exploit the symbolic power of the
Nacionalistas’ paramilitary units, the Ejército Libertador had to be as conspicuous as
possible. He thus decided to call publicly for the creation of the Ejército, to have the
Cadetes wear uniforms, to organize them as a regular army, and to have them conduct
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Report on Monthly Summary of Subversive Activities, C.I.H.P.C. C.18, Ct. 4,
Doc. 2 A. Enamorado Cuesta was the general military instructor in the Nationalist Party.
He was a U.S. Army WWI veteran and served in the reserve with the rank of Captain
until 1929. He briefly served in the Republican Army in 1936 during the Spanish Civil
War. See FBI, Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico Vol. 4., 50.
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In 1917, Albizu Campos interrupted his studies at Harvard to volunteer for
service during the First World War. He was assigned to a Black regiment which trained
in the southern U.S., which according to Gruening taught him “what it was to be a Negro,
not only in the army, but in America. All his love for America turned to hate.”
Maldonado, 139, citing Ernest Gruening Many Battles, the Autobiography of Ernest
Gruening (New York: Liveright Publishers, 1973), 196-97.
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military exercises and parades in broad daylight and in public spaces.394 The
paramilitary nationalist units’ main target was the Puerto Ricans’ sense of honor, duty,
and manhood; in short Puerto Rican identity, which the Nacionalistas identified with the
Island’s Hispanic legacy.
According to a U.S. Army report on subversive activity, which was monthly
conducted by the intelligence section (G-2) of the 65th Infantry Regiment, in late January,
“units [of the Nationalist Party had] begun to drill in violation of Sections 7-8 Chapter
1 of the Federal Penal Code of 1910.”395 The nationalist units, sometimes armed with
machetes, chose to have their own military exercises (drills) across from the Puerto Rico
National Guard (PRNG) Armories which apparently unsettled the commanders of such
units.396 That the Nacionalistas attempted to provoke and intimidate the PRNG was
apparent. These incidents were also a clear attempt to contest the legitimacy of the
Puerto Rico National Guard as a true national corps. Moreover, while the Nacionalistas’
drills sent the unequivocal message that they were preparing militarily, which was
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Albizu Campos emulated many of the policies and tactics of the Irish Sinn
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probably intended to daunt the guardsmen, the fact that they did not carry weapons
precluded the Insular Police from stopping their drills, and so they were free to continue
harassing the PRNG units.
Meanwhile, despite Albizu Campos’ diatribe against students of the University of
Puerto Rico, his party was gaining a strong foothold in this institution. A Puerto Rican
captain in the 65th Infantry reported that he had gained the trust of a nationalist student
“who informed him that he is a captain in a Nationalist company, part of a battalion of
175 members in Río Piedras,” and that they “are raffling a submachine gun amongst them
to raise funds to buy more weapons.”397 The report shows two weaknesses inherent to
the Nacionalistas. First, evidently it was not such a hard task to infiltrate the
organization and to get their members to openly discuss their plans. Second, and more
importantly, the fact that they had to raffle weapons to obtain funds in order to secure
more weapons indicated the financial weakness of the movement though not of their
members. This second point is of the outmost importance because the Nacionalistas had
seen their movement grow during times of economic hardship. While pride and a sense
of having a mission may for a while content the unemployed and malnourished to the
point of even expressing fanatic support for a cause, in the long run, the leaders of such
movements have to provide for the wellbeing of their followers or see their ranks
dwindle. The Nacionalistas were not ready to fulfill that role, and it would cost them
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dearly. While they could attract young middle and upper class Puerto Ricans, they did
not have the same appeal among the masses.398
According to Army intelligence, the Nacionalistas, who boasted to have 10,000
members in the Ejército Libertador, had plans to take over the Island.
The [nationalist] leaders are planning a coup to take place in the no distant future,
during which all police stations and National Guard armories, except San Juan
and Cayey where the 65th is too strong, will be attacked simultaneously, to gain
arms, ammo, and complete control of the island. The Nationalists have made a
black list of persons to be killed.399
The plan was sensible indeed. The National Guard, as a reserve component made of
multiple units scattered throughout the Island, left its installations in charge of a skeleton
crew when they were not conducting exercises. Moreover, even when the PRNG
conducted monthly exercises, they did not train in unison which meant that at any given
time there were dozens of targets which could be quickly overtaken. Once weaponry was
secured from the PRNG armories, the planned assaults on police stations would have a
better chance to succeed. Taking on the 65th, which, as a U.S. Army regular unit, was
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well-trained and armed, and manned to operational levels, was the Nacionalistas’ biggest
challenge. And, apparently, they had no plans to do so.
While uniformed cadets openly challenged the colonial authorities and the PRNG,
other Nationalist elements were targeting the Insular Police and Puerto Rican and
Continental government officials. Going after individual policemen became a favorite
tactic employed by the Nacionalistas. This trend continued until October 1936 when the
Nacionalistas set their sights on political leaders from the other parties and high value
targets from the colonial administration.400 On February 23, 1936, Nationalists Hiram
Rosado and Elias Beauchamp killed the chief of the Insular Police, Colonel Riggs, and
were in turn executed while in police custody. The Intelligence Section of the 65th
reported that roughly 8,000 people attended the funeral of the Nacionalistas held the very
next day in Santurce. Albizu Campos, who had sworn to avenge the death of the four
nationalists killed by the Insular Police the previous October 24, 1935 near the University
of Puerto Rico, addressed the crowd gathered at the cemetery late in the afternoon. He
declared that the death of the young nationalists had not been in vain since “for every
nationalist killed we gain 100 adherents.” The intelligence section agreed in principle
with Albizu Campos. The report stated that it was “evident that the public sentiment is
running high against the Insular Police for the shooting of the nationalists after they had
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been arrested.” 401 Emboldened by the growing support shown to the Nacionalistas
Albizu Campos publicly celebrated the assassination:
Colonel Riggs, a tyrant, has fallen. Colonel Riggs ordered the murder of our
comrades in Río Piedras last October… On the occasion of their funeral a solemn
promise was made, Beauchamp and Rosado have made good their promise. They
are dead but they have done their duty. 402
He went further and implicated the governor and his superiors with the
assassinations. “General Winship is following higher authorities attempting to kill any
nationalist sentiment which may be developing in the people.” 403 Local leaders were not
exempt from Albizu Campos’ threats.404 He accused the whole directive of the Liberal
Party- the other party seeking Independence- the local press, and the functionaries of the
PRRA of complicity with Winship and Riggs.405 Ironically, the Liberales, just like the
local press, had been extremely sympathetic and accommodating towards Albizu Campos
and very supportive of the Nationalists. The Liberal leadership went as far as
condemning the political targeting of Nationalist leaders. The Liberals, especially Muñoz
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Marín, were in fact the lone effective opposition to Winship. Nonetheless, Albizu
Campos apparently considered that the existence of a party seeking independence by
peaceful means, and of an agency bent on alleviating the economic situation in the Island
(PRRA), would rob him of potential adherents and momentum.
The 65th intelligence section warned that: “Colonel Riggs was very popular but
indignation against his assassination has been overshadowed by strong popular
indignation against the police for what is considered the murder of the young assassins by
them.”406 The report concluded by pointing out the weaknesses of the Nacionalistas but
warning “that if this party movement is unchecked there will be others assassinations
attempted.” Furthermore, the intelligence section saw “no danger of general uprising but
these young men and their organized companies encouraged and abetted by [Albizu]
Campos may attempt such coup against police and National Guard armories.”407 The
officers of the 65th, a mostly Puerto Rican unit tracing its lineage to 1899, evidently
believed they would enjoy the support of the population and emerge victorious from a
faceoff with the Nacionalistas. The report also pointed out one of the roots of
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nationalists’ support, police brutality. The warning fell on deaf ears, and violence would
only continue to escalate.
The metropolis and colonial authorities responded to the Nationalist challenge by
misusing the legal system to persecute the Nationalist leaders and by threatening the
Island with independence. The Federal Bureau of Investigation joined the surveillance of
the Nacionalistas. U.S. Marshalls and Insular Police carried out raids in March and
found military equipment, weapons and a bomb in the possession of the Nationalists.408
On March 5, 1936, Albizu Campos and other seven Nationalist leaders were arrested and
charged with sedition and conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United
States.409 The next month, a Federal Grand Jury submitted accusations against Albizu
Campos and other leaders of the party.410 Local newspapers and politicians, as well as
the American Civil Liberties Union were against trying the Nationalist leader for sedition
instead of murder or conspiracy to commit murder. Albizu Campos’ defense argued that
it was preposterous to try him for sedition when the U.S. Congress was in the process of
preparing an independence bill for the Island.411 The metropolis, however, had had
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enough of the Nacionalistas and sought to strengthen federal authority in the Island by
trying and convicting Albizu Campos in a federal court. A predominantly Puerto Rican
jury did not convict the defendants. Albizu Campos’s standing among Puerto Ricans had
reached its zenith. On July 31, a second trial, with a jury composed of ten Continentals
and two Puerto Ricans, concluded with a guilty verdict.412 Albizu Campos and Luis
Velazquez were sentenced to seven years in the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary.
A month after Riggs assassination, Senator Millard Tydings, a Democrat from
Maryland, introduced a bill to grant independence to Puerto Rico. Tydings presided over
the Senate branch of the Committee of Territories and Insular Affairs in the U.S Congress
and, as a close friend of Colonel Riggs, was enraged by his assassination. If Riggs’
assassination was not enough to move Tydings to introduce a punitive independence bill
for Puerto Rico, his racial beliefs undoubtedly drove him to propose such a measure. As
the co-author of the Tydings-McDuffie bill of 1934 to grant independence to the
Philippines, he had declared that the Filipinos were a “burden for the federal budget and a
menace to the racial composition of the U.S.”413 According to the bill introduced by
Tydings, Puerto Rico would obtain its independence in four years at the end of which full
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economic tariffs would be established between the two countries. Moreover, if Puerto
Rico voted for independence, all federal aid would cease immediately, and the
transitional government would assume responsibility for the defense of the Island. As
the Island’s economic relief and reconstruction had come to rely solely on the federal
monies channeled through the PRRA, the passing of such bill meant economic ruin for
Puerto Rico.
President Roosevelt, Secretary of the Interior Ickes, and Secretary of the Division
of Territories Gruening gave lip service to the Tydings bill, although, in fact, they did not
considered granting independence to the Island as a real option. The president secretly
gave his support to the Tydings bill since the harsh measures that were included in it
guaranteed that it would be rejected, not only by most Puerto Rican politicians but by the
masses, resulting in a de facto popular vote to preserve the colony intact.414 This strategy
was designed to enhance the image of the United States in Latin America and to shield
FDR’s administration from accusations of imperialism. In that regard, Secretary Ickes
declared to the New York Times that the administration would give sympathetic
considerations to any “political demand which is responsibly backed by a majority of the
people of Puerto Rico.”415 In other words, the responsibility for moving towards
independence was put, falsely, on the Puerto Ricans. Knowing that the bill would not
pass in Congress, and that if for some reason it did, it would be rejected by the Puerto
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Ricans, Ickes reasoned that introducing the bill in Congress would have a quieting effect
among separatist elements in Puerto Rico.416
Gruening, who had been a close friend of Muñoz Marín, felt even more
aggravated by Muñoz Marín’s reluctance to condemned Riggs’ assassination than by the
act itself. In fact he believed Muñoz Marín had stabbed him in the back by refusing to
publicly condemn Riggs’ assassination. Muñoz Marín, on the other hand, thought that
Gruening was in essence asking him to blame all Puerto Ricans for the assassination
while keeping quiet in the matter of Rosado and Beauchamp’s execution while in police
custody. When Muñoz Marín finally condemned the assassination of Riggs and
Beauchamp and Rosado’s execution, Gruening had already decided to wage war on
Muñoz Marín and the Liberales.417 A former opponent of Winship, Gruening quickly turn
into his ally. Gruening hit where it hurt Muñoz Marín the most, with a purge of Liberal
elements from the PRRA.418 According to a Continental PRRA employee, the purge
created a sense of fear and killed the agency’s dynamism. Furthermore, with Muñoz
Marín out of political favor the PRRA became ineffective. After all, to Puerto Ricans,
even to his detractors, “Muñoz was the PRRA.”419
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The Tydings Bill had the desired outcome and effectively killed the independence
spirit among many Liberal leaders.420 Muñoz Marín thought that the intention of Tydings
was to “obtain from the people of Puerto Rico under duress a mandate for a continuation
of the colonial system.”421 The bill divided the Liberal Party by causing a schism
between Muñoz Marín and Barceló. Muñoz Marín believed that participating in the
elections of November 1936 would be fatal for the Liberales who would lose the
elections because they would be identified with an independence that meant economic
ruin. He reasoned that abstaining from the elections of 1936 would give the Liberales
time to regroup and to secure economic guarantees that would make independence viable
and thus more attractive to Puerto Ricans. His plan then, was to participate in the
elections of 1940 from a position of strength.422 Barceló, however, did not share Muñoz
Marín’ convictions and led the party during the campaign for the November elections.
Muñoz Marín, though he himself did not run for office, campaigned strenuously for the
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Liberales. Barceló, showing how disconnected he was from the socio-economic
maladies afflicting the Island’s population, declared that he would welcome
independence “even if we starve to death”.423 Such declarations did little to convince the
already-starving peasantry and urban workers to vote for the Liberales.
Soon after the defeat of the Liberales in the general elections of 1936, Barceló
issued an ultimatum to Muñoz Marín urging him either to follow the party’s policies or to
form his own party.424 After failed attempts at reconciliation, on March 31, 1937, Muñoz
Marín and his followers were expelled from the Liberal Party. Muñoz Marín and close to
40% of the former Liberales founded the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular
Democrático, PPD) on July 22, 1938. An object of derision after its creation, the PPD
would become an important force in Puerto Rican history. Before Muñoz Marín and the
Populares emerged as the dominant force in Puerto Rican politics, relations between the
Island and the U.S., which had suffered tremendously due to the events of 1936, would
deteriorate even further.
Incarcerating Albizu Campos did little to silence the Nationalists. Political
violence in fact increased after his capture. On October 25, 1936, a group of nationalists
423
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wounded the Socialist leader Iglesias Pantín, during a rally in Mayagüez. In November, a
nationalist mob attacked a political meeting held by the Liberales because the latter were
using the Puerto Rican flag. Such acts, and the introduction of the Tydings Bill, had
started to dissipate popular sympathy for the Nacionalistas, and many Nationalists
leaders began to leave the party disgusted with the violent campaign. These events,
however, paled in comparison to the colonial response to the nationalist challenge.
On March 21, 1937 the Insular Police opened fire on a group of unarmed
Nacionalistas parading in the southern town of Ponce. Originally the Nationalists had
been denied permission to hold the parade. The Mayor of Ponce José Tormos Diego later
approved the event as a “civic parade” with the Nationalists’ promise that the event
would not have a military character. The new chief of the Insular Police, Colonel
Enrique Orbeta, rushed to Ponce under Winship’s orders and convinced the mayor to
revoke the permit. Orbeta and Tormos notified the Nationalists and warned them not to
proceed with the march. Roughly eighty cadets in black shirts followed by the
“Daughters of the Republic” and the “Nationalists Nurses” prepared to march. Police
Captain Guillermo Soldevilla, leading a contingent of more than 150 policemen armed
with rifles carbines and submachine guns, ordered the Nationalist to stop as they initiated
the march. A single shot was heard followed by a police barrage. When the shooting
was over seventeen Nationalists and spectators had been killed and roughly 100 lay
wounded. Two policemen also died from bullet wounds.425 The slaughter of the unarmed
nationalists, which came to be known as the Ponce Massacre, led to widespread
425
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discontent if not open hostility towards the police and Governor Winship. The massacre
did little to weaken the Nacionalistas. In fact it won them more sympathizers. El Mundo
reported that over 15,000 people attended the funeral in Ponce and roughly 5,000 in
Mayagüez.426 Even the American Civil Liberties Union concluded that the event had
been a massacre.427
Local newspapers published page-size pictures of the massacre on a daily basis.
El Imparcial offered a $25 prize to the person making the best analysis of the shooting
and providing “the best evidence of the first shot.” 428 The 65th Intelligence Section
complained that El Imparcial “will not publish any theories blaming the nationalists.”429
Such theories may have been hard to find. Even members of the National Guard were
openly critical of the Insular Police. Asked by a reporter, Lieutenant Colonel Miguel A.
Muñoz (PRNG) criticized police tactics such as encircling the crowd and failing to
provide an avenue of escape to the nationalists. In what eventually emerged as the most
accepted explanation, he stated that the wounded and dead policemen (the prosecution’s
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evidence that the nationalists initiated the shooting), had probably been hit by friendly
fire. Colonel Muñoz was not an anti-metropolis pundit. In fact, he had served the
colonial administration in several positions including that of Assistant Attorney General.
There was no evidence at all to put into question the loyalty of this former commander of
the American Legion in Puerto Rico and vice-commander of the National American
Legion. Nonetheless, the 65th intelligence officers stated that his analysis of the Ponce
Massacre was “unbecoming of an officer of the guard” and believed that “he [would] be
forced to resign” [presumably by Winship].430 Governor Winship was so determined to
eliminate the nationalist threat that he would not tolerate the mildest dissent or
opposition.
Under Winship, the decapitation of the Nationalist leadership and the silencing of
the opposition continued unabated.431 During the next April 16, the anniversary of the
birth of Puerto Rican politician and poet Jose de Diego, who tirelessly fought for
independence, the atmosphere was undeniably tense. For the last few years the
Nacionalistas had been holding a mass and a rally by de Diego’s tomb. Winship was so
decided to deny the Nacionalistas any opportunity to celebrate de Diego’s birthday that

430

Currently serving as executive officer (XO) of the 295 Regiment (PRNG),
Lieutenant Colonel Miguel A. Muñoz served as a captain in Camp Las Casas during the
WWI, as commander of the “Porto Rico American Legion” and vice-commander of the
National American Legion. He graduated from Cornell Law in 1913 and became the
personal secretary of Governor Yager in 1914. During his legal career he was Assistant
Attorney General, judge of the district court of San Juan, acting prosecuting attorney of
the supreme court of Puerto Rico, and president of the Public Service Commission. “He
was also a militant politician member of the Liberal Party and was removed from his last
post by the Coalitionists in the senate.” See Ibid.
431

On January 10, 1938, Julio Pinto Gandía and other seven Nationalist leaders
are sentenced to five years in prison.
204

he put regular army units and the National Guard on alert. Across the Island, the Insular
Police impeded groups larger than two persons from entering the cemeteries to present
flowers to the “Puerto Rican patriots.”432
The Nacionalistas, however, promptly wasted any sympathy obtained after the
Ponce Massacre by perpetrating a series of attacks on judges and even the governor. On
July 25, 1938 Governor Winship sponsored the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the
U.S. military invasion of Puerto Rico. This yearly celebration was usually held in San
Juan or Guánica- the place of the original U.S. landings. In what could only be seen as a
show of force and calculated provocation, Winship decided to hold the celebration in
Ponce, roughly a year after the massacre of the unarmed nationalists. More than 50,000
people congregated to watch the parade and to listen to Winship’s speech. A battalion of
the 65th Infantry, led by Colonel, Luis A. Irizarry, a well-known and respected Puerto
Rican officer, was marching before Winship and the parade’s guests of honor when a
nationalist commando with at least five shooters opened fire. Ángel Esteban Antongiorgi
fired more than ten shots directly at Winship, who remained undisturbed as the rest of his
entourage ducked for cover.433 A detective shot and killed Antongiorgi. Irizarry died in
the shooting which also left thirty-two wounded. Once order was reestablished, Winship
delivered his speech as planned. Colonel Irizarry’s death provoked a wave of public
outrage against the Nationalist Party. On September 28, several nationalists were
convicted in connection with the attempt against Winship further debilitating the party’s
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leadership.434 The fallout of the shooting was even more troublesome. Any chances of
convincing FDR to remove Winship, a priority for Secretary Ickes and whom Muñoz
Marín had continued to attack from La Democracia, dissipated after the attack.435
Police brutality had gained the Nacionalistas much support among the Island’s
population. However, they apparently did not understand that the islanders’ sympathy
was also a repudiation of violence. The events of July 1938 eroded the support they had
amassed. The press, criollo and Continental politicians were quick to point out that the
blood spilled that day was Puerto Rican blood, and that fact undermined the nationalists.
Even the remaining official leadership of the Nationalist Party sought to distance itself
from the incident. Rafael Medina Ramírez, speaker of the Nationalist Party in the Island,
condemned “anarchical” acts even if planned with “good faith” and “conducted
patriotically and heroically” for they only provide an excuse to the colonial
administration to implement the “most barbaric of official terrorisms.”436 The nationalist
leaders’ statements evidenced the breaking of communications between the political arm
of the party and its armed wing, and a growing schism between Albizu Campos (who
condoned any violent act against Continental Americans and their “allies”) and moderate
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elements in the Nationalist Party. As the party’s leadership crumbled, the ranks of the
nationalists petered out. Even more disheartening for the Nacionalista leaders was that
whenever opportunities arose to obtain a job, even if it meant working for the colonial
administration or for the metropolis armed forces, party members quickly applied for
such jobs.437
Shortly after the failed attempt to assassinate Winship, political violence subsided.
Winship’s persecution of the Nacionalistas, which succeeded in incarcerating the most
militant wing of the party, had much to do with decreasing violence. Many remaining
militants went underground to avoid Winship’s hunt. Scores of nationalist leaders
disenchanted with Albizu Campos’ radical tactics switched allegiance, mostly joining the
Populares or the Independentista party. However, the main reason for the abating
violence was the Nacionalistas failure to mobilize a considerable segment of the
population, especially the urban and rural working classes, to continue engaging the
colonial authorities.
The Nacionalistas’ failure to win the support of a sizeable portion of the
population was also a rejection of their iconography and emphasis on Spanish traditions.
After all, at the time, the majority of Puerto Ricans had been born under U.S. sovereignty,
and those lucky enough to have been schooled had been exposed to a curriculum based
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on the New England public school model. In other words, the nostalgic discovery of the
“Hispanic” past was an alien concept to the Puerto Rican masses of the 1930s, except for
the elites who still traced their lineage to the Peninsula. Moreover, for all means and
purposes, the Nacionalista “rediscovery” of the Island’s Hispanic past was incongruent
with the drive towards progress and a modern Puerto Rico. Both progress and
modernization, and hints at industrialization, were at the core of the PRRA’s effort to
improve Puerto Rico’s socio-economic condition. Many Continental and Puerto Rican
politicians had accepted the PRRA’s plan as a solution for the Island’s maladies. The
Nacionalistas could not compete with the metropolis’ material superiority which implied
a vague promise of a better future. Hence, the combination of violent acts, the lack of an
alternative path forward, the disconnection with the masses socio-economic realities, and
the emphasis in Spanish tradition were as responsible for the Nacionalistas’ demise as it
was political persecution.
As the Island descended into a shooting war between the police and the
Nacionalistas, the police ranks swell. The National Guard also expanded during this
period- though the expansion had little to do with the Nationalist challenge. Nonetheless,
it is very telling that whenever volunteers were requested for the National Guard or the
65th Infantry, the Puerto Ricans, even Nacionalistas, quickly moved to fill those
positions.438 While the Insular Police stained their record and lost much credence in their
battle against the Nacionalistas, the National Guard and the regular U.S. Army in the
Island stayed out of the fray, at least in the public’s eye. The U.S. military in Puerto Rico
had always functioned as a possible avenue of socio-economic advancement, which
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appealed to a large segment of the Island’s population. Its prestige remained
unblemished by this period’s violence. That the Puerto Rican units were not involved in
the brutal repression of their fellow countrymen would ease the conscience of tens of
thousands of Puerto Ricans who would soon join the armed forces of the metropolis.
Albizu Campos had challenged the Insular Police and the legitimacy of the armed forces
in the Island as true national corps and had lost the duel.
Albizu Campos was not the only one losing in this battle. The independence
movement was seriously weakened by the Nacionalistas’ radicalism. Locally, the
separatist leadership was balkanized, and popular support for independence seriously
waned due to the endless cycle of violence. Outside the Island such violence worked as a
self-fulfilling stereotype. If there ever was any doubt in the minds of Continental
politicians that Puerto Rico would descend into chaos if it became independent, there was
the proof. The independence movement would never recuperate from this blow. To add
to the Island’s calamities, the split of the Liberal Party and Muñoz Marín’s fall from
Washington’s grace hindered the progress of the socio-economic reconstruction effort led
by the PRRA. In a sense, those who could afford to lose the least lost more than anybody
else.439
Muñoz Marín, unlike Nationalist leaders, understood that the islanders’
indignation was a rejection of all types of political violence. He had condemned Riggs’
assassination and the subsequent execution of Beauchamp and Rosado by the Insular
Police in 1936, as well as the Ponce Massacre of 1937. This stand gained him the
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antipathy of Tydings and Winship, and of many other metropolitan administrators. It
also cost him his friendship with Ernest Gruening. Muñoz Marin’s political career almost
ended after 1936 as a consequence of Riggs’ assassination and the Tydings Bill.
Unfettered, Muñoz Marín immediately condemned Irizarry’s assassination but he also
denounced what he considered to be the root of the incident. He declared:
We emphatically condemned and repudiate violence, as well as when it comes
from the government as when it comes from individuals. Our opposition to
violence- as an evil itself, and as a danger to our people’s future democracy and
freedom- is so strong and unequivocal, that we condemn it even in cases when the
most extreme provocation may seem to justify it.440
Muñoz Marín was slowly emerging as a better option to the endless cycle of violence
between the Nacionalistas and the Insular Police. He skillfully denounced the Winship
administration for provoking the incident while also condemning the nationalists. His
attempts to appear fair and balanced endeared him with the Puerto Ricans, and while his
actions may have irked colonial administrators and continental politicians, he presented
the metropolis with a more palatable alternative to political violence. Furthermore,
though at the time he did not hold any official position, Muñoz Marín had been
associated by the public with both the PRERA and PRRA. Thus Muñoz Marín presented
himself as fair-minded leader apparently in touch with the socio-economic problems of
the Island while campaigning to end the colonial relation. He would eventually rise to
power with a popular mandate to tackle the first issue and with the personal conviction of

440

“Alma Latina,” Julio 1964, 15-20, in Norat Martínez, Historia del Regimiento
65 de Infantería, 20.
210

advancing the latter. These two concerns were to eventually become the pillars of his
new party’s platform.
Whereas Muñoz Marín had initially amassed political power riding on his father’s
brand name and thanks to his position as a Washington insider, his comeback to the
political center stage was to be fueled by hundreds of thousands of votes coming from the
Puerto Rican Jíbaros, rural and urban workers. The young professional classes in the
Island would dessert traditional parties and join his new party to try and lead the Island
out of its economic malaise, but it would be popular support what gave Muñoz Marín and
the Populares the moral and political strength to demand from Washington the needed
economic reforms and the eventual decolonization of the Island.
The high point of Muñoz Marín’s political trajectory lay ahead. In great measure
his rapid ascendance was facilitated by the outbreak of war in Europe on September 1,
1939. But that he emerged as the most prominent leader in Puerto Rico during the war
years was also the result of the political chaos prevailing in the Island previous to the
outbreak of the war. The shooting war between the Nacionalistas and the Insular Police
was detrimental to FDR’s Good Neighbor policy and forced Congress and the president
to take a more pronounced interest in the political and socio-economic conditions of the
Island. In a sense, it was necessary to complement the Good Neighbor policy with a
domestic corollary for Puerto Rico, which was after all a Caribbean and Latin American
nation. This newfound interest in Puerto Rican politics and socio-economic matters
helped to bring Muñoz Marín to the insular political scene with strength that he did not
enjoy before, and that he probably would have not held if FDR had not found it suitable
to improve the relations between the U.S. and Puerto Rico.
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During the Second World War, Muñoz Marín would use the military-diplomatic
value of the Island to advance the decolonization project while extracting every possible
economic concession with the intention of fixing socio-economic problems and readying
Puerto Rico and the Puerto Ricans for eventual independence. The Puerto Ricans, and
especially the Jíbaros, were about to be mobilized both politically and militarily on a
scale and fashion never seen before. During the war years, the Island would undauntedly
start its movement towards industrialization- as way to a modern Puerto Rico and
towards decolonization. The peasants and urban workers turned soldiers would
spearhead the effort, and in the process change the meaning of decolonization.
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CHAPTER 5
EDUCATION, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DECOLONIZATION: THE
BATTLEFIELDS OF THE PUERTO RICAN SOLDIER DURING THE SECOND
WORLD WAR

After two years, the War Department has given Puerto Rican Americans the same
opportunities as any other American, to enter the United State Army and fight for
the Nation as well as to obtain such benefits as could certainly be of advantage to
the underpaid, inadequately educated Puerto Rican, who has little opportunity to
improve himself. Puerto Ricans, it is stated, will now be able to enter the army
and have their lots improved learning trades that will not enable them to help win
victory, but will afford them a means to a better livelihood after the war, thus
benefiting themselves and raising the standards of their communities and of
Puerto Rico.441
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With the end of the Second World War in sight, U.S. congressmen discussing a bill to
make the office of the governor of Puerto Rico subject to election could not help but
wonder what impact this measure would have in helping to modernize and democratize
the Island. Puerto Rican and Continental Americans residing in the Island testified before
Congress that through their willingness to support and participate in the war effort, the
Puerto Ricans, especially the tens of thousands who joined the U.S. military, had shown
they could be trusted to carry out both tasks.442 Congressmen were notably worried about
the possibility that the returning soldiers might cause unrest in the Island if reemployment
opportunities were not readily available. Those testifying on the matter were quick to
stress the need to create economic opportunities, but they also pointed out that political
development was necessary and ultimately linked to the returning Puerto Rican soldiers
and the peaceful decolonization of the Island.443 Echoing the Island’s press and the
dominant political thought, Elmer Ellsworth, a Continental American and Insular
Senator, stated: “The G.I. Bill will help them [the Puerto Rican veterans] in the creation
of a better Puerto Rico.”444 That better Puerto Rico, however, had to offer more than
economic opportunities. A congressman asked: “Will the [1944 Governor’s] Bill
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alleviate tensions in Puerto Rico and ease the comeback of Puerto Rican soldiers?” Jesus
T. Piñeiro, a leader of the Popular Democratic Party, promptly answered: “That is the
urgency of the Bill, so the boys feel that some steps have been taken in the right
direction.”445
World War II was a catalyst for socio-economic and political change in the Island.
With the exception of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s decision to transfer Puerto Rico from
the War Department to the Department of the Interior on March 1934, no major changes
to Puerto Rico’s political relationship with the metropolis had occurred since 1917, when
Congress imposed U.S. citizenship upon the Puerto Ricans and created an elective insular
legislature through the Jones Act.446 War, yet again, highlighted the strategic importance
of the Island and provided for faster negotiation between the metropolis and the colony.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the years preceding the U.S. entrance into
World War II were marked by economic distress and political instability in Puerto Rico.
In fact, a shooting war between the Nacionalistas and the militarized Puerto Rican Insular
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Police briefly threatened to become a full military affair. By 1939, however, the colonial
administration had gained the upper hand over the Nationalists. Puerto Rico did not
become the dreaded “Ireland of the Caribbean.”447 Still, the political violence that
reigned in Puerto Rico in the mid to late 1930s, forced the federal government to take a
closer look at the Island’s socio-economic and political situation.
The outbreak of World War II, even before the juggernaut of the German and
Japanese militaries became apparent, and the U.S. slowly started to ready itself for war,
made Continental politicians ever more open to finding solutions to the Island’s plightand to avoiding a repetition of the 1930s. Thus, war brought the promise of political and
economic advancement by rekindling Puerto Rico’s strategic value. Once more the
Puerto Ricans were called to arms and, for many reasons, responded with overwhelming
enthusiasm. Different projects of decolonization and modernization, which included the
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revitalization of the economy as well as the Puerto Rican’s self esteem, rested on the
roles these soldiers were about to play during and after the war.
This chapter analyzes the military mobilization of tens of thousands of Puerto
Ricans during World War II and how this process responded to military and diplomatic
necessities as well as local political realities. Emphasis is put on what Continental and
Puerto Rican politicians and opinion makers expected to gain from military collaboration
and participation. In essence, the first question to be answered is: how did the metropolis
and criollo politicians try to transform the strategic relevance of the Island and the
massive enrollment of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. military into political gains? I argue that
the metropolis sought to secure the loyalty of natives of the Island by allowing their mass
entry into the U.S. military and by conferring upon them the same benefits as Continental
veterans. Furthermore, among metropolitan agents, the idea of Americanization through
military service (and public education) made a strong comeback as war engulfed Europe.
Concurrently, the metropolis became more inclined to granting a higher degree of selfgovernment to Puerto Rico since it could enhance its standing in the international arena,
and could very well quench any political unrest in the Island.
The metropolis’ plans, however, had to compete with those of local politicians.
Aware of Puerto Rico’s military and diplomatic relevance, Luis Muñoz Marín, leading
the Popular Democratic Party, followed a strategy that supported the war effort and
placed the socio-economic restructuring of the Island before anything else while using the
participation of Puerto Rican soldiers in the war, and the Island’s strategic position as
leverage to extract political concessions. Furthermore, Muñoz Marín and the Populares
tried to secure veteran’s benefits so these men and women could attempt to change the
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dire socio-economic condition of the Island. Muñoz Marín’s strategy was threefold:
supporting the war effort; using the participation of Puerto Rican soldiers in the war and
the Island’s strategic position to barter political concessions; and using the soldiers’
benefits and training to advance the socio-economic restructuration of the Island.
In fact, the mass military mobilization of Puerto Ricans was essential to the
Populares’ reconstruction and decolonization plans. Once socio-economic problems
were alleviated, Muñoz Marín believed that, Puerto Ricans would have enough selfconfidence to overwhelmingly support independence. The Puerto Rican turned soldier
was thus expected to bring more than economic respite or technical knowledge. These
soldiers were also supposed to erase a colonial inferiority complex by showing that they
could bear the same burden as any other man.
This chapter then analyzes two very different projects. On the one hand, the
metropolis sought to show Puerto Ricans that they were regarded as American as any
Continental, which hopefully would generate loyalty towards the metropolis and
simultaneously enhance the United States’ image as emerging leader of the Free World.
On the other hand, the dominant political leader during this period, tried to use military
participation to advance the decolonization of the Island by obtaining concessions from
the metropolis and by ultimately decolonizing the Puerto Ricans themselves by turning
the experience of these soldiers into a lesson on self-confidence, and, in more practical
terms, by using their veteran’s benefits and skills learned in the military to reconstruct the
Island and its socio-economic structures.
These political projects were not impervious to the needs of the masses being
mobilized to carry them out. Actually, I argue that both the metropolis’ and the
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Populares’ projects were influenced, if not outright changed, by the sudden
enfranchisement of tens of thousands of peasants and urban workers. This
enfranchisement was in part possible due to military mobilization. Thus, the military
mobilization of the Puerto Rican, as we address it in this chapter, had a political, socioeconomic, and very popular character.
War in Europe seemed imminent by 1938, while Japan continued its inexorable
march in China. The American public, however, was not prepared to support
involvement in a European war nor were the armed forces of the U.S. ready to participate
in it. If the Good Neighbor policy had put Puerto Rico’s problems in the sight of FDR’s
administration in the early 1930s, the impending war and the reluctance of the American
public to consider participating in it moved the Island to the center stage of U.S.
preparedness and defense efforts. 448 FDR’s administration decided to base its military
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In part due to the Great Depression- which made it difficult to explain military
spending in Central and South America to the American public - FDR’s administration
started a retrenchment from the area while seeking to improve relations with the these
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strategy on the concept of Hemispheric Defense.449 The United States would stay out of
the war and concentrate on preparing and strengthening the defenses of the western
hemisphere to stop any assault on the Americas far from the mainland. Puerto Rico was
to play a vital role on this strategy. For decades, the Island had been crucial to the
defense of the Panama Canal. This time, however, its importance went beyond protecting
the Canal. This design was an extension of Alfred T. Mahan’s strategy for the defense of
the American empire.450 The U.S. Navy planned to stop naval aggression far from the
mainland in what it called the Caribbean Sea Frontier. The waters surrounding Culebra
Island, a Puerto Rican municipality lying off the east coast, would be the stage for such a
battle.451 Puerto Rico effectively became the center of the Hemispheric Defense strategy,
and the first American line of defense against German aggression. The importance of
Puerto Rico in the defensive plans of the United States is best expressed in a presidential
letter to Congress dated September 28, 1943:
When the present war became imminent, however, it was obvious that the chain
of islands stretching in a great arc from Florida to the shoulder of South America,
enclosing the Caribbean Sea, formed a vast natural shield for the Panama Canal,
449
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suited in distance and conformation to the use of the military plane. And of the
island shield Puerto Rico is the center. Its possession or control by any foreign
power - or even the remote threat of such possession - would be repugnant to the
most elementary principle of national defense.452
The fortification of the Island became a priority, and by 1939 the construction of
multiple army, naval, and air bases was well on its way.453 The Roosevelt administration,
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The Department of War built multiple camps and forts, and opened medium
and small naval and air facilities throughout the Island. Established in 1925 under the
name of Fort Miles, this installation became a permanent fixture of the U.S. Army in the
Island under the name of Fort Buchanan (first commander of the Puerto Rican regiment
of Volunteers). During WWII it served as Headquarters of the Department of Puerto
Rico and as induction center. Fort Bundy was built in 1940 to serve as general
headquarters for coastal artillery units in eastern Puerto Rico. Camp O’Reilly, in honor
of Field Marshall Alejandro O’Reilly, recognized as “padre de las milicias
Puertorriqueñas” was finished in 1942. Camp Salinas (later renamed Santiago) and
Camp Tortuguero opened in 1940 to serve as training centers for the National Guard and
Army units in the Island. Between 1941 and 1943, at a cost of over $10,000,000, the
Department of War built Roosevelt Roads Naval Station, comprising installations in
Culebra and Vieques islands and the town of Ceiba on the east coast. This base was
intended to provide maritime control over the whole circum-Caribbean area. Between
1939 and 1943, and with a cost of over $50,000,000 the War Department built Isla
Grande Naval station (originally intended for naval aviation) near San Juan Bay. This
facility housed the 10th Naval District and the Caribbean Sea Frontier headquarters.
Protecting the Panama Canal, the Venezuelan Oil fields, and trade in the area were the
main responsibilities of this naval command. On September 6, 1939, a major air base
known as Borinquen Field or Puerto Rico Air Base No. 1 and capable of handling all
types of military planes became operational at Punta Borinquen in the northwest city of
Aguadilla. This installation provided the U.S. with a southern air route to Africa and
Europe via Brazil. Loosey Field was established on January 1, 1941 east of Ponce in the
southern coast. In 1940 and 1941 airports were built in Arecibo and Vega Baja
respectively to support Camp Tortuguero and to provide an airbase for anti-submarine
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however, was concerned about the possibility of American troops finding themselves
without the support of the Island’s population, which in case of an invasion, might mean
that these bases would become nothing more than isolated outposts. Consequently, the
administration sought to improve relations between Puerto Rico and the U.S. which had
deteriorated to an unprecedented low due to the events of 1936, the Ponce Massacre of
March 21, 1937, and the continuation of the shooting war between the Insular Police and
the Nacionalistas.454 The first positive step taken by FDR was the removal of Governor
Winship, himself the target of an assassination attempt in July 25, 1938. President
Roosevelt replaced him with Admiral William D. Leahy who took charge of that office
on September 11, 1939. Leahy was entrusted with supervising and supporting plans for
military expansion in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean and with advancing military
coordination with South American countries.455 Of equal relevance was his mission to
promote social and political stability in Puerto Rico which the administration considered
essential to its defense plans. Urged by Muñoz Marín, Leahy went out of his way to
prevent fraud in the general elections of 1940- the first in which the Populares would
participate.456
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“corralling” of rural voters. The latter refers to the practice of enticing Jíbaros known to
sympathize with the opposition with the promise of rum into corral-like buildings which
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The Popular Party was extremely weak after its creation in 1938. Most analysts
and political rivals dismissed Muñoz Marín’s intent on participating in the elections as a
Quixotic if not an outright act of foolishness. However, by 1940 the political picture in
Puerto Rico seemed to favor the rise of the Populares. Albizu Campos was still a federal
prisoner in Atlanta and the nationalist movement had been seriously weakened. The
Nacionalistas remained dormant during the period of late 1938 and 1940.457 Meanwhile
the dominant traditional parties faced a series of setbacks. Barceló and Iglesias Pantín
died in 1938 and 1939 respectively.458 After Barceló’s death the new president of the
Liberales decided to make statehood the political goal of the party and most
Autonomistas and Independentistas abandoned the PLP to join the Populares. Unión
Republicana’s principal leader, Martínez Nadal, was absent from most of the campaign

then stayed closed until the election was over precluding them from voting. Leahy was
appalled by such practice and ordered the police to set direct lines between the police
headquarters and political parties’ headquarters with orders to act immediately on any
reported case. Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 176-77.
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The Nationalist Party continued its activities throughout the war period but
they did not attract the numbers they once had and limited themselves mostly to rallies
and collection of funds. In 1943, they were more concerned with securing the
cancellation of Albizu Campos’ four year probation period. To that effect on June 6,
1943, Juan Antonio Corretjer, acting as party’s secretary, ordered political activity to be
kept at a minimum in Puerto Rico so as not jeopardize their leader’s pardon. The biggest
nationalist rally occurred on August 15, 1943 when some 10,000 people, including over
1,800 delegates from the Island’s 77 municipalities and their families, attended a proindependence congress. However, a “Great Nationalist Meeting” held on June 13, 1943
in Barrio Obrero, Santurce, was attended by only 100 people, and even less attended a
meeting in Caguas on July 25. Based on the number of people still paying the party’s
membership dues, the FBI estimated that no more than 500 people remained as members
of the Nationalist Party in 1943 of which only 150 were known to the public. FBI,
Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, Vol. 4, 1-13.
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as he fought against cancer finally succumbing in 1941. To make matters worse for the
annexionists, García Méndez left the party and formed the Partido Unión Republicana
Progresista months before the election. Unión Republicana honored the pact with the
Socialistas and continued the Coalición while Unión Republicana Progresista and the
Partido Laborista Puro, which splintered from the Socialistas, joined what was left of the
Liberales to conform Unificación Puertorriqueña Tripartita.459 This incessant
splintering and confusing net of tactical alliances further weakened the traditional parties.
The nature of their alliances also showed that political survival, not addressing the socioeconomic problems of the Island, was their priority.
On the other hand, while campaigning for the 1940 general elections, Muñoz
Marín opted for downplaying resolving the political status and spoke instead of
alleviating the socio-economic problems of the Island. The insignia of the PPD, a pava
(the traditional hat of the Puerto Rican Jíbaro) and the slogan, “Pan, Tierra, Libertad”
proclaimed the priorities of the Populares. Claiming that the rural masses distrust him
because of his association with independence, Muñoz Marín announced in a meeting in
San Juan that “el status no está en issue”.460 Resolving the political status of the Island
was not to be his party’s immediate goal. This position was resented by much of the
Popular Party’s independentista wing. The outbreak of WWII in Europe a year before
the elections helped Muñoz Marín convince the most pro-independence elements in his
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party that it was not the right time to fight for independence. Muñoz Marín was thus able
to keep the masses’ support and avoid a schism in his new party.
Muñoz Marín wasted no time in linking his campaign to the war effort. Not only
would the status question be put on hold for the duration of the conflict, but the
Populares committed themselves to supporting the Hemispheric Defense plans and the
war effort. Recognizing the change in Roosevelt’s attitude towards Puerto Rico, as well
as the cause for such change - the renewed military importance of the Island, Muñoz
Marín would use the latter to promote social and economic development, which he
thought essential in advancing the decolonization of the Island.461 The mass political
mobilization of the Jíbaros and urban working masses had started but not as imagined by
Albizu Campos who remained in jail. Tactical decisions, however, tend to alter broader
strategic views and goals. Muñoz Marín may have temporarily adopted the Jíbaros’
point of view with regard to independence in order to win the political battle, but what he
had learned from them during the 1936 and 1940 campaigns had started to erode his own
independentismo.462
With the votes of hundreds of thousands of peasants, Jíbaros and urban workers,
Muñoz Marín and the Populares surprised the coalition of Socialistas and Republicanos,
as well as the Unión Tripartita of Liberales, Progresistas and Laboristas Puros by
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According to Maldonado, the touring of the country and the endless meetings
with Jíbaros, workers and peasants started to convince Muñoz Marín that the Jíbaros’
rejection of independence was not “an irrational, mindless, fear of independence… nor
was it the product of a demeaning cultural defect of Puerto Ricans ashamed of their
nationality”. Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 180-85, citing Muñoz
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obtaining a pyrrhic, but important, triumph. Though the PPD obtained fewer votes than
the Coalición, it secured a majority in the Senate (10-9) and a tie in the House of
Representatives (18-18).463 FDR publicly congratulated Muñoz Marín, who became
president of the Puerto Rican Senate, and offered his full cooperation and support for his
project of “social justice and economic rehabilitation.”464 Once in power, Muñoz Marín
and the Populares sought to control the socio-economic reconstruction effort in the Island
while carefully moving forward the process of political decolonization.
In many respects Muñoz Marín benefitted from FDR’s concerns regarding the
Island. World War II was responsible for bringing the New Deal in full force to Puerto
Rico. Roosevelt took a significant step by naming Rexford G. Tugwell as governor of
the Island in August, 1941. Leahy, Tugwell’s predecessor, had secured clean elections in
1940 and started Roosevelt’s plans to make of Puerto Rico an island fortress with a
friendly population, but it would be Tugwell who would lead the Island during the war
years. Tugwell was more a scholar than a politician, and had become one of the foremost
champions of the New Deal, as well as one of its leading ideologues. His appointment as
governor could only mean that FDR’s administration was serious about improving social
and economic conditions on the Island. Strategic considerations were behind the
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In the general elections of November 5, 1940 the Coalición obtained 222,423
votes (134,582 Unión Republicana and 87,841 the Socialistas) good for 9 senators 18
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appointment of Tugwell to whom the President told that his first duty as a representative
of the United States in Puerto Rico was to “shape civil affairs… so military bases, which
might soon have to stand the shock of attack, were not isolated in a generally hostile
environment.”465 Moreover, Roosevelt and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes had
made clear that sending such a prominent New Dealer like Tugwell to Puerto Rico would
help to undermine the charges of imperialism emanating from Latin America since the
early 1930s. Whatever reasons brought Tugwell to Puerto Rico the fact of the matter is
that he shared many of Muñoz Marín’s concerns.
Tugwell and Muñoz Marín, though many times at odds, were natural allies. They
both believed that a restructuring of the of the Island’s economy and society were badly
needed. However, Muñoz Marín sought eventual independence for the Island while
Tugwell did not believe such status to be practical. In this regard Tugwell thought that
liberalization of the political status, granting more autonomy and powers to the Island, or
even moving towards statehood were the best options for both the Puerto Ricans and the
metropolis. In order to push his goal forward, Tugwell used the strategic importance of
the Island to convince the President and Congress that political change was needed.
In a letter to FDR dated March 10, 1942, Tugwell expressed concerns about the
loyalty of the population in case of an attack. In this letter Tugwell made clear that both
the British and Dutch had lost their possessions in the Pacific to the Japanese because
these countries never won the loyalty of the native population who saw them as foreign
rulers. The U.S. had to avoid that from happening in Puerto Rico. To guarantee the
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loyalty of Puerto Ricans in case of an attack, Tugwell recommended, that the President
ought to support “a new status for Puerto Rico now.” Moreover, he wrote that such a
gesture would disassociate the U.S. from “the colonial empires” and could serve to avoid
“the risk of a Malaya or Java here [in Puerto Rico].”466
The Caribbean Advisory Committee (CAC), a local version of the Caribbean
Committee established between Great Britain and the United States to study possible
collaboration in the Caribbean, recommended to FDR in March 1942 that he should
support an amendment to the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, which had remained
unchanged in all major respects since 1917. The suggested amendment would make the
office of the governor an elected one. This measure, the CAC believed, “would in fact
have the effect of converting Puerto Rico into a state, except for income tax-purposes and
for voting representation in Congress.”467 Moreover the letter expressed that that such a
move would show that the “United States has no ambition to be a colonial power,” and
that this measure was submitted more “for its general than for its local effect.”468 These
events followed a unanimous request made on February 10 by the Puerto Rican
legislature (a Muñoz Marín’s initiative) to Congress and the President to allow Puerto
Ricans to find a solution to end the colonial regime on the Island. The letter did not make
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reference to the issue of the elective governor, which Muñoz Marín did not support as it
could block the path to eventual independence.469
FDR did in fact move to support the creation of an elective governor for Puerto
Rico. On March 9, 1943 the President asked Congress to consider “as soon as possible
an amendment of the Organic Law of Puerto Rico to permit the people of the Island to
elect their own Governor and redefine the functions and power of the Federal government
and the government of Puerto Rico.”470 The previous day, Roosevelt had ordered
Secretary Ickes to establish a commission of four Puerto Ricans and four Americans to
make a study and report on the amendments required to provide for such measures.471
Tugwell and Muñoz Marín were members of this committee which met in Washington
D.C. from July 19 to August 7. On September 28, in a special message to Congress on
the status of progress in Puerto Rico, Roosevelt urged, once more, that Congress adopt
the recommendations of the committee as a matter of “right and justice for Puerto
Ricans.”472 FDR saw “no reason why their [the Puerto Rican’s] Governor and other
officials should continue to be appointed from without.”473
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In a letter to Senator Dennis Chavez (New Mexico), Chairman of the
Subcommittee of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs of the Senate, Muñoz
Marín expressed his support, although not enthusiastically, for the Governor Bill and
added that it was essential to incorporate in such bill the necessary provisions so that
Congress could not alter the Organic Act unilaterally.474 Muñoz Marín skillfully
included the military participation of Puerto Ricans in the world conflict as well as the
ideological icons used by Allied propaganda, especially democracy, national selfdetermination, and the principle of the consent of the governed, to support his
demands.475 In February 15, 1944, the bill, with the proposed amendments, was
approved by the Senate. It would not reach the House of Representatives until August of
that year, when the war appeared to be nearing its end.
With the bill sent to the House leaders from the PPD launched yet another
campaign to secure the passing of the Governor Bill with the proposed amendments.
Jesús T. Piñero declared before the House that doing so was essential for the peaceful
decolonization of the Island by showing the returning Puerto Rican veterans that “some
steps have been taken in the right direction.”476 Elmer Ellsworth, a native of
474
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According to the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, the Consent of the
Governed Principle established that the signatories believed in “The rights of all people
to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see
sovereign rights of self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of
them.” See, Senate Committee on Territorial and Insular Affairs, A Bill to Provide For
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Massachusetts but longtime resident and Senator in Puerto Rico (PPD), accused Congress
of excessive paternalism and urged the representatives to approve the bill. Senator
Ellsworth declared that Puerto Rico should be an example for “all the islands being
liberated in the Pacific that they too would be free.” Moreover, Ellsworth was quick to
point out that approving the bill “will clear the atmosphere throughout all Latin America
of accusations of Uncle Sam’s merciless exploitation of Puerto Rico.”477 Such strategic
considerations as well as the impact that the Governor Bill could have regarding U.S.
foreign relations did not escape federal officials. Abe Fortas, Undersecretary of the
Interior, declared during the hearings before the House that approving “this substantially
increased measure of home rule” would be seen as an indication of goodwill being
“most beneficial in reaffirming the leadership of the United States in world affairs.”
Fortas emphasized that “not only will it have that effect upon the people of Latin
America but also throughout the world.”478
The bill, however, died over the issue of denying Congress the right to change the
Organic Act without the concurrence of the people of Puerto Rico or their elected
representatives. The House would not approve it without eliminating this provision, and
Muñoz Marín, disillusioned with the limited nature of the bill, asked Secretary Ickes to
let it die. The proposal to allow Puerto Rico to elect its governor failed because of
protests from Puerto Rico and the President’s indifference, who after his letter to
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Congress of September 1943 did not make a single effort to push the bill.479 The
President’s support might have convinced Congress to grant Muñoz Marín’s requests.
The war situation, however, had changed by August 1944 on all major fronts, and hence
Roosevelt did not even try to push the bill as it was not longer imperative to do so.
In September 1943, the President had strongly endorsed the Governor Bill.
Presidential support, however, was absent when the House convened in August 1944 to
discuss the bill approved by the Senate in February. The difference may have well been
that the Allies were in full pursuit of the German armies across Europe. War in Europe
appeared to be nearing its end, and Japan was never a threat to the Caribbean. Thus, once
the danger in the Caribbean had completely dissipated, FDR forgot about Puerto Rico.
As the military importance of the Island declined in comparison to other war theaters,
promoting a change of its political status ceased to be a pressing matter for the
administration.480
Muñoz Marín had also had to contend with the most staunchly separatist wing
within his own party. The independentista faction within the PPD convinced Senator
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Tugwell believed that Roosevelt’s attitude towards Puerto Rico was shaped
partly by misinformation as well as by traces of imperialist ideas he learned during his
years in the Navy. According to Tugwell, Muñoz Marín “succeeded in alienating both
Secretary Ickes and President Roosevelt. More important is the fact that FDR distrusted
Muñoz Marín, who, he thought, was a Nationalist, or at least a sympathizer of the
Nationalists. Distrust of Muñoz Marín was also the product of the imperialist side of
Roosevelt, the navy man, who could not support autonomy wholeheartedly because “he
just never thought that Puerto Ricans were the equals of Continental Americans. As a
matter of fact, in 1934 Tugwell had to join Ickes in persuading Roosevelt not to return the
Virgin Islands, then under control of the Department of the Interior, to the Department of
the Navy. Roosevelt’s attitude towards ultramarine possessions led Tugwell to believe
that “There was an admiral concealed somewhere in Roosevelt.” See Tugwell, The Arts
of Politics, 1. 146-151.
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Millard Tydings, to present yet another Independence bill, which he did in April 2, 1943.
Hearings were held in the Senate on May of the same year.481 During these hearings,
however, the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, made it clear that the military
was against the independence of the Island since Puerto Rico was still vital for the
defense of the Panama Canal. Moreover, McCloy labeled Puerto Rico as “irreplaceable
for Caribbean defense” and informed the Committee that its independence “was not in
the best interest of the military.”482 Senator Robert A. Taft, a member of the Committee
on Territories and Insular Affairs, declared during the hearings that Puerto Rico was still
necessary to secure the military control of the Caribbean.483 For all purposes, the fate of
the 1943 Independence Bill was sealed with the testimony of McCloy, who, guided by
Senator Taft, convinced the whole committee of the impracticability of granting
independence to Puerto Rico during wartime.
The Tydings bill not only lacked support among American officials but also
among Puerto Ricans. A letter from Muñoz Marín addressed to Senator Tydings, dated
April 29, 1943, reminded Tydings of the resolution approved unanimously by the Puerto
Rican legislature on February 10 requesting a referendum to end the colonial regime as
soon as the conditions allowed it, and of the President’s decision to create a committee to
work on reforms to the Organic Act. Muñoz Marín made clear in this letter that he could
not support the bill since doing so might break the delicate equilibrium that had led to the
resolution from the Puerto Rican legislature requesting a referendum on the political
481
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status.484 Muñoz Marín probably had in mind that he had been elected because he
proclaimed that the political status would not be an issue, and that a vote for the PPD was
not a vote for independence. Moreover, the military had made clear that it would
opposed independence for the Island during wartime.
Furthermore, the new Tydings bill was only a slightly improved version of the
one rejected by most Puerto Rican politicians in 1936. Although the bill provided for a
period of twenty years before full trade tariffs were implemented between Puerto Rico
and the U.S., federal aid to the Island was to be cut almost immediately. Moreover, the
Armed Forces made clear that they would not support any Independence Bill that would
not guarantee the retention of all military installations and their right to appropriate lands
for expansion of those bases as needed. In other words, independence under the Tidings
bill would mean that the U.S. military, especially the Navy, would control much of the
Island and that Puerto Rico would not enjoy the benefits of any federal aid nor special
trade arrangements. This was not independence but a de facto transfer of its sovereignty
from Congress to the military, which would not have the responsibilities that Congress
had but would enjoy all of its rights and then some more. Lacking support from the
military, the State Department, or even from members of the Committee, and with the
backing of only the staunchest Independentistas in Puerto Rico, the bill did not survive
for long.
Many Independentistas in the PPD wanted the party to support Tydings bill
openly, but Muñoz Marín considered that this option was the equivalent of political
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suicide. He was aware that not only the President but most Congressmen, the military,
and almost every person with a voice in this matter were opposed to independence. At
any rate, explaining support for an independence bill to his constituency would have been
extremely difficult- if not impossible, when even the Nacionalistas were remaining
dormant and at least paid lip service to supporting the war effort.485 Furthermore, he had
come to believe that independence had no future under the current economic and social
situation. As early as 1936, he noted that the reaction of thousands of Jíbaros whenever
he spoke to them about independence was of fear and uncertainty. Most of them were
afraid of independence and would not vote for it.486 This realization had moved Muñoz
Marín to run the first PPD campaign based on social and economic reform and avoiding
the status issue. Most certainly Muñoz Marín kept independence as his goal, but he knew
that the social and economic situation of the Island had to be greatly improved, and that
he had to secure enough economic guarantees from the United States for the survival of
the new republic in order to persuade the Jíbaros to vote for independence.
The new Tydings bill did not offer the economic guarantees or the full
sovereignty that Muñoz Marín deemed necessary for independence to be viable and
485
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real.487 Furthermore, during his first campaign he has asked the masses to let him
borrow their vote and to remove him from office, along with the rest of the Populares, if
they strayed from their campaign promises of socio-economic justice or betrayed them by
moving towards independence.488 To that end and before the famous Operation
Bootstrap (Manos a la Obra) was launched in 1948, Tugwell and Muñoz Marín
embarked in several public-sponsored ventures seeking to promote the industrialization
of the Island, and the creation of industrial jobs and small business.489 Additionally, in
order to alleviate unemployment they promoted the military mobilization of the Puerto
Ricans, especially the peasantry and urban workers (who were the backbone of Muñoz
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Marín’s political power) which incidentally gave him another card with which to advance
political decolonization in his dealings with Washington.
If Tugwell and Muñoz Marín disagreed on the path to political decolonization,
they certainly agreed on the importance of military preparedness and mobilization as a
way to improve conditions in the Island. The economic impact of the military
preparedness was hard to miss. In November of 1939, as the U.S. accelerated readiness
procedures in response to the outbreak of WWII in Europe, the War Department decided
to augment the army units in Puerto Rico which at the time consisted of the 65th U.S.
Army Infantry Regiment and the 295th and 296th regiments of the Puerto Rico National
Guard. After announcements were made to that effect, the press reported a wave of
volunteers congregating outside the induction centers in the Island.490 Mobilization in the
Island moved speedily. In 1940 and 1941 U.S. Army units expanded exponentially. The
Selective Service in the Island, with 122 local boards, led and staffed (mostly) by Puerto
Ricans, registered roughly 525,000 men between the ages of 18 to 64. During this first
period Puerto Ricans were accepted under the same standards (with the exception of
English literacy) as their Continental counterparts.491 To process the Puerto Rican
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recruits an army reception and induction center was established in Fort Buchanan, a basic
training station at Camp O’Reilly (Gurabo), and an advanced training center at Camp
Tortuguero (Vega Baja).492 The 65th was quickly brought to war strength, attached to the
U.S. Army Second Army Corps and sent to Panama in January 1942. The regiments 295
and 296 of the P.R.N.G. were called into active service in 1940 and gradually took over
the 65th’s responsibilities-first in the Island and latter on throughout the Caribbean
Basin.493
Continental and local politicians were not the only ones invested in the mass
mobilization of Puerto Ricans. Convinced that “Puerto Rican men inducted under U.S.
standards were drastically inferior to Continental troops” the U.S. Army’s Puerto Rican
Department unilaterally set higher standards for natives to be admitted in the service in
July 1942, including twice the schooling of that of Continental Americans.494 More
satisfied with the men selected after the new requirements were instituted, the War
Department decided to use these men to replace Continental troops in the Caribbean area.
Club initiated the complaint that culminated with the War Department establishing same
parameters for Puerto Rican and Continental recruits. See, Clip from Periódico El
Mundo (San Juan), January 13 1944, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 21 Cartapacio 4 Documento 1.
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C.I.H.P.C., War Department: Bureau of the Budget, Puerto Rican Induction
Program, 15 April 1945,” C.I.H.P.C., Caja 17 Cartapacio 1, Documento 1A-B, 1.
493
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The Puerto Rican monthly quota was raised as the reports on the new inductees’
performance showed improvement, and over 16,000 men were inducted using the new
standards.495 Such policy, however, was taken as demeaning by the Islanders. In March
of 1944, under pressure from civic groups and local politicians, the War Department
ordered the local selective service unit in the Island to reinstate the 4th grade education
requirement for admittance into the army and to set the monthly inductee quota at 1,500
men. Between March 1944 and April 1, 1945 roughly 18,380 men were inducted in the
army. The War Department, however, decided that these new troops would be used as
“fillers for Puerto Rican units and as service troops in overseas theaters”.496 Thus, the
War Department found a way to still deny equal opportunity to those born in the Island.
It was the general attitude that Puerto Ricans, as colored troops, were not suited
for combat duty. The Bureau of the Budget’s report on the inductee program on the
Island declared that: “Puerto Ricans obviously are not as valuable as Continentals for
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The Free French, British and Dutch government opposed sending Puerto Rican
troops to their Caribbean possessions believing it may stir racial tensions. The presence
of Puerto Ricans, who were considered Colored troops in these overwhelmingly Black
colonies could undermined the racial structure of power and endanger the abysmally
small white elite. As a matter of fact that was the War Department’s reason for not
sending Black Continental troops to the Caribbean. At any rate, the War Department did
not believe it could spare any white troops, especially for a war theater that had become a
secondary concern after the Allied invasions of North Africa and Sicily in 1943.
Nonetheless, to placate their European Allies, the U.S. War Department assured them that
only white, highly-educated (referring to 8th years of schooling), English speaking Puerto
Ricans would be sent to their possessions. For instance see; British Joint Staff Mission,
Offices of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., June 2, 1943 to Secretary of
War Stimson; War Department, “Outgoing Classified Message,” 18 September 1943,
Operations Division W.D.G.S. Latin American Theater; United States Deputy Chief of
Staff to Field Marshall Sir John Hill, Combined Chief of Staff Building, Washington
D.C., October 12, 1943, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 22 Cartapacio 4 Documento 1, 3, 4.
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Army service because of lower educational and physical standards, racial and historical
traditions and background, aptitude, etc…”497 Not only did the War Department believed
that their race poorly suited non-whites for combat duty, but that it also made them
intellectually inferior to Continental white soldiers. Though the same regulations, with
regard to schooling were applied to Puerto Rican recruits, and then doubled, Continental
officials still believed that Puerto Ricans were deficient in intellect which they blamed on
the recruits’ race. Furthermore, the report reiterated the myth of Puerto Rican docility
(created shortly after the 1898 invasion) and ignored the Island’s military tradition.
The BoB report stated that the use of native officers in the Puerto Rican units was
“a major reason for the retention of many men whose effectiveness and/or efficiency is
questionable in comparison with Continental troops.”498 The conclusions of this report
with regard to the protective role played by Puerto Rican officers, however, goes against
many of the troops’ preference for serving under Continental officers as they were less
demanding than their Puerto Rican counterparts. According to these soldiers, Puerto
Rican officers seemed to always have something to prove, the proverbial chip on the
shoulder.499
The War Department’s low opinion of the Puerto Ricans was set before
recruitment began. In the Puerto Rican Induction Report prepared by the Bureau of the
497
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Budget in 1945, it is stated that the Puerto Rican inductee “admittedly, was not generally
suited for front line duty” but would valuable for other duties and “thousands of potential
actual combat U.S. Continental personnel would thereby be released from secondary
services.”500 A War Department adamant in showing that all “available sources of nonfather (pre-Pearl Harbor) manpower were being exhausted before fathers were called”
thus proceeded to mobilize thousands of Puerto Ricans- which it did not trust nor did it
intend to send into battle.501
According to the Bureau of the Budget, the Puerto Rican Induction Program
admittedly had another purpose “not directly related to the actual prosecution of the war.”
502

The War Department, through induction, sought to “provide employment for many

idle Puerto Ricans classified as 1-A”. 503 FDR, members of Congress and the military,
had continuously expressed their fear of local unrest. Excluding able, and unemployed,
Puerto Ricans from the military could have been taken as an outright insult especially
considering that unemployment in the Island went from 99,100 in July 1941 to 237,000 in
September 1942 because of the strain imposed on the Island by German U-boats,
rationing, the prioritization of military needs, and the failure to establish war industries in
Puerto Rico.504
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That Puerto Rican soldiers were excluded from the battlefield was not the result
of any refusal on their part. Soldiers, local leaders, the press, and the general public in
the Island demanded the opportunity to see action.505 Local leaders were interested into
getting as many Puerto Ricans as possible in the military, and many were certainly aware
of the economic and political effect of doing so. However, Puerto Rican leaders and
opinion makers did not want military participation to be a handout. It was important for
Puerto Rican leaders to debunk the myth of the Puerto Rican soldier inferiority (and thus
of the Puerto Ricans’ in general) and so they pushed the matter of sending the troops into
action- just as they had done during WWI. The War Department may have wanted to
save face by including Puerto Ricans in the military but restricting them to service duties,
an opinion shared by Continental politicians and opinion makers, but local leaders and
soldiers demanded a chance to prove their worth in the battlefield. For once, there was
the symbolic regaining of manhood. This could be attained by first being able to support
their families and secondly by sharing the burden of “national defense” by fighting, and if
necessary, dying in war. Furthermore, many local leaders, including Muñoz Marín,
thought that active participation in the war would convince Puerto Ricans that they could
stand on their own, individually and collectively, and that they could in fact run the
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Many Puerto Rican career officers tried unsuccessfully to receive combat
assignments in Europe or the Pacific Theater. See J.A. Ulio, Major General, War
Department Adjutant General, to Honorable Luis Muñoz Marín, President, Senate of
Puerto Rico, February 2,1945; an Luis Muñoz Marín to Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of
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Island by themselves. In a very real sense, being allowed to fight was perceived as a
mean to end psychological and sociological perceptions and complexes of inferiority.
As local leaders encouraged the population to support and join the military,
economic opportunity, personal and national improvement joined national duty as part of
the rationale used to exhort the Puerto Rican peasantry and working urban classes to join
the military.506 Economic hardships and the call for national defense-with everything that
it entails, combined to drive the Puerto Rican masses into recruiting stations. The War
Department casually reported that: “The number of volunteers appears to be
comparatively much higher than in the Continental United Sates. Some months, it is
stated, volunteers supplied the complete quota.”507
Economic distress was not missed by military officials when asked to comment
on Puerto Rico’s exceptionally high volunteer rate. Citing the senior commander of the
U.S. Army Puerto Rican Department, Major General James Lawton Collins, an editorial
in the Christian Science Monitor observed that:
Since Puerto Rico’s economic problems are so acute, a grocery store clerk in a
small coastal town would probably never have earned more than a few hundred
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failure to register for the draft. After serving parts of their sentences for draft dodging
several Nacionalistas were released and later accused the officers at the correctional
facilities of forcing them to complete registration cards. FBI, Nationalist Party of Puerto
Rico, Vol. 4., 42.
507

Puerto Rican Induction Program, 4. Some 23,000 Puerto Ricans volunteers
were accepted by the War Department though more than 70,000 volunteered.
243

dollars a year before becoming a soldier. His Army pay plus the Government’s
allowance to his wife and family will be actually a raise in income.508
Lawton Collins’ comments rang especially true to the peasantry and the Jíbaros.
An old saying in the 65th declared, “Poverty takes me to war, if I had any money I would
not go.”509 That seemed to be the case for many Puerto Ricans who joined the military
before and during World War II. Victor Vargas, who joined the 65th Infantry in 1940 at
age sixteen, stated: “I joined because of the economic situation. I used to go downtown
on a donkey to sell vegetables and tubers, but there wasn’t any money. When the war
[World War II] came, I took that opportunity and started to earn $21 per month.”510
Francisco Salinas, who enlisted in 1939 declared: “For many Puerto Ricans there is no
better institution than the Army. The Army gives the Boricuas housing, clothes, order,
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“Army orders given in Puerto Rico in English and Spanish” Clip from the
Christian Science Monitor, April 7 1942, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 21 Cartapacio 4 Documento
2A. The comments were not off the mark. Per Capita Net Income had taken a dive in
1931 to $108 from a previous $122 and by 1933 it had hit bottom at $86. Puerto Rico’s
PCNI was less than a third of the poorest state’s PCNI, (Alabama with $270) and a sixth
of the aggregated PCNI in the Continental U.S. which was $575. Reconstruction under
the New Deal and the coming of the war propelled a slow recovery and by 1940 PCNI
was back to 1930’s levels. As land reform and the war effort started to make an impact
PNCI continued to rise; to $184 in 1942; $218 in 1943; $236 in 1944; and $270 by 1945.
Underlining the correlation between the war effort and PCNI, after a relatively small
increase to $271 in 1946, PCNI again started to decline; to $254 in 1947, and to $252 in
1949. PCNI would not rise to war levels until 1950 when it reached $279. See, Dietz,
Economic History of Puerto Rico, 140, Table 3.2, 184, Table 4.1, 205.
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Publishing Company, 1961), 132-33.
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stated that “the stipend earned by the lower class Boricua, and even the middle class, is
lower than that offered by the armed forces.” Padrón, El 65 en revista, 1961, 132.
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recreation, school, a pension, three hot meals [last tres calientes], and a decent pay.
Where is the Boricua going to find all that?”511 The veterans who most frequently cited
economic reasons for joining the army also stated that once in the army they were very
happy and took pride in wearing the uniform. Their pride, some of these veterans
testified, came from the respect and admiration they received from the rest of the
community and a feeling of being important and needed.512 Lawton Collins, Commander
of the Puerto Rican Department, identified other reasons besides economic improvement
for Puerto Rican participation in the war effort. He stated: “It would be hard to find any
community where civilians have cooperated more wholeheartedly and unselfishly with
the army than in Puerto Rico. We have several gifts of lands from individual Puerto
Ricans for army projects here”.513 The overwhelming support for the war effort and the
numbers of Puerto Ricans joining the military even started to worry the Nacionalistaswhom as discussed in the previous chapter understood the symbolic value of military
service with regard to national identities.514
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Vargas Interview; Ortíz, interview, Mercado-Santana, interview. These
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The Great Assembly of the Nationalist Party appealed to the Pan-American
Convention in Rio, and the Atlantic Charter, asked for the withdrawal of all U.S. armed
forces from the Island, the recognition of national sovereignty and demanded “the right
and privilege of having a military representative in the High Command of Democracies
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The mobilization of tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans went beyond personal
economic improvement- whole families and communities were affected by it.
According to the Bureau of the Budget, federal payments in the form of dependant’s
benefits and “readjustment payments” (a type of unemployment benefit after being
discharge) were pumping $28,074.000 annually into the economy by 1944, and that
excluding the regular army pay.515 The BoB estimated that after the war at least 30,000
veterans would seek unemployment benefits under the Servicemen Readjustment Act of
1944. Entitled by this act to a weekly unemployment pay of $20 for 52 weeks ($1040
annually), these soldiers’ readjustment pay meant a monthly boost to the local economy
of $600,000 or 31,200,000 annually in wages. 516 The readjustment weekly benefit was
substantially more than the $12 weekly pay a veteran could earn working as a waiter in
Fort Brooks Officer’s Club, itself a higher pay than what most Puerto Ricans earned at
the moment.517 Many veterans in fact made use of this provision. Miguel A. Muñoz,

so as to accept equal risks in the war and have the same joy in victory.” FBI, Nationalist
Party of Puerto Rico Vol. 4., 53-54.
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U.S. Army payment for a private was $21 a month in 1940. In January, 1943 a
new pay scale went into effect starting at $50 a month for a private. Overseas pay meant
an extra $10 a month. Ironically, Puerto Ricans serving in Puerto Rico were entitled to
overseas payment while in the Island (an overseas possession) but not while training in
the U.S. The Bureau of the Budget monthly figures included: Administration Induction
Programs, $5,800; Dependants Benefits, (Exclusive of regular payment allotment):
Monthly Benefit of Men Already in the Service, 1,850,000; Initial Payment to
Dependants of New Inductees, 118,000 for a total of 1,965,000. Separation Payments:
“Mastering out lump sum payment” 80,000; Weekly Readjustment Payment ($20/weekly
for 52 weeks), 285,700. The total monthly expenses were thus $2,539,500 for an annual
rate of $28,074.000. Puerto Rican Induction Program, 3-10.
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Director of the Veterans Administration in the Island, informed Muñoz Marín that by
June 30, 1948 roughly 49,000 veterans had received unemployment readjustment pay for
a total of $40,755,971.518 However, those numbers show that although almost as twice
the number of the expected veterans received unemployment payments, the total
payments remained close to the Bureau’s 1945 estimate. This in fact indicates that
veterans were not sitting idle to receive a paycheck, as the BoB had feared, but were
seeking employment or retraining under the provisions of the Readjustment Act.
Regarding the Puerto Rican units being created the report concluded that “few, if
any, foresaw the cost of creating this comparatively small segment of the Army.” The
Puerto Rican soldiers averaged 2.6 dependants which meant an annual dependant
payment of $560 per men. Moreover, Puerto Ricans were entitled to overseas payment
while serving in the Island (an overseas possession) which translated into their pay being
equal to those troops deployed around the world and between 10% to 20% higher than
soldiers stationed in the Continental U.S.519 As illogical as they may be, those were not

week. However, the law had so many exemptions that most agricultural and factory
workers did not benefit from the minimum hourly wage at all. Dietz, Economic History
of Puerto Rico, 225-26; see also Henry Wells, “La modernización de Puerto Rico: La
política y los valores”, in Eduardo Rivera Medina, Rafael L. Ramírez, eds., Del
cañaveral a la fabrica: cambio social en Puerto Rico (Río Piedras, P.R.: Ediciones
Huracán-Academia, 1994), 87.
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enlisted men and warrant officers deployed overseas earned 20% more than those
stationed in the Continental U.S while officers earned 10% more. See Puerto Rican
Induction Program, 7.
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policies instituted by local officials but by the War Department based on Puerto Rico’s
political status and geographical location. Furthermore, anexionistasin the Island
preferred the Island to be treated as a state, even if that meant a decrease of the War
Department’s moneys assigned to the Island.520
The BoB took special aim at dependant’s benefits. It blamed the local Selective
Service Boards, “whose member are predominately, if not entirely Puerto Ricans,”521 of
failing to verify dependants’ claims and of fomenting the steady increase of inductees
applying for dependants benefits. The BoB report stated that it was “almost unbelievable
that 97 out of every 110 men inducted (more of 60% being single) were supporting an
average of 2.6 persons when joining the Army.”522 The report did not take into account
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Officials of the Bureau of the Budget went as far as proposing a pay reduction
for Puerto Rican soldiers since they believed that it would make sense to treat the Puerto
Rican soldiers different than Continentals since army regulations did not “take into
account the much higher level of living of Continental soldiers’ families, nor the much
lower cost of living in Puerto Rico.” See Puerto Rican Induction Program,10. However,
as previously discussed, the cost of living in the Island was higher and wages much lower
than in the Continental U.S., which had led to the pauperization of the peasantry and
extreme poverty of the urban working class, and this situation further deteriorated during
the early years of the war. Prices of imported food went up 90% between 1941 and 1946
while locally produced food increased 48% during the same period. Local food
production was only increased thanks to the land-reform program carried out by Muñoz
Marín and Tugwell. Supported by a federal recognition of the “Law of the 500 Acres”,
the government bought lands with over 500 acres and distributed them among landless
peasants. This program was credited with bringing the land area devoted to food
production from 230,000 acres in 1940 to 300,000 acres by the war’s end. Most
interesting, yuca, and tubers such as names and batatas, plantains and yautías made the
bulk of the increase in locally-produced foods. All of them were staples of the Puerto
Rican peasant’s diet. Sugar producers were adamantly opposed to devoting some of their
lands to food production, even during the 1941-42 period when the Island faced
starvation fearing that they would lose their production quotas. See Dietz, Economic
History of Puerto Rico, 204-203; and Tugwell, The Stricken Land, 215.
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that by 1933, families in Puerto Rico already averaged five members.523 Ironically, the
BoB, which used the cultural and social conditions of the Puerto Ricans to argue against
their usefulness as fighting troops, overlooked the extended Puerto Rican family, many of
which were led and supported by the oldest son, whom among his patriarchal duties
counted being the first to go to war. The BoB ignored that, especially in rural areas,
many Puerto Rican couples lived as concubines, which meant that many of those labeled
as “single” likely had a partner and children from their unrecognized union. Moreover,
as it is evident from the BoB report itself, local members of the selective service board
were strictly following this institution’s and the War Department’s guidelines, as well as
the laws passed by Congress.524 The BoB also complained that the local government was
bent on helping recruits to secure documentation for purposes of dependent benefits.
However, this was no different than in any of the states on the mainland to the point that
many of the initiatives devised by the local government in Puerto Rico to aid the veterans
and recruits in securing benefits were verbatim copies of Continental states’
legislation.525
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There was a very important provision which allowed for veterans 25 years old
and younger to claim that their studies were interrupted because of military service which
entitled them to a monthly pension of $50 and $75 for single and veterans with
dependants respectively while they continue their studies. The same applied for veterans
over 25 year of age but they had to prove that their studies were in fact interrupted.
Another provision set a monthly pension of $80 and $90 for single and married veterans
pursuing vocational rehabilitation 80 to single and married veterans respectively for up to
a period of four years. The local government aided in securing documents necessary to
claim all these benefits and even created a manual of veterans’ rights in Spanish. See
Administración de Veteranos, Servicio Selectivo- Puerto Rico, Información para
veteranos: derechos y beneficios, Mayo 8 1945, (Archivo Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín
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The Bureau of the Budget’s report denounced that the induction program in
Puerto Rico functioned as a “glorified WPA” or a “WPA in ‘uniform’”. Proportionally,
the report indicated, Puerto Rico received a larger monthly dependant benefit than any
other state of the Union.526 The report accused local officials of treating mobilization as
a workers’ program and of “expending large sums of money haphazardly” while “ground
work is being laid [by the Puerto Rican senate] for continuing post-war expenditures in
whatever form of pensions may be finally adopted.”527 The Populares were in fact
counting on the Puerto Rican soldier to bolster the socio-economic reconstruction effort
in the post-war years.
The American soldiers who fought in WWII enjoyed some tangible benefits not
expeienced by their WWI predecessors. The Populares would make sure that no benefit
(i.e., vocational rehabilitation, unemployment benefits, re-employment, discharge
compensation, life insurance, medical assistance, mortgage loans) remained unclaimed by
Puerto Rican veterans. The PPD leaders also fought to extend the same benefits to WWI
veterans. Altogether, the WWI and WWII veteran population residing in Puerto Rico in

(A.L.M.M.), Sección IV, Serie I Subserie 30 Subsección 2 Cartapacio 19 Documento 1),
12, 14, 16. Hereafter Información para veteranos: derechos y beneficios. Some of the
issues studied by the local government were state bonuses to veterans and they looked at
Alaska, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Connecticut, Georgia and North Dakota as guidelines for Puerto Rican veterans' bonus.
A.L.M.M., Sección IV, Serie I, Subserie 33, Veterans Administration, Cartapacio 75
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1947 totaled 70,426 men and 210 WACs or Women Army Corps veterans.528 Even
though a fifth of WWII veterans were no longer residing in Puerto Rico in 1947, over
14% of Island’s population consisted of veterans. The sheer number of veterans eligible
to participate on the several federal readjustment programs facilitated the Populares
effort to change the nature of the Island’s socioeconomic structures and eventually to
embark on the industrialization of the Island with native know-how.
Arguably, the most important of those benefits was the Servicemen's
Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as the G.I. Bill, which allowed almost eight
million WWII veterans in the U.S. to go to college- a feat that has been credited with the
dramatic expansion of the middle class in the mainland.529 The G.I. Bill had a similar
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Of those residing in the Island in 1947, 13,271 served in WWI and 52,586 in
WWII. See Contact Division, Veterans Administration Center, “Estimated Veteran
Population, Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands,” San Juan, P.R., June 9, 1947; A.L.M.M.,
Sección IV Serie 1 Subsección 1: Datos y Estadísticas Sub-serie 33 Cartapacio 29
Documento 2ª. The Military Aide to the Governor of Puerto Rico, Teodoro Vidal,
prepared a report which stated that between November 20, 1940 and March 31, 1947,
65,034 Puerto Ricans served in the U.S. military of which 368 lost their lives (combat,
training, and accidents). 70,138 volunteer for service but only 23,198 were accepted.
Over 12,000 WWII Puerto Rican veterans were not living in the Island by 1954. See
Teodoro Vidal, Ayudante Militar del Gobernador, “Participación Puertorriqueña en la
Segunda Guerra Mundial y en el Conflicto de Corea,” A.L.M.M., Sección V Serie 9:
Artículos, Discursos, Mensajes, Declaraciones Luis Muñoz Marín Gobernador de Puerto
Rico 1949-1964, Noviembre-Diciembre 1954, Cartapacio 7 Documento 9. By the war’s
end there were over 67,500 men serving in the Puerto Rican Department. It climaxed at
roughly 91,000 (including Continental troops) in 1943. See Negroni, Historia Militar de
Puerto Rico, 444-45.
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The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act was finally signed into law by President
Roosevelt on June 22, 1944. The Veterans Administration became responsible for
carrying out the law's key provisions: education and training, loan guaranty for homes,
farms or businesses, and unemployment pay. Millions of veterans who would have
flooded the job market after the war suddenly had the option of attaining college and
vocational education. According to the Veterans Administration, in 1947, “veterans
accounted for 49 percent of college admissions. By the time the original GI Bill ended on
July 25, 1956, 7.8 million of 16 million World War II veterans had participated in an
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effect in the Island. Understanding that many Puerto Rican soldiers would not be able to
use the benefits of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, for too many had little formal
schooling, Muñoz Marín and the Populares designed trainig and vocational state
programs for the returning soldiers so they could make use of these hard-earned benefits.
The returning soldier was not to go back to the fields; high schools, vocational schools
and the University of Puerto Rico were waiting for him.
The Department of Education and the Veterans Administration worked closely to
retrain and in most cases to help the veterans finish high school. In 1946-47 the
Department of Education in the Island had readied itself for the returning soldiers and
trained 1,167 academic teams which employed 3,677 people to cater 36,584 veterans.
Besides primary and secondary teachings the DoE conducted over 650 workshops and
8,418 veterans received diplomas that first year. 530 The DoE was spending over
$3,000,000 annually to run these programs. During the academic year of 1947-48 the
local government helped over 40,000 veterans to obtain the necessary credentials or
certifications necessary to receive education under the Servicemen Readjustment Act.
That year the DoE again counted 36,584 veterans finishing high school, 1,798 in
vocational (industrial) schools, and 936 pursuing vocational agricultural studies.531

education or training program.” Furthermore, between 1944 and 1952, the VA “backed
nearly 2.4 million home loans for World War II veterans.” More compelling, few
veterans “collected on one of the bill's most controversial provisions—the unemployment
pay. Less than 20 percent of funds set aside for this was used.” See “G.I. Bill History”
[United States Department of Veterans Affairs]; accessed 4 December 2009; available
from http://www.gibill.va.gov/GI_Bill_Info/history.htm.
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According to a report from Pedro Gil, Director of Veterans’ Division the Department of
Education, over 48,075 veterans were receiving some kind of secondary education. Over
2,000 were receiving vocational industrial training and roughly 1,200 were enrolled in
vocational agricultural studies.532 The report boasted that over 50,000 veterans were
receiving some kind of instruction.
The enrollment in the University of Puerto Rico increased 24% from 5,869
students in 1941-42 to 7,300 for the year 1944-45, and it would continue to expand
mostly in part to accommodate a growing veteran population- which now had the means
to go to college.533 The total veteran population for the academic year 1947-48, rose to
2,074 students.534 The next year 2,307 were attending the U.PR.535 As the U.P.R. grew
in terms of enrollment, it was also restructured to emphasize the teaching of social
sciences with the intention of producing a harvest of economists, public administrators,
social workers, and all types of professions associated with public service. Moreover as
explained by Henry Wells, strengthening the social sciences core did not diminished
interest in applied sciences which in turn supplied the new commercial and industrial
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enterprises’ demand for accountants, staticians, engineers, scientists, managers, and all
types of technicians.536
On August 1947, the University of Puerto Rico inaugurated an Industrial Arts
School (Escuela de Artes y Oficios) with 1,200 students mostly veterans. The school,
which when finished would have room for 7,000 students, covered twenty-two acres,
included twenty-five classrooms, one administrative building, fourteen buildings for
practical workshops, four classroom buildings, a bakery and a cafeteria.537 This school
offered over fifty courses designed to train carpenters, electricians, experts on car
bodywork, sheet metal work, and cast iron works, as well as auto, aviation, and general
mechanics, plumbers, experts on refrigeration, and welders. Five more of these schools
were eventually built.538 The director of the Veterans Administration in the Island
understood the priority of these schools and stated that although they were not
exclusively for veterans, former servicemen would receive preference for admission.539
The importance of these thousands of soldiers who received technical training
went beyond that of providing technicians. They subsidize the schooling of thousands
more since their tuition, books and other expenses were paid in full by the Federal
Government which allowed the U.P.R. to expand in other areas while keeping tuition
536
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rates low and offering scholarships. Hence, it is not surprising that the U.P.R.
administration went out of its way to make sure that “not a single veteran who wished to
enroll in the University of Puerto Rico and who met the admission requirements, was
denied the opportunity to attend either Río Piedras or Mayagüez because of lack of
space.”540 These citizen soldiers, through vocational and college education, were to
become the technicians and technocrats of a new political framework, the
“Commonwealth” and of its main project, the modernization of Puerto Rico’s economy
via industrialization.
But before Muñoz Marín moved towards the Commonwealth formula, he had
already engaged the military in promoting the Island’s industrialization and in providing
essential services commonly reserved for state agencies or the private sector. The
National Guard (and the State Guard) were occupied with providing entertainment during
towns’ Fiestas Patronales and helping public schools with extracurricular activities
ranging from athletics and field days to conducting seminars on industrialization for
civilians and veterans.541 Moreover, through their own radio show the National Guard
sought not only to provide entertainment but to remain engaged with communities
hosting guard units. The P.R.N.G. also appointed godmothers and honorary officers in
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Francisco Collazo, Acting Commissioner of Education congratulated the
Adjutant General of the National Guard for conducting a 3-day institute on
industrialization on June 1950. Another letter from the mayor of Aguadilla lauded the
participation of the Puerto Rico National Guard Military Band (“Banda del Ejército
Nacional) on the city’s Saint Patron’s Festivities in 1949. See Headquarter Puerto Rico
National Guard, Office of the Adjutant General, Annual Report 1949-50 (San Juan, P.R.:
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these communities seeking to create a sense of belonging.542 The military was in fact
busy with community and state building projects as it continued to take on civilian roles
to fill the vacuum of non-existent civilian structures. This added another dimension to
the role of the military in the Island- beyond providing economic relief by direct and
indirect employment and beyond its character and nation building role as proposed by
local and Continental leaders. In many areas the military in the Island had taken a
leadership role in the effort to reconstruct Puerto Rico. Unsurprisingly many of the
officers of the National Guard also worked for the relief and reconstruction agencies in
the Island. Furthermore, many of the enlisted men and officers had trained or were
training to fill the needs of the coming insular industrial revolution.543
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On April 46, the State Guard helped the Ponce High School celebrate its Field
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A good example of the overlapping military-civilian roles of the Puerto Rican
soldier is Miguel A. Muñoz, the director of the Veterans Administration in the Island
during this period. He was a Colonel in the National Guard who served as executive
officer (XO) of the 295th Regiment (P.R.N.G.), as a captain in Camp Las Casas during
the WWI, as commander of the “Porto Rico American Legion” and vice-commander of
the National American Legion. He had been the personal secretary of Governor Yager in
1914. After he publicly criticized the tactics of the Insular Police during the Ponce
Massacre of March 21, 1937 he had been under pressure from Governor Winship to
resign his commission. See, El Imparcial de Puerto Rico: Periódico Ilustrado, 1 April
1937, clip, in Report to Chief National Guard Bureau, April 27 1937, Extract from 65th
Infantry Report April 14 1937, Col. F.H. Lincoln, General Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, C.I.H.P.C., Caja 19, Cartapacio 2, Documento 11 H. Another example is Colonel
Juan C. Cordero-Dávila who served with the 65th Infantry during WWII and after the war
commanded the 296th Regimental Combat Team of the P.R.N.G. Cordero-Davila, who
would eventually lead the 65th during the Korean War, was also the director of the Puerto
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With the help of Tugwell, Muñoz Marín and the Populares had been able to plant
the seeds of socio-economic change during the war years and the early postwar period.
However, political advancement had been limited by an intractable Congress and by the
most militant pro-independence wing within the PPD. The PPD won the elections of
November 1944 in a landslide, even after bitter accusations between Muñoz Marín and
the Independentistas in the PPD were made public.544 The Independentistas had wanted
the total rejection of the Governor Bill and a compromise to celebrate a referendum to
vote for independence a month after the general elections of 1944. Once again, Muñoz
Marín ran the PPD’s campaign on the basis of social and economic reform, allegiance to
the war effort, and assurances that a vote for the Populares was not a vote for
independence. The platform of the PPD, however, made clear the intention of the
Populares to submit to the direct decision of the Puerto Ricans, “not later than the

Rican Housing Authority. This government agency built low-income houses as part of
the ongoing reconstruction effort. See, Gilberto N. Villahermosa, Honor and Fidelity:
The 65th Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center for
Military History, 2009), 188-89. During the post-war years veterans were among those in
the best position to buy new houses, some of which first came in the form of Housing
Projects or caseríos. By 1948 the Insular Housing Authority had built a caserío for 132
veterans and their families in San Juan. The V.A. estimated that of all new housing,
veterans were receiving between 10 and 15%. See Memorandum, Muñoz to Muñoz
Marín, 1948. The strength of the State Guard (an auxiliary corps to the National Guard
activated during WWII) as of June 30, 1946 shows 131 officers and 1,234 enlisted. They
included, 145 graduates from college, twenty-one engineers, six lawyers, twenty-nine
physicians, sixty-eight teachers, eleven accountants, seventeen minor surgeons, and
twenty-five dentists. See Report on the Puerto Rico State Guard, for the Year 1945-46.
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Of 591,978 votes the PPD obtained 383,280. Partido Unión Republicana
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moment when the world peace is structured, the question of the final political status
desired by the people of Puerto Rico.”545 Muñoz Marín, who followed the war closely,
probably thought, as many did, that the war would be over before Christmas that year.
Thus, the PPD platform of 1944 was a repetition of that of 1940 with an emphasis on
ending the colonial regime, as soon as the fighting was over, via a referendum in which
all the political sectors had a chance to promote their status preference.
On January 10, 1945 Tydings presented yet another Independence Bill, identical
to the one introduced in 1943. During the public hearings held during March 5-8 of that
year, the position of the different groups with interests in Puerto Rico remained the same
as in 1943. U.S Navy Captain G.B. Parks, representing the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, officially declared that “from the viewpoint of national security Puerto Rico
is of great strategic value as a site for naval operating base,” and that after the war the
facilities in the Island were to be used to locate the “Task Force in charge of defending
the Caribbean to deny the approach of any threat from east or south.”546 For that reason,
the Navy was “opposed to any bill for Puerto Rico independence that does not provide
for the retention of the naval and military reservations, and does not also provide for the
right of expansion and the selection of new sites at any time in the future.”547 The armed
forces’ position clearly indicated that the military leaders planed to continue using Puerto
545
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Rico to project U.S. power over the Caribbean Basin after the war ended- and that they
wanted a free hand with regard to expanding their foot print in Puerto Rico.
The death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 brought an inexperienced and
uninformed Harry S. Truman to the presidency of the United States. This event could
have not been more relevant.548 Truman was willing to support self-government for the
Island- a position that FDR had abandoned. He also made clear to Tugwell that he was
against independence for Puerto Rico. In an attempt to secure a fair referendum, Tugwell
tried to convince Truman that “if there is a plebiscite, neither of us should say so in a way
to influence Puerto Rican’s choice,” and Truman agreed that he thought the Puerto
Ricans “should have the right to make even a disastrous choice.”549 Unbeknownst to
Truman, he was, in fact, reversing his predecessor’s policy. However, without outright
support from the president there was little chance of convincing congress to grant
independence to the Island.
As it had been the case in 1943, Muñoz Marín could not support the
Independence Bill of 1945. He wanted economic guarantees and a chance for the Puerto
Ricans to vote on status options. Moreover, these options should be guaranteed by
Congress. Muñoz Marín was still operating under the assumption that once the war was
over the sacrifices made by Puerto Rico and its loyalty towards the Allies’cause would be
548

When Truman became President, he was unaware of the abandonment of the
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rewarded with a referendum sponsored by Congress to find a formula to decolonize the
Island.550 The Department of the Interior had come to believe that the Puerto Rico
should not sever its ties with the United States but that home rule was a must. Ironically,
the position held by Muñoz Marín, who was already recognized by the U.S. government
as the most influential and popular leader in Puerto Rico, strengthen the Interior’s
opinion.551
On October 16, 1945, in a special message to Congress on Puerto Rico, Truman
declared that it was the policy of his administration to promote the political, social and
economic development of people who have not yet attained full self-government, “and
eventually to make it possible for them to determine their own form of government.”552
Truman went further and emphasized that it was time to “ascertain from the people of
Puerto Rico their wishes as to the ultimate status which they prefer within such limits as
may be determined by the Congress,” with the end of granting Puerto Ricans the kind of
government which they desire.553 Truman probably did not intend to curtail the right of
Puerto Ricans to choose their status, but he was concerned that they might vote for a
formula that Congress was not ready to support. Such occurrence would undoubtedly
550
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have diplomatic repercussions for the United States at a moment when it was trying to
assert itself as the leader of the free world. Therefore, Truman suggested that Congress
consider four different possibilities: “(1) the right of the Puerto Ricans to elect their own
Governor with a wider measure of local self-government; (2) Statehood for Puerto Rico;
(3) complete independence; and (4) a Dominion form of government [similar to the
political arrangement between Canada and the United Kingdom].”554 Congress, which
was not interested at all in a referendum, did not even hold public hearings for the new
Tidings- Piñero bill.555
Cornered by the Independentistas in the PPD, by another American President that
did not support the independence of Puerto Rico, by a Congress that would not give
Puerto Rico an independence that the Island could survive, and compelled by the loyalty
he felt towards his constituency, which had elected him on the premise that a vote for the
PPD was not a vote for independence, and aware of the Island’s growing dependency on
federal funds- including veterans’ benefits, Muñoz Marín began to turn decidedly
towards autonomismo. In 1946, he expelled the Independentistas from the PPD, who
responded by forming that same year the Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño, or
PIP. The third Tydings bill, and its sequel, the Tydings-Piñero bill, had an unexpected
554
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effect. It almost destroyed the PPD, and in the end, it forced its leadership to define the
party’s status preference. Muñoz Marín had come to the conclusion that the U.S. would
not offer enough guarantees to make independence viable nor could he persuade the
people to vote for it. This experience finally moved Muñoz Marín to seek autonomismo,
or a higher degree of self-government, a formula that he knew Truman would support.
The reluctance of Congress to consider a referendum drove Muñoz Marín to
endorse yet another Governor Bill in 1947. This time, Muñoz Marín, expressed his
enthusiasm for the bill in a long cablegram to Congress.556 The PPD immediately
mobilized in favor of the bill. Piñero, whom Truman had appointed as governor of
Puerto Rico (the first Puerto Rican to serve in such position), and Antonio Fernós Isern,
the new Puerto Rican Resident Commissioner in Washington and member of the
congressional committee studying the bill, hurried to express their support and to educate
the members of the committee on the benefits of approving the bill.
Showing the new, although limited, decolonization spirit of the White House, the
new Secretary of the Interior, J.A. Krug, declared that Article 76 of the United Nations
Charter made the approval of the Governor Bill necessary.557 Krug also convinced the
committee that approving it would send a message to “the nations of the world, and
particularly of South America” that the United States adhered to the principles of
democracy and self-government and had no colonial empire.”558 He also called on
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Congress to commit itself to sponsor a referendum to decide the political status of Puerto
Rico in the near future.559 In his deposition, Piñero followed the anti-colonial line and
emphasized the prestige that this bill would bring to the United States throughout the
world. During the hearings he also promoted a Congress-sponsored referendum and
hinted at the possibility of a third status.560 James A. Beverly, a former governor of the
Island, informed Congress that over 99% of Puerto Ricans were intensely loyal to the
United States (and that their war service was evidence of such loyalty) and that approving
the bill would not affect national defense. Moreover, he also advocated the idea of a
holding a referendum as soon as possible.561
During the hearings before the House a single letter from the Independentistas,
and the personal testimony of Ruth M. Reynolds, Secretary of the American League for
Puerto Rico’s Independence, expressed opposition to the bill. Reynolds argued that
Puerto Rico should be granted independence and that American sovereignty over the
Island was illegal.562 In fact, of the eighty letters and cablegrams included in the records
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Reynolds based her arguments on the provisions of the Autonomic Charter of
1897, a position earlier developed by Dr. Pedro Albizu Campos, leader of the
Nationalists. Title VII , article 43 guaranteed the veto power of the Puerto Rican
parliament over decisions reached by the Cortes of the Kingdom were over a dozen
Puerto Rican delegates seat with both voice and vote. Article 2 declared that the
“present constitution shall not be amended except by virtue of a special law and upon
petition of the insular parliament.” Since the military disbanded the Insular Parliament,
and there were no Puerto Rican delegates present to sign the Treaty of Paris of December
10, the passing of sovereignty over Puerto Rico to the United Sates was a violation of the
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Crawford rebuked Ms. Reynolds and proceeded to discredit her testimony by pointing out
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of Congress, only the one sent by the PIP was against the bill. The rest of the messages,
signed by mayors, senators, independent organizations and common people supported
it.563
Representative Fred L. Crawford, who during the hearings expressed his
preference for Puerto Rican statehood, made clear on the record that he was completely
against independence.
I do not propose to give Puerto Rico its independence. Statehood is a different
proposition, change of political status is a different proposition, but the United
States will either defend Latin America, including Puerto Rico and Santo
Domingo and Haiti and South America or we [the United States] will come under
the domination of some power in Europe.564
Adhering to an end of siècle rationale used to take over Cuba and Puerto Rico
during the Cuban-Pilipino-Spanish American War of 1898, Crawford emphasized that
although he trusted Puerto Ricans, he believed that some European power might attempt
to gain a foothold there from which it could operate against the United States, and
therefore independence for the Island would be a blow against national defense.565
Unlike the Independence Bills’ hearings of 1936 and 1943, in which Senator Tydings
made clear that Congress would never grant statehood to Puerto Rico, in 1947 Congress’
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attitude towards Puerto Rico had shifted considerably to the point that statehood was
actually being considered by members of Congress and the military.566
Undoubtedly, the first consequence of the Cold War was to revive, or more
accurately, to increase the military importance of Puerto Rico, which made independence
unthinkable for Congress. The United States, however, had also emerged from World
War II as the self-proclaimed leader of the free world, a position quickly challenged by
the Soviet Union. The decolonization of Puerto Rico thus assumed more relevance than
ever before, especially with the intense propaganda that characterized the Cold War. The
diplomatic value of decolonizing the Island rivaled its military worth, a point that
politicians on both sides were quickly to realize.
The Governor Bill of 1947 was approved by Congress after the Department of
Interior and the political leaders of the Island went out of their way to establish that its
passage would not curtail the powers of Congress over Puerto Rico.567 This time Muñoz
Marín did not try to obtain from Congress guarantees that it would not make further
changes to the Organic Act except with the consent of the people of Puerto Rico.568 It
was obvious that he had bigger plans for the Island and that he had been gaining support
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of the Interior and powerful Congressmen to find a formula to decolonize Puerto Rico
with a future referendum. In August 5, 1947, President Truman signed the Governor Bill
which became Public Law 382, providing for the election of the governor of Puerto Rico.
The significance in passing the Governor Bill was that the Interior and powerful
Congressmen established without doubt the military and strategic significance of Puerto
Rico, but more importantly, they recognized the diplomatic gains that decolonizing the
Island offered the U.S.
In a visit to Puerto Rico in February 21, 1948, Truman reiterated his commitment
to local self-government, and labeled the nomination of an island-born governor, that of
Jésus T. Piñero, and the elected-Governor Bill, as significant steps toward the increasing
measure of self-government in Puerto Rico. More relevant, perhaps, was the fact that
Truman pointed out that the relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S. was mutually
beneficial and that it was an example to the world of how well the “democratic approach
to the problem of national existence in the modern world” worked. Moreover, Truman
stated that Puerto Rico represented “what the American people are trying to encourage in
the world at large.”569 The president recognized the value of Puerto Rico in global
politics, a point that Puerto Rican politicians did not miss. In 1948, Muñoz Marín
became the first elected governor of Puerto Rico.570 From this office, with firm
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command of the political apparatus and with overwhelming popular support Muñoz
Marín would launch a new offensive to decolonize the socio-economic and political
structures in Puerto Rico. The Puerto Rican veterans and the military units still active in
the Island in many ways would spearhead the new campaign.
When men of the 65th returned home on November 9, 1945, they were received as
heroes by an enthusiastic multitude crowding the streets of San Juan and waving both
Puerto Rican and American flags.571 The Victory Parades did not stop until the spring of
1946 as Puerto Rican units continue to return from overseas deployment.572 In several
speeches Muñoz Marín made clear the reasons for sending Puerto Ricans to join the fight
overseas. The common Puerto Rican, Muñoz Marín argued, was forging democracy
abroad and at home. He did not hesitate to identify who those heroes were; “soldiers and
citizens and Jíbaros…” 573 That the returning Puerto Rican “heroes” wore U.S. Army
uniforms and that they were received by crowds waving the Island’s unofficial flag and
the stars and stripes evidenced the intricate nature of national identities in the Island.
town of San Lorenzo, two senators and a representative at large- positions which were
won by Socialistas and Estadistas. See Bayrón Toro, Elecciones y partidos políticos
puertorriqueños, 210-11. Once Muñoz Marín was elected, it became harder for the
Independentistas to gain support from anti-American factions in Cuba, Brazil and Central
America, and the U.S. was able to shield itself from accusations of colonialism. Tugwell,
The Arts of Politics, 64.
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“Soldado Ocasio, ciudadano Ocasio, jíbaro Ocasio, soldados y ciudadanos y
jibaros en todos los montes de puerto Rico y en todos los frentes y campamentos del
mundo, la esperanza de puerto Rico esta en ustedes.” Luis Muñoz Marín, Discursos,
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During the war, both the metropolis and the local politicians’ projects had in
common their emphasis on creating a modern Puerto Rico. Modernization had meant
political Americanization as understood by some local politicians as early as 1898, and as
late as the 1920s. For the metropolis, however, Americanization was still intrinsic to
modernization, but it also entailed cultural assimilation not just political. Thus the initial
projects of both the metropolis and the criollo elites had presupposed some type of
modernization via Americanization with the meaning and extent of the latter varying
accordingly. These projects were nor completely rejected by the masses but re-imagined
as they went through the metropolitan institutions usually cheered by a cacophony of
modernizing discourses echoed and distorted by the Puerto Rican elites.
Cultural and political assimilation had been at the core of modernization projects
for four decades. During WWII, however, the emphasis was on economic
modernization- first suggested during WWI.574 The socio-economic reconstruction
programs in Puerto Rico have been studied either by over emphasizing a pure economic
or political focus. They center on relief agencies such as the PRERA and PRRA, and
economic strategies like the Plan Chardón, Rex G. Tugwell’s and Muñoz Marín’s
promotion of local industry during WWII, and the subsequent and world famous
Operation Bootstrap (“manos a la obra”) leading to the final industrialization of the
Island. Such narratives have left out the role of tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans
serving in the U.S. military during WWII. Initially they represented an economic boomin the form of new wages and unemployment relief- just by serving in the armed forces.
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Furthermore, as military mobilization advanced, their salaries and benefits came to
eclipse the funds available to both the PRERA and PRRA. However, through their
service they provided more than temporary economic relief.
Unlike WWI veterans, before WWII ended the Puerto Rican soldier could count
on a generous package of benefits designed to ease the soldier’s re-entry into civilian life.
A march towards a “modern” Puerto Rico had started and these soldiers would be leading
such movement. That Luis Muñoz Marín came to depend on the votes of the peasantry
and rural working classes to attain political power and on their military mobilization to
advance the socio-economic restructuration of the Island would eventually force him to
change his personal political goals, first tactically and later definitively. Fittingly,
militarization and enfranchisement of the Puerto Rican masses during WWII coincided
with a growing dependence in the Island on the federal government’s political, legal and
financial intervention.575
Old metropolitan ideas regarding the impact of military training on Puerto Rico’s
social and economic structures resurfaced during the war.576 This was not a new theory.
Immediately after the 1898 invasion and during WWI, military service had been consider
as a builder of character and national identity and as a way to remake the Puerto Ricans
in the Continental’s image. But even in WWI, the metropolis’ nation-building project,
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which heavily relied on modernizing the Puerto Rican via military service, had started to
escape the hands of the metropolitan administrators. History repeated itself during WWII
as the plans of the metropolis- including type, size, and length of mobilization had to
contend with an empowered Puerto Rican senate led by a popular and skillful politician
such as Muñoz Marín. Moreover, Muñoz Marín worked incessantly to make the Puerto
Rican soldier an integral part of the socio-economic restructuring of the Island.
By the end of the war, control of the nation, and now state-building project via
military service was firmly in the Populares’ hands. Thus, while the U.S. military had
envisioned service as a way to build a new Puerto Rican and thus a new Puerto Rico, as
early as 1898- and most certainly during WWI, this project really came to bear fruit when
it was appropriated by Puerto Ricans. Nonetheless, the military in Puerto Rico, be it the
National Guard or the regular Army units, remained part of the United States military and
depended entirely of federal funds to function. This could only allow for a third path as
the Populares continue to employ the military for nation and state building.
The first mobilization of the Puerto Ricans during WWII was more political in
nature than military and it happened in 1940 with the Populares first electoral victory.
The second mobilization of the Puerto Ricans was in fact military as the Island became
an integral part of the U.S. war effort and Puerto Ricans were called to arms. This effort
had strong economic impact in terms of federal monies transferred to Puerto Rico and
unemployment relief. The third mobilization was social in nature as the Puerto Rican
soldiers moved from the fields to classrooms and put to good use the skills learned while
in the military and the benefits to which they were entitled. Thus WWII ended with the
Island moving towards socio-economic restructuration very rapidly and with LMM
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accepting the third way. The fourth mobilization would happen during the Korean War
and would be socio-political in nature, becoming and creating the Estado Libre Asociado.
Korea would become a propaganda war for sponsors of the third way which entailed a
new Puerto Rican for a new Puerto Rico.
It was the Jíbaro who started to convince politicians of the third way, a hybridism
that allowed for a political identity and a cultural one. Muñoz Marín’s change of heart
with regard to independence was thus Jíbaro inspired and popular in nature. Initially a
tactical decision born out of the need of securing the vote of the peasantry and urban
workers which did not see independence as a solution to their everyday problems, the
idea that the “Status no está en issue” became a kind of end in itself as political
decolonization took a backseat and socio-economic decolonization became imperative.
Many have branded this change as a sellout or the cooptation of the people’s will, but in
fact Muñoz Marín was responding to the masses’ needs and will, which at this historical
junction coincided with one of the greatest social reconfigurations in U.S. and Puerto
Rican history. When WWII ended and during the immediate post war years the Island
moved rapidly to achieve the socio-economic change envisioned by Muñoz Marín and
Tugwell. Shying from independence Muñoz Marín had started to adopt the third way, a
place between independence and statehood. The Korean conflict would become a
propaganda war to support such third way which entailed a new Puerto Rican for a new
Puerto Rico.
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CHAPTER 6
FIGHTING FOR THE “NATION”? WAR AT HOME AND ABROAD
AND THE CREATION OF THE ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO
RICO
For fifty-four years we, the Puerto Ricans, have lived under the political tutelage
of our co-citizens of the North. We have assimilated their entrepreneur spirit and
industrial skills; and fed our soul and thoughts with the most sacred of men’s
attributes: their admiration and respect for freedom, justice and equality...
…without adulterating our Hispanic heritage, nor have we soiled it with artificial
trends of Sajonic assimilation: and without relegating our Hispanic culture,
sentiments and traditions, which we conserve pure, like the most precious legacy
of our gallant and noble ancestors.577

During the Second World War and its immediate aftermath, military mobilization
served both as a political bargaining chip and as tool with which to advance Puerto
Rico’s socio-economic restructuring. As discussed in the previous chapter, Luis Muñoz
Marín and the Populares came to rely on the sheer electoral power the masses gave them
to demand and embark on a reform of such grandiose scale. As the military in Puerto
Rico became an essential instrument for political and socio-economic modernization,
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Colonel Juan César Cordero, Commanding Officer, 65th U.S. Army Infantry
Regiment, South Korea, August 13, 1952 in José Norat-Martínez, ed., Historia del
Regimiento 65 de Infantería (San Juan, Puerto Rico: La Milagrosa, 1960), 84-85. The
author considers Norat-Martinez’ work as a primary source since it is a collection of
news and documents from the regiment’s historical office and the local press presented in
chronological order. The quoted material from Spanish sources is presented in the
author’s translation to English unless otherwise specified.
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however, the Island shifted closer to the U.S. Not only was Puerto Rico more dependent
than ever on federal transfers to effectively run reconstruction and relief agencies (not to
mention the military), but as shown by the tens of thousands of peasants and urban
workers who became soldiers, there was a growing affinity and acceptance of U.S.
institutions and values throughout the Island- which were then led and ran by Puerto
Ricans. This phenomenon curtailed the ability of Muñoz Marín to move towards
independence, and soon after becoming Puerto Rico’s first elected governor in 1948, he
began to earnestly consider a third option between federated statehood and
independence.578
That third option would eventually be known as the commonwealth formula or
estado libre asociado. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 would not only provide
the opportunity to mobilize tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans and to make them part of
the socio-economic reconstruction of the Island (as their WWII counterparts had been) it
would also provide a space where the Puerto Rican soldier would incarnate the ideals of
the Commonwealth formula. During the Korean War the mobilization of tens of
thousands of Puerto Ricans retained its relevance for the furthering of the political and
socio-economic reconfiguration of the Island. However, the symbolism of such
participation with regard to national identities and the PPD’s project of decolonization,
and thus the acceptance of the Commonwealth formula, was of the outmost relevance
during this period. That the estado libre asociado came into existence in 1952 is well
known. The part played by the Puerto Rican soldiers fighting in Korea to advance this
578

In 1946, Muñoz Marín had expelled the Independentistas from the PPD, who
wanted him to support another independence bill sponsored by Senator Tydings. The
Independentistas responded by forming that same year the Partido Independentista
Puertorriqueño, or PIP. See discussion in previous chapter.
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formula, however, has been almost completely ignored.579 This chapter thus studies the
contribution of the Puerto Rican soldier in the establishment of the Commonwealth in
1952 and in securing its survival.
In his inaugural address of January 20, 1949, President Harry S. Truman made
public to the world that the U.S., as leader of the free world, was bent onto combating the
“false philosophy” of Communism, not just by strengthening its military alliances with
“peace-loving” countries, but by its determination to “work for a world in which all
nations and all peoples are free to govern themselves as they see fit, and to achieve a
decent and satisfying life.”580 He emphasized that the U.S. sought no territory, that “we
have imposed our will on none”, and that “the old imperialism-exploitation for foreign
profit-has no place in our plans.”581 Moreover, the U.S. was to embark on a new plan to
make available its technology and expertise, as well as its capital, to the underdeveloped
world. This policy, known as Point Four, was a global version of the Good Neighbor
policy. Truman believed that to defeat Communism, the U.S. had to convince the world
that it did not intend to create a world empire, nor did it want to possess colonies.
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Few works hint at the connection between service in Korea and promoting the
commonwealth formula. See Silvia Álvarez Curbelo, “La bandera en la colina: Luis
Muñoz Marín en los tiempos de la guerra de Corea”, 1-17, in Fernando Picó, ed., Luis
Muñoz Marín, perfiles de su gobernación, 1948-1964 (San Juan, P.R.: Fundación Luis
Muñoz Marín, 2003), and Harry Franqui-Rivera, Glory and Shame: The Ordeal of the
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Accordingly, decolonizing Puerto Rico became a priority for his administration.
On March 13 1950 the new Puerto Rican Resident Commissioner in Washington
D.C., and PPD ideologue, Antonio Fernós Isern, inspired by Truman’s Point Four,
introduced a bill on the House (H.R. 7674) to provide for the organization of a
constitutional government in Puerto Rico. Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney, then Chair of
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, introduced the bill on the Senate (S.3336)
that same day. In a statement before a joint Senate and House committee, Muñoz Marín
declared that approving these bills would be of great value to the United States “which is
constantly accused by the Latin American countries and the Communists of running a
colonial system.”582 Unlike his remarks regarding previous bills, Muñoz Marín’s
statements, though linking the situation of the Island to the greater fight against
Communism and colonialism, were not adversarial. In fact, after Truman’s inaugural
speech, Muñoz Marín had offered to make of Puerto Rico a world showcase of Truman’s
Point Four.583 The gesture was reciprocated. The atmosphere during these hearings was
congenial, at least between the Populares and the members of Congress.
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By July 1950, the Island had received over 10,000 professionals, government
officials, academic, journalists, and students under the Point Four training program
institutionalized by the Puerto Rican legislature, with the support of Truman and the
Interior Department. See Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 285-86; and
“Luis Muñoz Marín Y Rafael Leónidas Trujillo: Una pugna caribeña (1941-1961)”, 41,
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Most of the Congressman agreed with Muñoz Marín’s views, and one even
pointed out the positive effect that a recent visit to Haiti by elected Puerto Rican officials
had had on their Haitian counterparts.584 Moreover, members of Congress noted that
passing this bill could only “elevate our position before the United Nations”, especially
since the United States was a signatory to the United Nations charter and therefore had to
adhere to the calling for self-government which it included.585 Others emphasized that its
adoption would advance the “defense of democracy in the eyes of the world, and
especially with our fellow Americans south of Rio Grande.”586 Although the
Independentistas tried to call into question the legitimacy of the legislation and of Muñoz
Marín’s government, Congress gave its blessing to the Senate version of the bill. On
July 30, 1950 President Truman signed the Congress Act of July 3 (S. 3336), into Public
Law 600 giving the Puerto Ricans the right to write their own constitution and to
establish a relationship with the U.S. in the nature of a compact. P.L. 600 authorized the
people of Puerto Rico to organize a republican form of government pursuant to a
constitution of their own choosing. That act, adopted by Congress, would become
effective only when accepted by the people of Puerto Rico in a referendum. As these
hearings were coming to an end, congressmen exhorted Inés Mendoza (Muñoz Marin’s
second wife) to address the audience. She declared: “this growing solidarity [between
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the U.S. and P.R.] will be paid back to the U.S. someday.”587 Her words could have not
been more prophetic. Soon los hijos de este país would be fighting in the hills of Korea
alongside the United Nations and against each other in the hills and towns of Puerto
Rico.588
A referendum was set for June 4, 1951 in which the Puerto Ricans would cast a
vote to “accept” or “reject” the provisions of P.L. 600. Muñoz Marín and the Populares
enjoyed broad popular support. Having overwhelmed all the other political parties and
alliances during the general elections of 1948 they were firmly in control of the political
apparatus in Puerto Rico.589 Acceptance of P.L. 600 in the coming referendum was
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Inés Mendoza Rivera was born on January 10, 1908 in Yabucoa. She was the
daughter of an illiterate worker who “had worked himself into economic security.” She
earned a teaching certificate by age seventeen and a degree from the University of Puerto
Rico four years later. Because of her testimony denouncing the Ponce Massacre she was
removed from her teaching position. She was known as a nationalist school teacher
when she met Muñoz Marín in 1938. In fact she had recently broken with the
Nationalists after she “heard Albizu comment to his wife Laura that it was necessary “to
kill Americans.” Persecuted by the pro-American parties – which won the 1936
elections- and who intended to eradicate “independentismo” from Puerto Rico’s schools,
she had been sacked from her teaching position and sought Muñoz Marín’s aid. They
quickly became romantically involved. Though living together for almost ten years, they
had to wait until 1946 to marry because of Muñoz Marín’s first wife, Muna Lee would
not grant him a divorce. See Maldonado, Puerto Rico’s Democratic Revolution, 159-167.
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Of 640,714 votes cast the PPD obtained 392,386, the Independentistas, 65,351;
the Estadistas (former Republicanos) 89,441; and the Socialistas 64,396. The former
Liberales under the name of Reformistas obtained 29,140. Estadistas, Liberales and
Socialistas formed another coalition. The PPD won all offices and municipalities but the
town of San Lorenzo, two senators and a representative at large- positions which were
won by Socialistas and Estadistas. See Bayrón Toro, Elecciones y partidos políticos
puertorriqueños, 210-11. Once Muñoz Marín was elected, it became harder for the
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hardly in doubt. This is not to say that there was no opposition. The staunchly proAmerican Estadistas opposed- at least in principle- what they regarded as a perpetuation
of the colonial status and an obstacle to achieve federated statehood. Nonetheless, even
though they had come second in the 1948 elections, the PPD had obtained more than four
times the Estadistas’s votes. The only chance the Estadistas, had was to convince the
voters to reject P.L. 600 and to have a congress-sponsored plebiscite including statehood
and independence as options. The Independentistas were in a similar predicament. They
had obtained even fewer votes than the Estadistas and their efforts to stop passing of P.L.
in Congress were fruitless. They chose to campaign against the acceptance of P.L 600 by
exhorting their members to abstain from voting in the referendum, and if they voted, to
do so against it. However, even when combining their mass appeal with the rest of the
parties opposing the PPD, they were still unable to match the Populares’ strength. In
fact, Independentistas, Estadistas and Socialistas had continued their exodus to the PPD
after 1948. Furthermore, the Socialist Party supported P.L. 600, which made its passing
almost inevitable.
The traditional parties were just too weak to stop the PPD by peaceful means.
The Nacionalistas, however, had long ago shunned the electoral process as a means to
obtain their goals. A violent confrontation pitting the nationalists’ Ejército Libertador
and the Puerto Rico National Guard and Insular Police was about to shock the Island.590

Independentistas to gain support from anti-U.S. factions in Cuba, Brazil and Central
America, and the U.S. was able to shield itself from accusations of colonialism. See
Tugwell, The Arts of Politics, 64.
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A balance account of the public confrontation, mostly through discourses,
radio speeches and commentaries to the press, can be found in Carmelo Rosario Natal,
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Albizu Campos, who had been convicted of sedition and conspiracy to overthrow the
government of the United States in 1937, returned to Puerto Rico from New York City on
December 15, 1947, four years after been released from federal prison on probation.591
He immediately started a campaign to derail the PPD’s projects and ordered the
mobilization of the Ejército Libertador once more. Only a day after his return Albizu
Campos held a press conference and warned the U.S. that after depleting all peaceful
means to obtain independence, the “Nationalist Party would resort to the use of force to
attain its goals.”592 His threats also targeted Muñoz Marín. Albizu Campos declared that
“Muñoz must be stopped and we will stop him.” Muñoz Marín publicly warned Albizu
Campos to abstain from violence. Albizu Campos resorted to question Muñoz Marín’s
Puertorriqueñidad while demanding that the Puerto Ricans abstain from voting in the
1948 general elections. He also condemned the teaching of English language in Puerto
Rico, declared that “every person serving in the Selective Service Boards should be
shot”, and commanded the Nacionalistas to start arming themselves with “revolvers,

“Muñoz y Albizu: el choque en la víspera de la insurreción”, 309-341, in Picó, Luis
Muñoz Marín, perfiles de su gobernación.
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other seven Nationalist leaders were arrested and charged with sedition and conspiracy to
overthrow the government of the United States The next month, a Federal Grand Jury
submitted accusations against Albizu Campos and other leaders of the party.
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rifles, guns, shotguns, knives and daggers to defend the cause of the Revolution.”593
Despite Muñoz Marín’s warnings Albizu Campos’s diatribe continued unabated. On
September 23, 1950, during the anniversary of the Lares Revolt of 1868, he addressed the
crowd gathered in Lares’ Plaza Pública and spoke against P.L. 600 and the participation
of Puerto Rican soldiers in the Korean War. He ended his speech by calling the Puerto
Ricans to defy the U.S. and its colonial pawns in the same way that “the men of Lares
defied despotism, with revolution!”594
That the Nacionalistas were planning a coup or insurrection was hardly a secret.
Emboldened by the apparent inaction of the insular government, Albizu Campos
continued his call to arms against the U.S. and its representatives in the Island- Muñoz
Marín, the Populares, and anyone who served, worked, or were in any way related to the
metropolis. In his speeches, Albizu Campos defied the hated Gag Law of 1948, which
prohibited planning or promoting by any means the overthrowing of the Island’s
government by violent means.595 On October 27 1950, the Insular Police detained one of
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The Insular legislature wrote Law 53 (better known as Ley de la Mordaza or
Gag Law) and on June 10 1948, Jesus T. Piñero, as appointed governor of the Island,
signed it into law. The Gag Law declared a felony to persuade people or to plead for
overthrowing the Island’s government by violence or force. Printing or publishing any
material encouraging people to engage on such activities and creating any kind of
organization to carry out any of these acts became felonies under this law. The law,
which was derogated in 1957, closely resembled the U.S. Alien Registration Act (also
known as the Smith Act) passed by Congress on 29 June, 1940. This act made it illegal
for anyone in the United States to advocate, abet, or teach the desirability of
overthrowing the government. The law also required all alien residents in the United
States over fourteen years of age to file a comprehensive statement of their personal and
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the cars of Albizu Campos’ motorcade and found explosives, weapons, and ammunition
in the car’s trunk.596 Throughout the Island the Nacionalistas rushed to hide their
weapons, and the chaos led to a gunfight with the Insular Police. After this second event,
the Police started a series of raids against known Nacionalistas. Albizu Campos
immediately ordered the Ejército Libertador to launch a general attack against the Insular
Police, political leaders and elected officials at midday on October 30.
The insurrection actually begun on October 28 as the Nacionalistas helped some
112 inmates to flee from the Insular Penitentiary. For a long time thought as a diversion,
the mass escape was in fact design to secure additional manpower and weapons for the
insurrection. The leader of the inmates who escaped that day, Pedro Benejam Alvarez,
who was in jail for stealing military weapons and ammunition from Camp O’Reilly, had
promised the Nacionalistas to hand over the stolen weapons in exchange for his freedom
in the Republic of Puerto Rico.597 After the plans of the insurrection had to be
accelerated because of the events of October 27, the Nationalists helped Benejam Alvarez

occupational status and a record of their political beliefs. Within four months a total of
4,741,971 aliens had been registered. The American Communist Party and other leftwing groups in the mainland were the main targets of this legislation. On May 1948, the
Insular Police established the Internal Security Unit, which worked closely with the local
FBI unit to keep the Nacionalistas, Communists and Independentistas under surveillance.
See Díaz Soler, Puerto Rico: Sus luchas por alcanzar estabilidad económica, definición
política y afirmación cultural, 319-323.
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597

According to Nationalist Anibal Torres, and other participants interviewed by
Seijo Bruno, Albizu Campos himself ordered the riot. The Nacionalistas had contacted
at least one of the guards and several inmate leaders who promised weapons and 1,000
men to join the insurrection. See Seijo Bruno, La insurreción nacionalista, 83-87.
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and others to escape. The mass escape served in fact as a diversion as it kept the Insular
Police occupied, but it also alerted them of the impending battle.
As ordered by Albizu Campos the Nationalists launched their attack on October
30 on what is known as the Grito de Jayuya. The revolt became a series of gunfights
between Nacionalistas and the police in the cities of Ponce, Arecibo, Mayagüez, the town
of Naranjito, and a more concerted attack in San Juan- including the attempted
assassination of Muñoz Marín in La Fortaleza (the governor’s house).598 Albizu Campos
designated the town of Utuado as the rendezvous point for all Nacionalistas to converge.
He chose Utuado as the Nationalists’ main line of resistance believing its geographical
location and the area’s topography would allow the Ejército Libertador to resist for at
least a month. In that time they expected to gain enough international attention and
support as to force the General Assembly of the United Nations to intercede in their
favor.599 The local Nationalists attempted to take the town, but after a firefight with the
Insular Police, they had to take refuge in a few houses. Aided by the National Guard, the
Insular Police quickly overwhelmed the Nationalists in Utuado during the night of
October 30.600
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Ibid., 53-59. Nationalists claimed that the National Guard summarily executed
prisoners in Utuado where five Nationalists, a guardsmen and policeman died, as well as
a civilian and a fireman. However, the account of how a groups of unarmed
Nacionalistas who had just surrendered and were subsequently fired upon, are
contradictory. The testimony of some of the Nacionalistas who survived the shooting
and several townspeople, points to the Nationalists been killed and wounded (as well as
the National Guardsmen escorting them) after soldiers manning a picket sometime after
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The Nacionalistas were able to take and briefly hold the central mountain town of
Jayuya. They proceeded to burn the Insular Police station, the United States Postal
Service building, and the equipment and records found in the Selective Service offices.
Just like the other Nationalist cells, they were supposed to make their way to Utuado but
lack of vehicles, disorganization and the prompt mobilization of the National Guard
prevented them from doing so. During that first day Blanca Canales, (one of the few
women involved in the insurrection) atop a hotel, proclaimed the Republic of Puerto
Rico. But in fact the Nacionalistas in Jayuya were trapped, and the revolt was coming to
a quick end. The Air National Guard bombed and strafed the town as a National Guard
infantry company surrounded it. Those Nacionalistas who were able to escape the
encirclement fled to the hills. With the National Guard in close pursuit, and alerted that
their leader had surrender in San Juan, the remaining Nacionalistas came down the
mountains to surrender on November 2, 1950.601
The battle in Puerto Rico was over. By no means had it been bloodless. Eighteen
Nacionalistas had been killed and eleven wounded. Seven policemen and a Guardsman
were killed while twenty-one police officers and eleven soldiers were wounded. A
fireman and two civilians also died during the gunfights.602 After his arrest, still defiant
and inexplicably jubilant, Albizu Campos declared that the “nation was undergoing a

midnight line saw the approaching column, panicked and fired on both the soldiers and
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283

glorious transfiguration.”603 Muñoz Marín instead talked of the “tragic and useless death
of 31 Puerto Ricans.” He was quick to link the revolt to the “island’s Communists” who
had joined Albizu Campos and his diehard followers. He warned the Nacionalistas that:
"A government founded on votes cannot be destroyed."604 It is obvious that Muñoz
Marín sought to link the revolt to what was perceived as the biggest enemies of western
democracies; fascism and communism.
The revolt also had an extra-insular chapter. On November 1, 1950 Nacionalistas
Oscar Collazo and Griselio Torresola, attempted to assassinate President Truman in front
of the Blair House in Washington. Torresola was killed in the attempt, and Collazo was
seriously wounded and captured. Pvt. Leslie Coffelt, a White House guard, was shot and
killed by the assailants. Two other White House guards were wounded during the
gunfight. During a press conference the next day, shrugging off the attacks and
lamenting the unnecessary loss of life, President Truman reaffirmed his commitment to
support the right of Puerto Ricans to write their own constitution.605
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Governor Muñoz Marín passed his first test with flying colors as he quickly
suppressed the revolt and succeeded in discrediting the Nationalists, especially after the
assassination attempt on the president. Furthermore, the local and continental press
presented the insurrections as a local affair. Even though martial law was declaredwhich entitled the White House and the continental U.S. Army troops in the Island and
the Caribbean region to have a more prominent role in containing the insurrectionMuñoz Marín and the colonial administration made sure that only the Insular Police and
the Puerto Rico National Guard participated in the affair. The commander of the U.S.
Army units in Puerto Rico and the Antilles, Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, turned his
units’ ammunition over to the National Guard during the insurrection, but did not provide
aid in any other way606
The insurrection was in fact a Puerto Rican affair. All of those involved, and all
the dead and wounded were Puerto Ricans commanded by Puerto Ricans. But besides
the obvious nationality of the participants, the revolt was a Puerto Rican affair in the
sense that it was the Nacionalistas’ last ditch effort to stop P.L. 600. They had hoped to
bring the international community on their side but succeeded in doing the opposite. The
revolt was suppressed quickly and with almost the same number of casualties on both
sides (which showed restraint by the local authorities from abusing their power as they
had overwhelming superiority and could have inflicted significantly more casualties on
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the Nacionalistas).607

The outcome of the revolt served to prove the viability of a

Puerto Rican autonomous state and to discredit those who arguing that the Island would
descend into chaos if left in the hands of the Puerto Ricans. Furthermore, locally, the
insurrection made opposing P.L. 600 by peaceful means even more difficult.608 On
November 3, Muñoz Marín made a personal radio call for all women to register for the
coming referendum and the next day for all males.609 Far from blocking P.L. 600 the
Nacionalistas had to deal with the fact that a record 779,695, including 157,393 new
voters, registered themselves to vote in the coming referendum.610 The Nacionalistas’
military wing had been defeated, their leaders imprisoned, and their ideology popularly
rejected.611
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Albizu Campos and several Nacionalistas were charged with violating Law 53,
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There was another battlefield in which Puerto Rican soldiers were engaged. On
June 25, 1950, war had broken out in Korea. The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA)
quickly overran most of the Korean peninsula, forcing South Korean and U.S. forces into
a small perimeter in Pusan.612 The United States was caught unprepared to deal with the
crisis as it had demobilized its huge military after World War II, and was suffering an
acute shortage of manpower.613

Major General Edmond L. Almond, the commander of

X Corps during the Korean War, believed that when war broke out, the U.S. Eighth
Pedro Albizu declared that he was being bombarded with radioactivity in his cell. The
Justice Department argued that he had premature senile dementia. His trial took place
between June 30 and August 5 of 1951. He was sentenced to 12 to 54 years of
confinement. As Albizu Campos continued to complain of radiation a psychiatrist
declared him insane and on September 30, 1953, Muñoz Marín conditionally pardoned
him. The government offer stated that he should pledge to not try to overthrow the
government of Puerto Rico again. He refused the offer but was declared mentally
incompetent and set free nonetheless. A year later he would again be sent to jail after
Nacionalistas, Lolita Lebrón, Andrés Figueroa Cordero, Rafael Cancel Miranda and
Irving Flores opened fire from the gallery of the House of Representatives in Congress
wounding five congressmen. On November 15, 1964, Albizu was again pardoned by
Muñoz Marín. He died on April 21, 1965. He was buried in the Old San Juan Cemetery.
See Díaz Soler, Puerto Rico, sus luchas por alcanzar estabilidad económica, definición
política y afirmación cultural, 338-39; and Negroni, Historia militar de Puerto Rico,
456-57.
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Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, supported North Korea’s
aggression thinking that “it would benefit the geopolitical position of the USSR in the Far
East.” In a gross miscalculation, Stalin believed that the United States would not
intervene. Immediately after the U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel and with Kim IlSung’s regime crumbling, Stalin “dictated a telegram to Mao Zedong [Communist
China’s leader] advising the Chinese to mobilize five or six divisions to the 38th parallel.”
On October 25, 1951, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) launched their first phase
offensive of the Korean War. Intelligence reports, however, disregarded the presence of
large numbers of Chinese soldiers in North Korea until the CCF launched a large scale
offensive on November 25, 1951. Vladimir Zubok, and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside
the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, (Cambridge Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1996), 54, 65.
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Army, the only force the United States had available to thrust into combat, was just 40
percent effective.614 The Eighth Army was not prepared physically or psychologically
for battle in the summer of 1950. 615 This situation would change the role of Puerto Rican
units within the U.S. military.
Racial prejudice had kept Puerto Rican units from seeing combat during WWI
and WWII.616 Major General Luis Raúl Esteves, a Puerto Rican West Pointer and
adjutant general of Puerto Rico’s National Guard, declared in 1951: “I was greatly
discouraged [during WWII] when the blindness of the Federal Military Authorities in
Puerto Rico denied us that opportunity [to fight].” General Esteves thought that the
Puerto Rican regiment in the U.S. Army, the 65th Infantry, was never trusted in combat
because the federal authorities believed that “although the Puerto Ricans were valiant
individuals, they could not be trusted in their collective abilities and valor.”617 This racial
prejudice was part of mainstream tenets which, backed by pseudo science and popular
writings, stated that the inferiority of colored races justified segregation at home and
imperialism abroad- in essence, a dogma for domination and imperialism based on a
racial hierarchy of power. As part of the decolonization project, fighting in this war was
in fact significant. Not just because it was fought under the U.N. flag but because it
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could very well undermine the basis for racial hierarchies of power- the inferiority of
darker races- and prove to the Puerto Ricans themselves that they were not inferior to
Continental Americans (specifically white people) or anybody else.
On July 26, 1948, President Truman signed Executive Order 9981 “calling on the
armed forces to provide equal treatment and opportunity for black servicemen.”618 In
compliance with the executive order, the army reluctantly started to integrate its forces.
Yet, as late as 1950, Puerto Ricans still did not receive any assignments that promised
action. As a result, they were not sent either to basic school or to the Army Command
and Staff General Staff College, which trained company and field grade officers in the
fundamentals and principles of higher command.619 The outbreak of the Korean War
would bring a striking change to the mission of the Puerto Rican soldier in the U.S.
military.
A combination of factors convinced the military authorities to use Puerto Rican
units, specifically the 65th Infantry Regiment, as first-line combat troops during the
Korean War. The gravity of the moment was the most important consideration. There
were two reasons why the U.S. Army did not assign the 65th Infantry to supporting roles
during the Korean War as it had during the two world wars. The first was the army’s
lack of manpower. The second was the regiment’s (and the Puerto Rico National
Guard’s) performance during a training exercise, Operation Portrex, held recently off the
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east coast of Puerto Rico and in Vieques Island.620 However, had there not been such an
acute shortage of military personnel, Puerto Rican units might have had to fulfill the
same supporting roles they had carried out in the previous wars.
In Puerto Rico, the National Guard was activated; the 65th was mobilized, secretly
ordered and embarked to Korea. The Island’s participation in the Korean War was more
significant than in previous wars since Puerto Ricans were entering this conflict very
early, and they were going in as first-line combat troops. Puerto Rican military officers,
and many soldiers, saw the war as an opportunity to prove they were as good as or better
than their Continental counterparts, and thus their participation became a fight for
equality at the most personal level. For political leaders in Puerto Rico, the outbreak of
the Korean War gave them an opportunity to prove that their people were ready for selfdetermination, that they had learned the ways of democracy and freedom, and were ready
to fight in defense of what was popularly promoted as America’s values. In a sense,
military service would prove that Puerto Ricans were politically mature according to the
parameters of the Western world.621 Consequently, the political leadership in Puerto
Rico, regardless of partisan affiliation, actively supported the participation of tens of
thousands of Puerto Ricans in the conflict.
620

This exercise convinced the army that the 65th was battle worthy. Operation
Portrex took place on Vieques Island, off the east coast of Puerto Rico, in late February
1950. It was the largest joint amphibious-airborne exercise to that date. During this
exercise, the 65th played the role of “Aggressor.” Its mission was to defend the Island
against the liberating forces of the U.S. Army 3rd Infantry Division (reinforced), plus a
battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division. To everyone’s surprise by the end of the exercise
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621

See discussion in Chapter 2.
290

Local leaders in Puerto Rico thought the war might also accelerate the
decolonization process. After all, the development of the political status of the Island and
the role of Puerto Rico’s participation in the U. S. military had followed parallel paths.
Moreover, P.L. 600, signed into law on July 30, called for Puerto Ricans to write their
own constitution through a constitutional convention, and that document was to define
both the status of the Island, and its relation to the United States. The coming of the
Korean War intensified the struggle between the political parties in Puerto Rico, which
sought to promote their respective visions for the political development of the Island.
Every legitimate political party had reasons to believe that supporting the war effort
would promote their particular goals. Consequently, all political factions, except the
Nationalists, supported the war effort.
Both the Estadistas and the Socialistas, who continued to propose ending the
colonial regime through the full incorporation of Puerto Rico into the Union, supported
participation in the war. The leadership of these parties saw in the Korean War the
opportunity to prove, not only to Americans but to Puerto Ricans themselves, that Puerto
Rico was ready to join the United States on equal terms. The rationale was that Puerto
Ricans had learned the American ways and were willing to do their share for the Union,
even if that meant dying in defense of the nation. On the other hand, the
Independentistas supported the war, because its leaders hoped to prove that if Puerto Rico
became independent, it would not turn anti-American or Communist. Just like their
ideological antagonists, the leaders of the pro-independence movement also sought to
demonstrate that Puerto Rico was politically responsible and mature. Ironically, the
champions of independence and the advocates of annexation pursued a common strategy
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promoting their respective political goals through participation in the Korean War. The
Nacionalistas orchestrated the only opposition to military participation. But after their
insurrection and the attempt to assassinate President Truman failed, Muñoz Marín
succeeded in discrediting their movement.622 Consequently, the only voice opposing
Puerto Rico’s cooperation with the U.S. military was silenced, and disgraced by its own
deeds.
The Populares had more reasons than anybody else to support Puerto Rican
participation in the war. The military mobilization of tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans
during WWII had provided economic relief and the means to launch the most
comprehensive socio-economic restructuring in the Island’s history, and with local
manpower and know-how. WWII and military mobilization had in fact allowed the
Populares to keep their promises of social justice. Mobilizing the Puerto Ricans again
carried the implicit promise that another generation of veterans could receive all the
opportunities and benefits to which the WWII veterans were entitled, and use those
benefits to join in the socio-economic restructuring of the Island. For the Populares,
however, who had moved to support a third way (the commonwealth), participating in the
war also provided a battleground to test the viability of the new political status and
promote its main discourse with regard to political and cultural identities. Korea would
be the arena where Puerto Ricans would show that Anglo-Saxon and Hispanic cultures
(identified by the press and politicians as the two great cultures of the hemisphere) could
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coexist, not just in one place, but in one body.623 Thus, throughout the war the PPD
would vigorously call the Puerto Ricans to arms and use every opportunity to link the war
effort with their own decolonization project, the socio-economic restructuring of the
Island and the making of a new Puerto Rican for a modern Puerto Rico.
Support for the war effort and the call to send Puerto Ricans to Korea started soon
after the outbreak of hostilities. In early August 1950, Fernós Isern, serving as Puerto
Rico’s resident commissioner, declared in Washington that the Island was ready to field
an army of 75,000 men to join the forces of the United Nations.624 Fernós Isern believed
that if Washington asked for this volunteer force, the quota would be easily filled.
Although Fernós Isern probably considered the economic situation in Puerto Rico when
he calculated such a high number of volunteers, he did not mention it in his declarations.
Instead, he stressed the patriotism of Puerto Ricans, asserting they would not fail to come
to the defense of democracy and the nation.625
Ordered to prepare the Puerto Rican 65th Infantry Regiment for duty in Korea, the
commanding officer, Colonel William W. Harris, asked permission to recruit about 2,000
volunteers to bring the regiment to 10 percent above war strength. The Pentagon agreed,
and Harris proceeded to solicit recruits over the radio and through the local press. At
first, Harris doubted he could collect all the men he needed but he soon was surprised to
623
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find the streets and sidewalks leading to the recruiting and induction center at Fort
Buchanan jammed with men waiting to get in. In his memoirs, Harris stated, “We could
have recruited fifty thousand if we needed that many. We literally turned them away in
droves after we reached our quota.”626 The fact that Governor Muñoz Marín publicly
exhorted Puerto Rican youth to respond to the call of the 65th and to defend other
peoples’ right to democracy because it was “our privilege... …as our people has
developed one of the best democracies in the world…” surely helped fill the ranks.627
Any doubts Puerto Ricans may have had about joining the U. S. military were
eased by the stance of the Island’s political parties. The Puerto Rican press echoed the
call to arms. It might have done an even better job than the political leadership in linking
participation in the U.S. military with decolonizing the Island. Even as late as 1950, the
press ran editorials in which the autonomous period of 1897 to 1898 stood as the
minimum standard to which Puerto Rico should aspire. Moreover, the press called for a
greater degree of autonomy, which was to be accomplished by allowing Puerto Ricans to
draft their own constitution.628 Waxing nostalgia for the Island’s brief taste of autonomy,
a journalist wrote: "Under the Autonomic Charter of 1897 we enjoyed a relative
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sovereign life, until it was brusquely replaced by an intractable military regime as a
consequence of the war of 1898."629 These calls for more autonomy appeared beside
articles lauding the 65th Infantry (nicknamed the Borinqueneers in an English
transliteration of Borinqueños), and citing the regiment as a possible catalyst in forging a
new national identity.630 Moreover, these editorials ran alongside commentaries praising
Muñoz Marín and Fernós Isern for their commitment to earn the right for the Puerto
Ricans to write their own constitution.631
The rationale behind these articles was that the Borinqueneers’ commitment to
Korea as first-line troops “will help Puerto Ricans to come out of their complexes of
insularism, and erase the marks of inferiority, which are the byproduct of hundreds of
years of colonial type regimes."632 This statement adds another factor to explaining why
support for military service, especially combat duty, was so widespread. Fighting
alongside U.S. and United Nation soldiers could help to prove, not only to Continental
Americans but also to Puerto Ricans themselves, that they were the equals of their cocitizens from the mainland. Thus both the press and the political leadership thought it
necessary to convince the people of Puerto Rico that they were ready to decide their own
future.
On October 12, 1950, Puerto Rico learned that the 65th was fighting in Korea.
Once the news got out, the day came to resemble a holiday more than anything else. The
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Island’s newspapers were full of stories, pictures of the 65th, and the ceremonies held
previous to their departure. The private sector joined the chorus with paid advertisements
wishing the 65th a prompt return, and exhorting Puerto Rican soldiers to uphold the ideals
of democracy and freedom. In both leading newspapers, El Mundo and El Imparcial, the
tone was the same. The latter proclaimed, “As it was yet another symbol of the United
Nations, under the American flag flies the flag of the 65th Infantry Regiment, this flag
flies today in Korea.”633 The colors of the 65th came to represent not only the regiment,
but Puerto Rico, “fighting alongside the peace-loving nations of the world.” 634
Muñoz Marín, told the departing soldiers in a farewell speech published two
months later in the press, that their fight was one for freedom and democracy. He
stressed that they were not fighting for a clichéd democracy but for a democracy that
entailed a fight against “scarcity of economic means; scarcity of knowledge; scarcity of
wisdom…’635 Governor Muñoz Marín had lost no time in linking participation in the
war to the Populares’ platform which ever more openly prioritize economic freedom and
social justice over political sovereignty. The Island’s media also reminded Puerto Ricans
what they were fighting for. “This regiment (the 65th) goes again overseas in defense of
our Nation’s freedom,” asserted El Imparcial.636 Another editorial in El Mundo stated, “
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It should bring great satisfaction to Puerto Rico that the military authorities in the United
States found the 65th competent and qualified to actively take part in this vital endeavor
that encompass so much for the Christian world.”637 Even before the 65th was mobilized,
the press ran patriotic news and editorials that sought to comfort fathers and mothers
"before the imminent probability that their sons will soon find themselves obliged to
carry on their patriotic duties by participating in the conflict."638 Defense of the Nation,
democracy, and freedom, mixed with patriotism and local pride in the narrative put
forward by the Island’s press. Surrounding this discourse was the call to decolonization
and the creation of the new Puerto Rican.
As political leaders and the press issued a call for fighting in defense of the
Nation, Puerto Ricans responded en masse. On several occasions the military authorities
in Puerto Rico had to announce that they did not need more volunteers. Even when the
war had turned into a bloody stalemate and long lists of casualties appeared almost every
week in the Puerto Rican press, the recruiting stations never lacked volunteers, at least
not until 1953.639 Eventually, over 61,000 Puerto Ricans served in the U.S. Armed

637

Periódico el Mundo (San Juan), 12 October 1950.

638

Ibid., 27 August 1950.

639
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Forces during the Korean War. 43,434 fought in the Korea, most of them with the 65th
Infantry. Of the latter group, 39,591 or roughly 91% were volunteers.640 Although

ninety-four Puerto Ricans became known on the Island and the Department of the Army
decided to integrate the 65th that the number of volunteers declined. During the Battle of
Jackson Heights, which took place between October 25-29, 1952, men from A and F
Companies left the battlefield without permission, and some of them refused to go back
to the fight. The next day, roughly thirty men from C Company also abandoned their
positions. Another damaging incident occurred on the night of November 3-4. While on
a combat mission, the 2nd Platoon, L Company, 3/65, divided into four groups, never
reached its objective, and some of its soldiers refused to follow the platoon leader across
a river. Thirty-nine more men were arrested, because of this incident. On November 23,
1952, a military court found First Lieutenant Juan E. Guzmán guilty of disobedience of
orders and willful disobedience of the command to move his unit into combat. The court
sentenced Guzmán to five years of confinement, total forfeiture of pay, and dismissal
from the armed forces. On April 24, 1953, an army board of review upheld the decision
of the court. The rest of the men were tried in several mass trials between December
1952 and January 1953. They were found guilty of willful disobedience of a superior
officer’s command to return to a forward position, and/or of misbehavior before the
enemy by running away. The sentences ranged between six-month to eleven years of
confinement. The sentences also included total forfeiture of pay and benefits, and
dishonorable discharges. Though the sentences were upheld by a military review in1953,
the Secretary of Defense (under pressure from Puerto Rican groups and the Governor)
later annulled them and the soldiers were returned to duty and assigned to other
regiments. The trials led to the integration of the 65th with Continental troops- a policy
much resisted in the Island. For a detailed account of the events leading to the court
martial and of the trials themselves see, Harry Franqui-Rivera, “Hold to the Last Man,”
62-89, “The Last of the Borinqueneers,”90-118, “Separate and Unequal,” 120-153 in
Franqui-Rivera, Glory and Shame: The Ordeal of the Puerto Rican 65th U.S. Infantry
Regiment During the Korean War.
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Puerto Rico’s poor economic situation was partially responsible for a high enrollment
during peacetime, other reasons compelled Puerto Ricans to join and then stay in the U.S.
military. Soldiers killed in action (KIA) received full military burials in Puerto Rico,
some of which the governor attended. The wounded (WIA) were welcomed home as
heroes. Those facts may explain why Puerto Rico sustained a high enlistment ratio,
notwithstanding a high casualty rate among its troops. Those men were praised as heroes
because they died or were maimed defending the Nation.
Puerto Rican leaders, the press, and the common folk continued to show their
support for the war effort, and especially for the 65th’s soldiers throughout the conflict.
On May 21, 1951, scarcely two weeks before the people of Puerto Rico voted to accept
the provisions of P.L.600, roughly 300 hundred veterans of the 65th arrived in San Juan.
This group was the first contingent of Puerto Ricans to finish their tour of duty under the
U.S. Army’s rotation system. They received an extremely warm welcome from both the
leaders and the people of Puerto Rico. The Governor declared the day a national holiday
and hosted a ceremony to honor the returning “heroes and their families.” Even a comic
strip in a local newspaper followed the exploits of the Puerto Rican heroes.641 Avenues
and plazas were named in honor of the regiment, while monuments went up to
commemorate the dead. The coat of arms of the 65th was painted on all the public buses
in the capital, and on the sides of train engines and freight and passenger carts. Groups of
parents collected and sent tons of packages, containing Puerto Rican food, music, letters,
and gifts to the Puerto Rican soldiers. The private sector also showed its support.
Serrallés, Inc., a Puerto Rican distillery, sent a thousand cases of rum. Newspapers sent
641
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free copies to Korea for distribution to the soldiers. Lest the Puerto Rican soldiers in
Korea forget what they were fighting for, Muñoz Marín had his speeches taped and sent
to them.
Some of the farewell messages from soldiers of the 65th embarking for Korea
support Fernós Isern’s presumption that Puerto Ricans would respond patriotically to the
call to arms. “We will fight for our motherland until victory is achieved,” wrote one
departing soldier. “I will fight for the motherland until we secure victory and thus enjoy
eternal peace and democracy,” vowed another Borinqueneer.642 Though at first glance
these statements may read as the usual discourse of soldiers yet to see battle, it would be
wise to consider the deep implications of such comments. First they referred to Puerto
Rico when talking about the motherland (usually patria or madre patria) but to the U.S.
when referring to the Nation. In a very direct way they were actually accepting the
defense the American nation as their duty as Puerto Ricans. Secondly; fighting in the
war, as part of the United States military and the United Nations command, was
perceived as a way to secure democracy and freedom at home, which went along with the
Populares’ new ideology.
That the leading newspapers handpicked the statements that more closely
resembled the developing ideology behind the commonwealth formula is a possibility but
it is more likely that Muñoz Marín and the Populares had started to adopt the views of
the peasants and workers turned soldiers. After all, in his previous three campaigns
Muñoz Marín had to convince his constituents that social justice and not independence
was his party’s priority. Furthermore, the fact that these two newspapers, which more
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often than not were at odds with Muñoz Marín, chose to present this narrative (which
clearly benefitted the Populares’ plans) attests to the growing support for the
commonwealth project.
Puerto Ricans had responded to the call to arms, both by fighting and by
supporting the Island’s fighting men. More important, they had responded to a call to
defend the United States, reaffirming that they considered themselves part of it. But the
call to arms also emphasized the attributes of Puerto Rico and its Anteamerican heritage.
By responding to this call, Puerto Ricans evidenced their complex identities which allow
them to be Puerto Ricans and Americans simultaneously and interchangeably, and to
negotiate and synthesize cultural and political identities. This in fact became the essence
of the Commonwealth formula in its early days. Thus, the Puerto Rican soldiers who
went to fight in Korea, especially with the 65th Infantry, became national icons and the
incarnation and champions of the commonwealth’s philosophical matrix. These soldiers
became an energizing element in the fight for decolonization. Major General, Luis Raúl
Esteves, the adjutant general of Puerto Rico’s National Guard, summarized the
regiment’s initial service in Korea in an open letter to the men of the 65th. He told the
Borinqueneers: “With your conduct in Korea, you are destroying the discrimination that
hurt us so much during the war [World War II]; you are writing a glorious page in our
history . . . Puerto Rico is proud of you.”643
By linking the Korean War and the active participation of the Puerto Rican soldier
to the project of political decolonization, the PPD ensured the acceptance of P.L. 600.
Furthermore, Muñoz Marín soon equated the battles being fought in Korea to those being
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fought at home. On May 28, 1951 he held a ceremony honoring the guardsmen,
policemen, and firemen who fought the nationalist insurrection. Addressing those about
to be awarded medals for their service during the insurrection, Muñoz Marín declared
that just as their brothers in Korea were doing, they had put “their lives between the
assailants of freedom and peace and the people of Puerto Rico.” The Nacionalistas, he
argued, believed that they had the right to “impose their views on the people by violent
means” and could not respect the will of the people as expressed through the electoral
process.644 The Nacionalistas had hoped to derail the referendum and the Populares’
project of decolonization. Ironically, their actions provided the Populares with the
opportunity to link their project to local and global decolonization and democracy.
On June 4, 1951, the people of Puerto Rico voted by a large majority to accept the
provisions of P.L. 600.645 Following the referendum, the Puerto Ricans elected delegates
to a constitutional convention on August 27. The constitutional convention, led by
Fernós Isern, convened in San Juan on September 17, 1951, and concluded its
deliberations on February 6, 1952. The constitution it adopted was submitted to the
people of Puerto Rico in a referendum on March 3, 1952, and was passed by an
644
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overwhelming majority.646 On April 22, 1952, in a special message, Truman
recommended that Congress granted early approval of the constitution drafted by the
convention and argued that such action would be evidence of the United States’
adherence to “the principle of self-determination and its devotion to the ideals of freedom
and democracy.”647 The constitution was approved by Congress on H.J. Res. 430, and
signed into law by the President on July 3, 1952. Upon signing the constitution Truman
reiterated the importance of the event for the free world.648
After the acceptance by the constitutional convention of the conditions of
approval and the issuance of a proclamation by Governor Muñoz Marín, the Constitution
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico became effective on July 25, 1952, exactly fiftyfour years after the American invasion. The date could not have been more symbolic, for
the constitution was supposed to erase all traces of colonialism, including the anniversary
of the Island becoming and American colony. Many Continental politicians thought that
the establishment of the Commonwealth showed that the United States was not only
“disposed to increase the well being of Puerto Rican fellow citizens but was willing to
allow them to define for themselves the relationship they would establish with the federal
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union.”649

Truman remarked that the “American people should take special pride in the

fact that the constitution was the product of the people of Puerto Rico.”650 These
comments are representative of how important it was for the United States to prove its
adherence to the principles of self-determination. Soon afterwards, Muñoz Marín asked
President Truman to stop submitting annual reports on Puerto Rico to the United Nations,
a decision which led the international organization to remove the Island from the list of
non-self-governing territories on November 27, 1953.651 According to both the Puerto
Rican and the U.S. government, the Island had ceased to be a colony, and the U.N. had
certified the end of the United States as a colonial power.
According to its preface, the new constitution was intended to promote the
“coexistence in Puerto Rico of the two great cultures [Anglo-Saxon and Hispanic] of the
American Hemisphere.”652 Puerto Rican soldiers fighting in Korea thought they were
doing just that. A copy of the constitution was sent to Korea before ratification along
with a number of Puerto Rican flags. One soldier commented, “We know and understand
the things we are fighting for, but it is better to have a document of our own, stated in the
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words of our people.” 653

Another Borinqueeneer added, “Now we have two

Constitutions to defend.”654 It is significant that two corporals made these comments in
1952, which means that they were not part of the 65th Infantry’s old guard but volunteers
who joined the army after the war broke out. They enlisted to defend the nation to which
they felt they belonged, but they were also proud of having a document expressing the
will of the Puerto Rican people.
On August 13, 1952, exploding Chinese artillery rounds and the strains of the
Puerto Rican national anthem, La Borinqueña, set the mood as a group of Puerto Rican
soldiers proudly raised their homeland's flag beside the Stars and Stripes on a
mountainous battlefield in South Korea.655 The soldiers commemorated the creation of
the Estado Libre Asociado after half a century of direct U.S. colonial rule. Colonel Juan
César Cordero, the first Puerto Rican commander of the 65th U.S. Infantry Regiment, felt
that all Puerto Ricans in the U.S. military, especially those in his regiment, had
contributed more than their fair share to the creation of the commonwealth. Addressing
the troops in Spanish, Cordero stated: “Today more than ever, we the Puerto Ricans have
motives to feel highly proud of our citizenship. Today we ceased to be group citizens
taken by the hand and led by the rest of our co-citizens from the North.” Cordero told his
men that it was important that they continue to be American citizens, but he also
emphasized that “we too have a constitution that emanates exclusively from our own
will.” He added, lest anybody forget how they had obtained their constitution, “Patiently
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but armed with faith in the great democratic attitudes of our great nation, we hoped for
the day in which, not only we were allowed to enjoy our individual freedom and our
rights as individuals citizens, but also to determine our own destiny.”656 Cordero was
mistaken in one respect. The Puerto Rican soldier had not only waited, he had fought for
such status and became instrumental in the battle for psychological, political, and socioeconomic decolonization. The Puerto Rican soldier advanced the decolonization process
by proving to Puerto Ricans that they were the equals of their “co-citizens of the North.”
Cordero expressed the complex paradigm of Puerto Rican national identities that
August 13 in Korea: “For fifty-four years we, the Puerto Ricans, have lived under the
political tutelage of our co-citizens of the North. We have assimilated their entrepreneur
spirit and industrial skills; and fed our soul and thoughts with the most sacred of men’s
attributes: their admiration and respect for freedom, justice and equality.” Puerto Ricans,
in Cordero’s opinion, had assimilated and embraced what the United States represented,
but without ceasing to be Puerto Ricans or “without adulterating our Hispanic heritage,
nor have we soiled it with artificial trends of Sajonic assimilation: and without relegating
our Hispanic culture, sentiments and traditions, which we conserve pure, like the most
precious legacy of our gallant and noble ancestors.”657
Nevertheless, Puerto Ricans had assimilated trends from American culture. It
would have been impossible not to do so after half a century of U.S. rule and after going
through the institutions set by the metropolis to Americanize its new subjects. But the
Puerto Ricans did not renounce their Anteamerican heritage but fused it with that of the
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newcomers. In the process, a new nationality identity slowly but surely emerged, finally
becoming hegemonic during the Korean War. The Puerto Rican soldier was instrumental
in making the new national identity hegemonic. The cultural and the political, the
insular and the continental, the Puerto Rican and the American could, according to the
soldiers’ and politicians’ discourse, coexist and strengthen each other. The words of two
Puerto Rican POWs may express this better. Released after two years of imprisonment in
a Chinese camp, Corporal Fernando Arroyo told a correspondent of the Pacific Stars &
Stripes, “They (the Chinese) often tell me about big trouble and revolution in Puerto Rico
because American [sic] exploits masses. I tell them I am American and they are liars.”
Master Sergeant Enrique R. Fernández, Arroyo’s prison mate, added: “We may come
from Puerto Rico and speak a different language but the communists could not take away
from us one thing, we are Americans.”658
As discussed earlier, the historical juncture of 1898 gave way to the development
of very complex national identities in Puerto Rico. This process was furthered by the
U.S. presence and active campaigns to Americanize the natives on the Island, but more
importantly, by the active support given by Puerto Rico’s political leadership to
cooperate militarily with the metropolis. This, many thought, would bring about the
decolonization of the Island, either by becoming a state of the union or an independent
republic. Paradoxically, military participation eventually made it easier for Puerto Ricans
to embrace an identity that allowed them to negotiate between being Americans and
Puerto Ricans or to be both simultaneously and hence, to embrace the Commonwealth
status.
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A heavy burden was placed on the Puerto Ricans during the Korean War because
of the strong support of the war effort championed by political leaders and the press.
Puerto Rico hailed the soldiers of the 65th as heroes, even before they reached Korea.
Editorials talked about the role of the Puerto Rican soldier as a catalyst for forging a new
modern Puerto Rican nationality.659 Military participation was equated with patriotic
duty and the defense of the nation, and the men of the 65th were singled out as the
quintessential example of what it meant to be Puerto Rican. Consequently, the Puerto
Rican community felt obliged to either volunteer for military service or actively support
the war effort on the home front. In short, many Puerto Ricans came to believe their duty
to defend the American nation.
Since the very early days of U.S. domination over the Island, politicians and the
press sought to hasten the decolonization process by using colonial instruments, and in
this case the metropolis’ military. In the end, however, a midpoint was chosen when it
became obvious that military participation had not moved Puerto Ricans toward either
full assimilation or full rejection of American culture and values. If the project of nation
building through military service had passed from metropolitan to Creole control during
WWII, during the Korean War such project became popularized. As peasants and urban
workers continued to join in mass the armies of the metropolis and to support the
Populares’ project of social justice and the economic restructuring of the Island, their
views with respect to identity, political and cultural, became hegemonic. Unable to
convince his constituency of the viability of independence, incapable of winning
elections without the support of the masses, and aware of the significance of military
659
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service (and federal aid and support) for the reconstruction of the socio-economic
structures in the Island, Muñoz Marín and the Populares revived and championed a
political status which they thought offered the space for development and growthpolitically, culturally, socially and economically speaking. When the Puerto Rican
soldier became the embodiment of the Commonwealth formula, the political leaders
involved in its design were in fact responding to the peasants and urban worker’s
complex identities as reflected and empowered by their military service. Among other
things, their national identities compelled them to defend the “American Nation” to show
their Puertorriqueñidad. As such, the new status, at least for the time being, offered a
space where most Puerto Ricans could feel comfortable.
Former Governor of Puerto Rico, Rexford G. Tugwell predicted in 1958;
The [Commonwealth] Constitution might prove so satisfactory that it would
arrest furthest progress towards union, at least temporarily, and would also make
it impossible for Muñoz’s successors to press farther towards independence.660
The constitution indeed proved satisfactory to both American politicians and
Puerto Ricans. The United States was able to shield itself against charges of colonialism
and to proclaim itself as the true champion of the free world. In late 1952, the
government of Puerto Rico asked President Truman to stop presenting annual reports on
Puerto Rico before the United Nations, which led the international organization to
remove the Island from the list of non-self-governing territories on November 27,
1953.661 For a while, Puerto Rico became a miracle, a window for the underdeveloped
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world to see what could be accomplished by aligning itself with the United States. For
Puerto Ricans the Estado Libre Asociado offered a high degree of sovereignty that few
thought possible at the time while retaining its relation to the United States. It also
brought a respite to a people that had been fighting for a change in their colonial status
for over fifty years. Both Puerto Ricans and Americans grew comfortable with the
Commonwealth, perhaps too comfortable, and over fifty years later the Island still has the
same political status.662
Epilogue:
Those Puerto Rican soldiers, who celebrated the creation of the Commonwealth
by raising the now legal Puerto Rican flag and by playing the national anthem in a
forgotten hill in Korea, made another symbolic contribution to the emerging nation. The
Puerto Rican danza, "La Borinqueña", composed in 1867 as a Creole version of the
European waltz and quickly banned by the Spanish authorities, had been for a long time
the unofficial anthem of the Island. In 1922, the director of the 65th regimental band
adapted “La Borinqueña” to be used as the regiment’s march. In July 24, 1952 that
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version became the official anthem of the Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico.
Unbeknownst to these soldiers, their regiment, el sesenta y cinco had safeguarded that
expression of Puertoricaness.
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CONCLUSION
Usually, when metropolitan powers and empires engage in transforming the
socio-economic and political structures of the colonies or territories under their sphere of
power, they call these projects “nation building” when in fact they are engaging primarily
in “state building”. Their efforts are better described as state-building because they focus
on creating or reimagining the public and private infrastructures that should allow for a
territory or country to operate according to the rules set by the hegemonic world power or
coalition, which are considered as modern and thus desirable. Among these structures
that make a country or territory “modern” are; sanitary-health facilities, a bank system
tied to western models, a public education system, political and judicial institutions that
resembles that of the dominant power, and of course, a professional military.
These institutions in fact serve to change the self-perception ( if not the loyalties)
of individuals and native groups in such territories, and since it is the metropolis’ desire
to do so, they are indeed engaging in nation building via state or institution building.
Hence, metropolitan powers do engage in “nation building” but only because the
structures they built or change in the colonies to create a state more in tune with the
metropolis, ultimately alters the socio-cultural identities of the colonial subjects and their
national identities.
It is worth considering that the metropolis is not really hegemonic in deciding
what the colonial subjects are to become. Local realities and idiosyncrasies more often
than not alter the metropolis’ designs. Institutions have to be adapted to such things as
climate and geography, and more importantly, to cultural differences. Moreover, as elite
colonial groups become engaged in the nation building process (an inevitable process
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since the metropolis needs them to secure the loyalty of the colonial masses)663 the
metropolis is forced to negotiate with pre-metropolis or emerging colonial elites with
regard to the socio-economic and political structures of the colony. Laura Briggs has
argued that "…internal power relations of gender, race, class, age, and so on, can be
worked out through the structure of colonialism (what structures are untouched by it)
without being in any meaningful sense determined by them."664 I do agree with the first
premise. Even within colonial structures there is space to negotiate internal power
relations, but I would add that these colonial institutions can also be turned around to
resist the metropolis. Furthermore, power relations are inevitably influenced by the
metropolitan structures, but the colonial subjects have a say in altering the nature of these
institutions too.
To some extent the degree of colonial or criollo engagement with the
metropolitan structures determines how liberal or at least how responsive to the colonial
subjects’ needs the metropolitan policies towards its colony are. The degree of criollo
participation in state and nation building projects is in itself influenced by the needs of
the metropolis. And, during periods of crisis, metropolitan-colonial negotiations tend to
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accelerate. The need to rely on local elites to command the support of the colonial masses
gradually leads to the Creolization of the institutions and projects set by the metropolis to
control or assimilate their subjects. When this happens, there is a chance that the nation
building project of the metropolis falls into the hands of a native elite. Depending on the
nature of the native coalitions gaining control over these projects, there is also the
possibility that eventually such projects and the institutions devised to carry them out,
become popularized and that a very pluralistic polity supported by flexible and open
national identities becomes hegemonic.
As per our case, the more that Spain was able to exclude those born in Puerto
Rico from the colonial administration and the military, the more repressive it became. As
discussed in chapter one, the Spanish colonial administration tried since the early
nineteenth century to restrain the power of colonial elites by reducing the presence of
those born in the Island in the colonial militias. However, it was not until the once vast
Spanish Empire was reduced to Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and some smaller
possessions, that the Spaniards were able to concentrate on closing all avenues to
enfranchisement, especially the military, to los hijos de este país. After the failed
insurrection of Lares in 1868 and the final exclusion of the Puerto Ricans from the
military, the liberal criollo political leadership moved towards autonomismo while the
exiled leadership joined revolutionary juntas in the United States and continued to
advocate for independence. By the dawn of Spanish control over the Island, the Iberian
metropolis also tried to keep the Island by passing the Carta Autonomica de 1897, but
this gesture came to late and only placated the criollo political elite as it did not change
the daily dynamics in Puerto Rico.
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Though the Spaniards were able to quench political insurrection until they finally
lost the Island to the U.S., they had alienated themselves from the general population
fueling the emergence of a distinct Puerto Rican national identity. As a matter of fact,
when the U.S. troops landed in Puerto Rico in 1898 the Spaniards could not rely on the
loyalty of the islanders. Four hundred years of history and dominance, however, are hard
to erase. The natives of Puerto Rico probably started to develop distinct national
identities during the last third of the nineteenth century, and while the vast majority felt
no loyalty towards Spain, they still retain a high degree of cultural affinity.
Under United States’ rule, access to military institutions for the “hijos de este
país” was reestablished while political participation- to a certain degree- was opened to
the masses. Soon after the U.S. seizure of the Island, Puerto Ricans started to replace
U.S. continental soldiers. From the beginning the new insular soldiers became elements
of the United States Army tightly controlled by the American colonial administration.
Additionally, the new metropolis gradually allowed for a higher degree of political
participation eventually creating the space for mass electoral enfranchisement. These two
apparently disconnected trends facilitated the transfer of sovereignty over the Island from
Spain to the United States, and, more importantly, they transformed the character of
Puerto Rican nationalities. The inclusion of Puerto Ricans in the armed forces of the
new metropolis, and mass political mobilization, especially of the rural sectors, gradually
led towards competing national identities.
The U.S. embarked in a comprehensive build up of the public education system,
(which was intended to Americanize and modernize the inhabitants of the Island
according to the metropolis’ standards), and launched massive sanitary and relief
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campaigns. Although cultural affinity might have been absent between Puerto Ricans
and Americans in 1898, the metropolis’ control of the education system allowed for the
projection of American material superiority disguised as cultural supremacy.
Furthermore, simultaneous sanitary and relief campaigns allowed for positive interaction
between the new metropolis and its colonial subjects. A special relation started to
emerge between the military and Puerto Rico’s population as military doctors and
engineers combed the mountains and towns of the Island building sanitary facilities,
roads, and schools and launched massive health and relief campaigns.
The fact that the military institutions, the political arena, and the public school
system were opened to previously disenfranchised groups began to profoundly alter the
islander’s national identities. Participation in U.S. institutions provided unifying
experiences for the Puerto Rican masses which allowed for the strengthening of their
national identity but with an American touch. Public schools offered a homogenized prometropolis oriented experience for hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans while the
opening of the U.S. military to groups previously excluded from it and other sectors of
Puerto Rico’s society conferred these groups with a sense of inclusion. Access to
education and military positions also offered an opportunity for mobility and the chance
to overthrow old socio-economic hierarchies, a phenomenon that led to the creation of
upwardly mobile classes and neo-elites who owed their wellbeing and their political
allegiance to the new metropolis.
The early American attempts to create a new Puerto Rican via military servicewhich were supported by the criollo elite, including supporters of independence- were
curtailed by the limited scope of the project. The small size of the United Sates military
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apparatus at the beginning of the twentieth century, limited the size of the military in
Puerto Rico and its effect on the population. Still, the re-mobilization of the Puerto
Ricans began during the first years of U.S. rule as Puerto Ricans came to wear U.S. Army
uniforms and replaced Continental troops garrisoning the Island.
It was not, however, until the First World War, when over 18,000 Puerto Ricans
served in the U.S. armed forces, that the U.S. had to heavily rely on the criollo elites to
mobilize militarily and lead thousands of Puerto Ricans. The chance could have not
come at a better time for Puerto Rican politicians who had started to aggressively
challenge colonial policies. The First World War provided the grounds to retry the
projects of Americanization and modernization via military service at levels previously
unimaginable and with more players involved.
The coming of the war temporarily brought to power the staunchly pro-American
Republicanos who were the first to embrace President Wilson’s 100 percent
Americanism discourse, and to tie it to their own political goal of federated statehood.
By the war’s end, however, by turning President Wilson’s promise of ending the
hyphenations in the American nation into a call for a “New Americanism” that promoted
creating a new Puerto Rican out of Hispanic gallantry and Anglo-Saxon industrialism, the
autonomistas within Unión had found an image they could use to sell as a third way, the
Libre Asociación, to the general population. This was in essence a return to Eugenio
Maria de Hostos and Rosendo Matienzo Cintron’s early idea of Americanizing the Puerto
Rican, which for them meant creating a modern political individual without losing the
essence of Puertorriqueñismo,665 only this time, economic modernization superseded

665

See discussion in Chapter 2.
317

political modernization. The autonomistas had found a new philosophy and an agent to
incarnate it. There could be a space for the Anglo-Saxon and Hispanic cultures to
coexist. The Jíbaro would be that new man and Puerto Rico that new space.
After the Armistice, however, the Jíbaro soldiers were quickly demobilized and
returned to the hills and coastal valleys. Neither the metropolis nor the colonial
administration created vocational or educational projects to facilitate these soldiers’
readjustment into civilian society. The promises of a new Jíbaro, integrated into the
economy as its driving force, and as the “new teachers of freedom and democracy,”
remained unfulfilled. The autonomistas of the 1920s were not able to fully exploit or
develop their new popular philosophy, but the seed had been planted for the generation
coming of age during the war, and they would retake this narrative decades later.
The imposition of U.S. citizenship previous to U.S. entry into the war, the mass
participation of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. military, the newly created Puerto Rico
National Guard, and the willing support of the newly elected Puerto Rican legislature for
the war effort, temporarily cemented U.S. control over the Island, and more importantly,
over the islanders’ loyalty to the metropolis. As some supporters of the metropolis
argued during the war years, the unwillingness or inability of the vast majority of the
Puerto Ricans to resist becoming American citizens and their determination to participate
in the war reflected the impact that the institutions of the new metropolis had had on the
Puerto Ricans. That same institutional influence would lead the Puerto Ricans to expect,
if not equality, at least more political and socioeconomic opportunities.
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The mass mobilization of the Puerto Rican peasantry and urban workers, and the
initial enthusiasm shown by the inductees hid the fact that control over the military
apparatus in the Island was no longer the exclusive prerogative of the American colonial
administrators. The traditional and emerging criollo elites, as well as the professional
classes, had to be called upon to train and lead the massive army of peasants soldiering in
the Island. Out of sheer necessity, the metropolis broadly opened the officer’s corps to
los hijos de este país providing in the process the tools for the local elites and emerging
professional classes to attain and consolidate political power.
criollo leaders, which for different reasons and with different goals in mind
supported the war effort, by the war’s end, had succeeded in wresting exclusive control
over the nation-building project via military service from the metropolitan authorities.
The “Creolization” of both the military and the project of nation-building had begun.
This situation, even if not immediately apparent in the post-war years, would eventually
put the local elites in a better political position than they had been before the WWI.
Oblivious to the transformation occurring in Puerto Rico, the metropolis was slow to
respond to these challenges, and no major political changes would take place after 1917
until yet another war, the Second World War rekindled the strategic importance of the
Island.
Before the outbreak of the Second World War Puerto Rico experienced natural
disasters, the Great Depression, and the end of political stability. The emergence of the
Nationalist Party as a radical force under the leadership of Pedro Albizu Campos is one
of the most striking characteristics of this period. Albizu Campos, in Anderson’s jargon,
was one of many colonial subjects who discovered the “limit of their inward ascension”
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during his educational pilgrimage to the metropolis. According to Anderson, awareness
of their exclusion from the metropolitan power circles would become the basis for the
colonial subjects to see themselves as “nationals” separate from the metropolis.666
Initially staunchly pro-American, Albizu Campos would eventually lead his followers in
a virulent anti-U.S. campaign in an attempt to create the Republic of Puerto Rico. The
Nationalists of the 1930s resorted to underlining the differences between Continental
Americans and Puerto Ricans while emphasizing Hispanic traditions. Recognizing the
relevance of military traditions in the Island and the impact that military institutions were
having on the population, the Nacionalistas created their own paramilitary units.
The Nacionalistas’ failure to win the support of a sizeable portion of the
population was also a rejection of their iconography and their emphasis on Spanish
traditions. After all, at the time, the majority of Puerto Ricans had been born under U.S.
sovereignty, and those lucky enough to have been schooled had been exposed to a
curriculum based on the New England public school model. The Nationalist’s nostalgic
discovery of the “Hispanic” past was an alien concept to the Puerto Rican masses of the
1930s, except for the elites who still traced their lineage to the Peninsula. Moreover, for
all means and purposes, the Nacionalista “rediscovery” of the Island’s Hispanic past was
incongruent with the drive towards progress and a modern Puerto Rico. Both progress
and modernization, and hints at industrialization, were at the core of federal efforts to
improve Puerto Rico’s socio-economic condition. The Nacionalistas could not compete
with the metropolis’ material superiority which implied a vague promise of a better
future. Hence, the combination of violent acts, the lack of an alternative path forward,
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the disconnection with the masses socio-economic realities, and the emphasis in Spanish
tradition were as responsible for the Nacionalistas’ demise in the 1930s as was political
persecution.
Old metropolitan ideas regarding the impact of military training on Puerto Rico’s
social and economic structures resurfaced during the Second World War.667 This was not
a new theory. Immediately after the 1898 invasion and during WWI, military service
had been consider as a builder of character and national identity and as a way to remake
the Puerto Ricans in the Continental’s image. But even in WWI, the metropolis’ nationbuilding project, which heavily relied on modernizing the Puerto Rican via military
service, had started to escape the hands of the metropolitan administrators. History
repeated itself during WWII as the plans of the metropolis- including type, size, and
length of mobilization had to contend with an empowered Puerto Rican senate led by
such a popular and skillful politician as Muñoz Marín. Moreover, Muñoz Marín worked
incessantly to make the Puerto Rican soldier an integral part of the socio-economic
restructuring of the Island.
By the end of the war, control of the nation and state-building project via military
service was firmly in the Populares’ hands. The U.S. military had envisioned service as
a way to build a new Puerto Rican and a new Puerto Rico, as early as 1898- and most
certainly during WWI. This project, however, came to bear fruit when it was
appropriated by Puerto Ricans. Nonetheless, the military in Puerto Rico, be it the
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The Christian Science Monitor after pointing out that 35% of the Island’s
population was illiterate, argued that “trained Army officers are inculcating in thousands
of Puerto Ricans improved ideas of diet, education, and sanitation which they believe
will contribute to raising the standards of domestic and community life when the war is
over.” Christian Science Monitor, April 7 1943.
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National Guard or the regular Army units, remained part of the United States military and
depended entirely of federal funds to function. This could only allow for a third path as
the Populares continue to employ the military for nation and state building. The
military relevance of the Island, the immense size of the U.S. military and the Puerto
Rican contingent (with over 65,000 islanders serving in the U.S. armed forces), allowed
for the Creolization of the military and of the agencies in charge of reconstructing the
socio-economic structures of the Island. Very tellingly, Puerto Rican military officers
came to preside over many of these agencies and openly supported Muñoz Marín and the
reconstruction effort.
The first mobilization of the Puerto Ricans during WWII was more political in
nature than military, and it happened in 1940 with the Populares first electoral victory.
The second mobilization of the Puerto Ricans was, in fact, military as the Island became
an integral part of the U.S. war effort and Puerto Ricans were called to arms. This effort
had strong economic impact in terms of federal monies transferred to Puerto Rico and
unemployment relief. The third mobilization was social in nature as the Puerto Rican
soldiers moved from the fields to the classrooms and put to good use the skills learned
while in the military and the benefits to which they were entitled through the G.I. Bill of
1944. WWII ended with the Island moving towards socio-economic restructuring very
rapidly and with LMM beginning to accept the third way, the commonwealth.
It was the Jíbaro who started to convince politicians of the third way, a hybridism
that allowed for a political identity and a cultural one to coexist. Muñoz Marín’s change
of heart with regard to independence was thus Jíbaro inspired and popular in nature.
Initially a tactical decision born out of the need of securing the vote of the peasantry and
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urban workers which did not see independence as a solution to their everyday problems,
the idea that the “Status no está en issue” became a kind of end in itself as political
decolonization took a backseat and socio-economic decolonization became imperative.
Many have branded this change as a sellout or the cooptation of the people’s will, but in
fact Muñoz Marín was responding to the masses’ needs and will, which at this historical
junction coincided with one of the greatest social reconfigurations in U.S. and Puerto
Rican history. When WWII ended and during the immediate post war years, the Island
moved rapidly to achieve the socio-economic change envisioned by Muñoz Marín and
the Populares.
Benedict Anderson has argued that a final wave of nationalism occurred during
the post war era, especially in Asia and Africa and that it was directly linked to the those
colonial subjects who made the educational peregrination to the metropolis and found
out they belong to another “family”. These nationalist movements seeking political
independence were led by “lonely bilingual intelligentsias unattached to sturdy local
bourgeois,” which read another language. This intelligentsia, however, was able to
“bypass print in propagating the imagined communities” not only to illiterate masses but
to “literate masses reading different languages.”668 It is tempting to fit what happened in
Puerto Rico into Anderson’s “final wave”. After all, Muñoz Marín, the architect of the
final commonwealth formula, for a time spoke a language different to that of the masses,
at least symbolically. Moreover, his campaigns were marked by the use of radio
speeches to circumvent both the difficulties of traveling in the Island and illiteracy. But
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instead of asserting this formula, I propose that a different wave of nationalism visited the
Island.
Creolization of the military and other metropolitan institutions paved the way for
another phenomenon, which I call “Popularization”. As Creolization yields to
Popularization, the former metropolitan institutions, originally intended to change the
colonial subjects into something more attuned with the metropolitan master, can turn into
tools for resisting complete assimilation. This metamorphosis may occur when the
metropolis finds itself in need of the colonial subjects’ manpower- as in WWII- and the
military, and other metropolitan institutions have to open to the masses. In this instance
the military can become a type of megaphone for the masses to express their voices- and
there is a real chance of altering both the metropolis and the criollo elites’ plans. If the
military and its project of nation and state-building had fallen in the hands of the criollo
elites during WWII, the process of “Popularization” had already begun as the native
political leaders owed too much to these soldiers.
During WWII the Populares used military service to begin their project of social
justice and succeeded in gaining control over metropolitan institutions. As discussed
earlier, Florencia Mallon has argued that the degree of military, paramilitary, and
political mobilization of peasants and indigenous groups contributes to the depth of the
liberal spirit of a country’s polity. She believes that political groups considered as class
not only sense a stake in nation state formation but also seek to participate on its design.
Participation, she argues, is contested at the local level and filtered through regional
politics until it moves towards the national level where negotiation continues and a
contract is reached among contesting forces. Mallon calls this stage hegemony, a process
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that will continue endlessly as counter-hegemonic forces keep challenging the hegemonic
entity or polity.669 Subaltern groups, she contends, have initiated projects for “collective
identity based on a premise of citizenship available to all, and with individual
membership beginning with the presumption of equality.”670 In other words, subaltern
groups have taken the challenge of national democratic discourses and attempted to
create their own version of a more egalitarian practice trying to make real the unfulfilled
promises of nation and democracy.671 Mallon thus emphasizes the construction of
alternative national projects, (popular, inclusive and liberal), through the political and
military mobilization of peasants and other subaltern groups during periods of crisis.
When subaltern groups are successfully integrated within the new hegemonic coalition,
the popular sectors are incorporated into the country’s polity and economy and the state
becomes a real negotiator between labor and capital while embarking on land reform.
The combination of these factors attests to the liberal spirit of a hegemonic political
alliance based in a national populist discourse. By the end of WWII, the political and
military mobilization of popular sectors in the Island started the drive towards a popular,
inclusive and liberal national project and in the process the project of political
decolonization would take another meaning.
The next mobilization of the Puerto Rican happened after the military and the
nation and state building projects had been creolized and took place during the Korean
War, and during this war the military became fully popularized. This mobilization had a
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socio-political character nature and was essential in the creation of the Estado Libre
Asociado in 1952. Korea would become a propaganda war for sponsors of the third way
which entailed a new Puerto Rican for a new Puerto Rico. During this war, military
service not only served as a path to political and socio-economic enfranchisement for the
Puerto Rican peasantry and urban workers, it also allowed for their national identities to
become hegemonic and to translate into the political realm by virtue of the Estado Libre
Asociado. That is not to say that everyone welcomed the ELA or the philosophy behind
it. In fact, pro-Annexation groups, echoing the Independentistas in the Island, soon
denounced it as a farce.672 But the ELA’s creation had a very popular, liberal, and
pluralistic origin supported by an alternative conception of the Puerto Ricans’ national
identities.
The tens of thousands of Puerto Ricans turned soldiers during WWII and Korea
had the opportunity to become part of an emerging or broadening middle class. The
masses cultural discourse was characterized by neither a rejection nor an acceptance of
the 100% Americanism espoused by some metropolitan agents and native politicians, or
the Hispanic revival of the nationalist movement. Instead, their discourse was a hybrid
672

The Independentistas had their best showing ever obtaining 126,228 votes, the
Estadistas obtained 85.591, the Socialistas 21,719 and the Populares 431,409. The
Populares won the Governorship, and the Resident Commissioner post, the 8 senatorial
districts, and 40 district representatives. They also elected 14 of 22 senators at large and
all of the municipalities. Though the Independentistas became the biggest opposition
block, replacing the Estadistas, the growth was short lived and in the elections of 1956
the Estadistas would once more become the leading opposition party. The Populares
would not really face a challenge until 1968-the second election after Muñoz Marín’s
retirement from public life- when Luis A. Ferré, running for the Partido Nuevo
Progresista, won the governorship. However, the PNP did not become a serious threat to
the PPD until the elections of 1976, when the political system in the Island evolved into a
two- party system. All the while, the Independentistas continued their decline becoming
a permanent minority. See Bayrón Toro, Elecciones y partidos políticos de Puerto Rico,
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popular language which fused and accepted Americanism and Hispanismo, as well as
other cultural influences, as they understood them. The popular hybrid culture inched its
way forward to eventually become the dominant cultural and political discourse. Had
tens of thousands of Puerto Rican peasants and urban workers not been mobilized for war
and then enfranchised, such popular discourse would have had a hard time becoming
politically hegemonic.
This discourse was hard to accept by the nationalists. For the Nacionalistas, the
“Nation” could not survive; in fact it had no purpose at all if it did not have its own
independent state. Becoming an independent state to secure the survival of the nation
went from being the means to becoming the end as Nacionalistas were willing to
sacrifice every last Puerto Rican to obtain an independent Puerto Rico. This narrow
vision put them at odds with most Puerto Ricans. Puerto Ricans obviously identified
culturally with the Island - though the influence of fifty years of U.S. institutions was
noticeable in every aspect of Puerto Rican life- but politically, they identified with the
U.S. In effect, even to this day Nacionalismo expresses itself in every possible cultural
form but does not translate into political power.673 For the Nacionalistas the “Nation”
was an ideal, a concept higher than the Puerto Ricans themselves. For they imagine the
Puerto Rican nation as a sovereign political entity, as a Republic. The Populares on the
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other hand came to consider the Puerto Ricans to be the “Nation”. Thus, political
sovereignty in the form of an independent state came second to the welfare of the people.
In fact, when Muñoz Marín and metropolitan leaders backed the creation of the ELA,
they were responding to the variegated essence of Puerto Rican national identities.
Muñoz Marín and Albizu Campos were part of the intelligentsia that Benedict
Anderson identifies as the future leaders of national movement of decolonization. Albizu
Campos, after his pilgrimage to the metropolis was never able to speak again the
language of the masses for he never understood that many Puerto Ricans had come to
adopt traits of American culture as their own. Muñoz Marín, who was at heart a
nationalist and a fervent Independentista, learned to speak the language of the people.
And as a true nationalist, he put aside his personal preferences in favor of the people’s
will who are after all the embodiment of the nation.
The institutions and plans of the metropolis- and of the criollo elites- may have
been changed by the masses, but in the process the masses were changed as well. After
fifty years of U.S. dominance, Puerto Ricans identities were divided into a very Puerto
Rican cultural side (which mainstream mainly identified with Hispanic legacy), albeit
with a heavy American influence, and a political identity attuned mostly with the precepts
of Americanism. Puerto Rican society- where the political meets the cultural- provided
the space for these two identities to merge. Nobody expressed the hybridism of Puerto
Rican identities better than the Puerto Rican soldiers who thought their duty was to
defend the American Nation, to which they thought they belonged, because it was their
duty as Puerto Ricans. In this regard we can then find Puerto Ricans serving in the U.S.
military during the Korean War, with the overwhelming support of the population, who
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were proud of their Puertoricaness and who saw no incongruence with proving their
Puertorriqueñidad by defending the American nation and wearing a U.S. Army uniform.
The colonial subjects going through these institutions- with the cheering of the criollo
elites- found it hard not to be receptive to the metropolis’ tenets. And thus, these soldiers
who among many other things cited “freedom”, “democracy”, “fighting for our nation”,
“defending our nation in peril”; had in fact adopted much of the metropolis’ creed, even
if creolized or popularized, and even with the inherent contradictions of a colonial subject
fighting for his nation while wearing the uniform of the metropolis. By bleeding
alongside the soldiers of the United Nations in Korea, the Puerto Rican soldiers would
become the heroes of the emerging nation.
But as Mallon warns us, hegemony is always in contestation. Soon after the
creation of the Commonwealth, the criollo elites tried to create a sanctioned national
identity to fit the new state’s official discourse. Arlene Dávila has argued that that after
Puerto Rico became a commonwealth, the PPD sought to counter the pro-independence
movement, and thus secure the survival of the commonwealth, by appropriating the
Nationalist Party’s icons and discourse. The PPD’s appropriation of the nationalist
discourse and imagery, Dávila argues, led to the neutralization of independence as a
political option.674 Here she misses the point, for Muñoz Marín abandoned independence
as an immediate political goal after he became disenchanted with the cold reception that
the masses in Puerto Rico gave to the idea of independence in 1936. He did not
appropriate the symbols of Puerto Rican nationalism. He identified them correctly and
altered his political posture accordingly. Moreover, he did so only after spending another
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decade trying to secure independence for the Island, after realizing that important groups
in the United States were starting to favor statehood for the Island, and recognizing that
he would not command the loyalty of the Puerto Rican peasantry and urban worker if he
moved towards independence. Most notably, Dávila has argued that the creation of the
Racial Triad- the “brave and gallant” Spaniard, the “noble” Taino, and the “strong” Black
African- to encapsulate Puerto Rican culture and identities, was the ELA’s attempt to
consolidate its position, and defeat the Independentista movement, by dominating
cultural identities in the Island. The racial triad, however, was not an attempt to move the
Island away from independence or Puertorriqueñismo, but a last ditch effort to hinder
further Americanization. In essence, the new state sponsored identity was intended to roll
back half a century of American influence. Nonetheless, the Popularization of the
metropolis institutions meant that the criollo elite lost control over the Islanders’ national
identities. New national identities emerged in the Island, but they were and remain
impossible to be controlled by the state.
A word on the fate of the Jíbaro;
As was the case for WWII veterans, the majority of the Puerto Rican soldiers who
fought in Korea came from the mountains, sugar cane plantations and the urban working
classes. And, once more, the returning Jíbaro-Soldier would renounce subsistence
agriculture or life as a sugar cane-cutter. Many would become the technocrats and
technicians of the Puerto Rican “industrial miracle” and would join a broadening middle
class. But they did not renounce their identity. In fact many of those Jíbaro/soldiers,
who went on to study and became professionals and/or remained in the National Guard,
subsidized their plots of land with the income from their new professions. Ironically, the
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Jíbaro, a heavily romanticized figure to be sure and the quintessential icon of the
Populares, and of modern nationalist and independent movements in the Island, survived
as such in great part due to military service.
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